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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE INFLUENCE OF LIFE DOMAINS ON ADOLESCENT AND ADULT
OFFENDING: TESTING AN EXTENSION OF AGNEW’S GENERAL THEORY

More than a decade has passed since Agnew (2005) introduced his General
Theory of Crime and Delinquency (GTCD). Despite this interval, GTCD remains a
relatively untested theory. Drawing on previous testing efforts, the current research
provides a systematic assessment of Agnew's theoretical propositions. It also provides
only the second empirical examination of Cochran's (2015) extension of GTCD, which
incorporates religion as a sixth distinct life domain. Nested negative binomial regression
modeling and Poisson regression modeling are used to assess the effects of life domains
on several diverse forms of self-reported criminal behavior at two distinct stages of
development: adolescence and adulthood. Data are drawn from two waves of the second
generation of the Kaplan Longitudinal and Multigenerational Study. Consistent with prior
empirical tests, results provide mixed support for theoretical propositions, highlighting
the complexity of Agnew’s initial theory. Specifically, general support is provided for the
direct effects of both theories’ variables, indicating they are important to the explanation
of crime. Also, in line with Cochran's findings, initial observed effects of religious
variables on criminal behavior are reduced to non-significance when all other predictors
are introduced in most regression models, hinting that the incorporation of such variables
may be incongruous with Agnew's chosen method of theoretical integration. However,
religious variables emerge as significant predictors of general crime during adulthood,
suggesting that the relationship between these variables and crime is more complex than
anticipated. Additionally, strong support is found for the proposition that the effects of
life domains are primarily contemporaneous. Results offer weaker support, however, for
the assertion that life domain effects are largely mediated by constraints against crime
and motivations towards it. Policy implications for the creation of theoretically-informed
crime prevention and intervention strategies tailored to specific developmental stage are
discussed.
KEYWORDS: Crime and Deviance, Correlates of Crime, Criminological Theory,
Constraints, Motivations, Life Domains
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Why do criminals offend? Agnew (2005) poses this question as the title of one of
his manuscripts on criminal behavior. This seemingly simple and innocuous question has
proven exceptionally complex and difficult to answer. Indeed, criminologists have
disagreed, sometimes vehemently and bitterly, on which factors cause criminal behavior
for decades. This highlights the importance of such a question for the social sciences, as
providing a satisfactory answer to it is the chief goal of the majority of criminological
theories. Such disagreement has produced a large number of theoretical explanations for
crime and ensuing research has yielded a high number of empirically-verified correlates
of crime (Bernard 1990; Bernard and Snipes 1996). Despite this, there exists much debate
and little consensus on the true causes of crime.
According to Sutherland (1939), scientific inquiry in the discipline of criminology
is broadly separated into three primary areas: the sociology of criminal law, the sociology
and social psychology of crime and criminal behavior, and the sociology of punishment.
For this reason, criminological theories typically address “lawmaking, lawbreaking, and
law enforcing” (Akers, Sellers, and Jennings 2017:2). In other words, these theories
either attempt to account for the design and evolution of the law, to explain criminal and
deviant behavior, or to describe methods of crime control and law enforcement. The
second variant may be referred to as the etiology of crime, as such theories generate
predictions about the causes of various forms of proscribed behavior. Etiological theories
of crime far outnumber theories of the law; within this domain alone rest such notable
families of theory as strain and anomie, social control, social disorganization, social
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learning, development and life course, rational choice and deterrence, and labeling,
among many others. Indeed, scholars routinely identify as many as fifteen distinct
families of etiological theory (Akers et al. 2017; Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould 2016;
Weisburd and Piquero 2008). It is precisely for this reason that criminology as a
discipline is accused of suffering from an abundance of theoretical explanations of
behavior (Bernard and Snipes 1996; Bernard et al. 2016; Elliott 1985; Liska, Krohn, and
Messner 1989; Muftić 2009; Weisburd and Piquero 2008).
There exist two primary means of addressing the problem of theoretical
overcrowding in criminology, with each aiming to reduce the overall number of extant
theories and enhance the discipline’s ability to explain its dependent variable (i.e., illicit
or otherwise prohibited behavior). First, theory competition, or falsification, refers to the
process of testing the propositions of various extant theories against one another as a
means of empirically supporting one theory and falsifying the other. Falsified theories are
subsequently disregarded. The second option is theoretical integration. This process
entails combining some or all elements of disparate theories to produce a new
explanation of criminal behavior. Where there once may have existed several separate
theories, a single, integrated theory remains. Elliott, Ageton, and Canter (1979) are noted
for their attempt at the theoretical integration of strain, social control, and social learning
theories into a unified explanation. In fact, this early attempt is widely regarded as the
catalyst that ignited a major debate regarding the methods and merits of integration in
criminology.
Theoretical integration enjoyed substantial initial interest (Akers 1973;
Braithwaite 1989; Burgess and Akers 1966; Krohn 1986; Thornberry 1987) and remains
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a popular contemporary alternative to theory competition (Agnew 1992, 2005; Akers
1998; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Colvin 2000; Farrington 2005; Messner and Rosenfeld
2012; Moffitt 1993; Robinson 2004; Sampson and Laub 1995; Thornberry 1987; Tittle
1995, 2004). Note that the aforementioned citations indicate works that propose
integrated theories of crime. Integrated explanations have also garnered scholarly
attention in that they inspire empirical testing efforts. For instance, Weisburd and Piquero
(2008) analyzed 169 published tests of sixteen families of theory between 1968 and 2005.
Of these, studies testing integrated theories accounted for 5.9% of the entire sample.
Additionally, Pratt and colleagues (2010) performed a meta-analysis of empirical tests of
social learning theory, an integrated theory, in which they examined the results of 133
published studies between 1974 and 2003.
Robert Agnew is one of the strongest advocates for theoretical integration. He has
proposed multiple integrated theories and authored several defenses of and
recommendations for the practice of integration (Agnew 1992, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2011,
2013a, 2013b, 2016, with White 1992). Agnew’s (2005) General Theory of Crime and
Deviance (GTCD) is one of his most recent integrated attempts to explain human
behavior. It represents a notable departure from his (1992) exceedingly famous general
strain theory (GST), which is one of the leading and most widely-tested explanations of
deviance in the field of criminology. GTCD primarily integrates elements of strain,
control, rational choice, deterrence, and social learning theories to explain the
mechanisms by which reduced constraints against crime and increased motivations
towards it ultimately increase one’s likelihood of criminal and deviant behavior. Agnew
(2005) argues that the variables affecting one’s constraints and motivations have common
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root causes, and thus should be grouped according to these roots in categories referred to
as life domains. The five life domains of family, self, peer, school, and employment
include all variables that may affect crime and are said to be the true causes of criminal
and deviant behavior, exhibiting both direct and indirect effects on illicit behavior.
Agnew’s (2005) integration of numerous disparate theories into a unified
explanation aims to reduce the number of extant criminological theories and to
parsimoniously explain all forms of criminal and deviant behavior, in all social contexts,
among people inhabiting all social strata. Therefore, if empirically supported, it may
reduce the abundance of criminological theories and explain a greater variety of criminal
and deviant behavior. GTCD is also potentially valuable as it may significantly improve
the discipline’s ability to explain and predict criminal behavior, which builds credibility
for the field. In his review of integration attempts, Elliott (1985) demonstrates how such
theories indeed result in a greater level of overall explanatory power. Overall, he finds an
average net increase of 4 percentage points and a relative increase of 12 percent over
previous explanations of criminal behavior. However, in their more recent review of the
literature, Weisburd and Piquero (2008) find that integrated theories explain slightly less
variation in crime than the average for all theories tested. The potential for increased
explanatory power also has practical implications as it facilitates the formulation of
policies that have an enhanced probability of effecting real, positive change. GTCD is
also an age-graded theory, as Agnew specifies that the effects various variables exhibit on
crime change according to the developmental stage inhabited by the individual. This
means that policies and interventions derived from its propositions may be tailored
according to developmental stage, further increasing the likelihood of their success.
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Agnew’s GTCD is at once an attempt to reduce the number of explanations in
criminology and a case study in the consequences of theoretical overcrowding. Despite
its ambitious goal and resultant potential utility for all areas of crime and justice, GTCD
remains a severely understudied theory. It was born into an overabundance of theoretical
explanations and remains buried among a plethora of theories of deviant behavior
(Bernard 1990; Bernard and Snipes 1996). This scholarly neglect is evidenced by the
mere handful of empirical tests to which it has subjected since its inception over a decade
ago (Cochran 2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014;
Zhang, Day, and Cao 2012). This poses several problems, as theories must be evaluated
in order to determine their worth to the field (Akers et al. 2017). First, one cannot
ascertain the theory’s ability to explain crime and deviance. As such, the goal of theory
reduction through integration cannot be reached. Additionally, its arguments cannot be
used to effect positive change in the form of crime reduction and intervention policies.
Similarly, the theory has not seen significant revision or improvement. In fact, only one
scholar (Cochran 2015) has proposed any such revision, extending GTCD to include an
additional set of predictor variables. Specifically, Cochran introduces religion a sixth life
domain, arguing that religious commitment and involvement should significantly
decrease the likelihood of criminal and deviant behavior.
Further, those few empirical tests that exist are limited in a number of ways.
Specifically, they exhibit limitations related to sample characteristics, methodology, and
theory interpretation. This small pool of tests and their inherent limitations identifies a
key gap in the scientific literature surrounding this potentially important theory.
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The Current Study
The goal of this dissertation is to empirically investigate the claims of GTCD and
assess its explanatory power. In doing so, this dissertation aims to add to and improve
upon the small pool of literature surrounding the GTCD by providing the most
comprehensive test to date. This is accomplished by taking careful measures to avoid the
shortcomings of previous testing efforts, investigating a number of the theory’s
propositions, utilizing a large number of items to construct variables within each life
domain, incorporating a large sample drawn from two waves of data, and examining a
number of criminal outcome variables.
This dissertation also aims to explore the utility of extending the general theory to
include religion as a sixth and separate life domain by providing only the second test of
Cochran’s (2015) General Theory of Crime and Deviance-Extended (GTCD-E). Though
it is the second test, the current research utilizes a significantly larger sample than that
employed by Cochran. Testing the propositions of GTCD and GTCD-E allows for an
assessment of value in terms of explanatory power. This facilitates the reduction of the
number of criminological theories and improves the discipline’s ability to explain
criminal and deviant behavior. It also enables the creation of theoretically-informed and
empirically-validated social control policies that permit targeted intervention and
prevention efforts based on one’s developmental stage.
Research questions.
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD proposes that crime is most likely when constraints
against it are low and motivations towards it are high. It further specifies that the
variables causing constraints and motivations to either attenuate or strengthen have root
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causes and are best sorted into clusters called life domains. That is, the variables that
affect constraints and motivations may be separated into mutually exclusive categories
related to the family, self, peer, school, and employment arenas in one’s life. As the true
causes of crime, they are composed of variables exhibiting both direct and indirect effects
on crime. Life domain variables should exhibit a direct effect on crime and deviance, as
well as an indirect effect through their influence on constraints and motivations.
Research Question 1: Are all five life domains directly related to recent criminal
behavior? Specifically, do each of Agnew’s five life domains, and the variables
within them, exhibit a direct effect on such crime?
Research Question 2: Are the effects of life domain variables on recent crime
mediated by constraints against it and motivations towards it?
Another argument Agnew (2005) proposes is that the life domains with the largest
effect on crime vary according to one’s stage of development. In other words, different
life domains, and specific variables within them, exhibit greater or lesser effect sizes
depending upon the life stage inhabited by the individual. During adolescence, the self
and peer domains are expected to have a large effect on crime, relative to others.
Additionally, in adulthood, the self, peer, family, and employment domains are predicted
to exert the largest relative effects on criminal behavior.
Research Question 3: Do the life domain variables with the largest relative effect
on crime vary according to one’s developmental stage in the manner predicted by
the general theory? That is, do the life domain variables with the greatest effect in
adolescence differ from those in adulthood?
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As a general theory, Agnew’s theoretical propositions should apply to all forms of
crime in all contexts committed by all types of offenders.
Research Question 4: Does the general theory predict all types of criminal
behavior? Specifically, do the causal variables and the size of their effects differ
in predicting general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime?
Agnew’s (2005) theory also contends that life domains exhibit both
contemporaneous and lagged effects on crime. In other words, life domain variables
should exhibit an effect on recent crime and an effect on crime at a later developmental
stage. Further, contemporaneous effects are expected to be larger than lagged effects as
“crime is largely a function of current constraints and motivations rather than those
experienced in the past” (Agnew 2005:124).
Research Question 5: Are life domain variables more strongly related to recent,
rather than future, criminal behavior?
Cochran (2015) extends the general theory to include religion as a sixth life
domain. He contends that the key variables within this domain are religiosity and
religiousness. The former refers to the frequency of engaging in religious practices, while
the latter is “the integration of religion and God into one’s daily life” (2015:9). He
combines elements of both into a single scale referred to as religious commitment. In his
analysis, Cochran finds that religious commitment significantly decreases academic
dishonesty among his sample of young adults enrolled in college. However, once the
constraint and motivation measures are added into the regression equation, the effect of
religious commitment is reduced to non-significance. Agnew (2005, 2017) does not
include such variables in his original formulation as they tend to produce a relatively
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small effect on crime and therefore do not fit very well with his variable-centered
approach to integration, which focuses on those variables that have consistently produced
a moderate to large effect (Bernard and Snipes 1996).
Research Question 6: Do religious variables affect crime enough to warrant
inclusion as a separate life domain? Specifically, does introducing religion as a
separate life domain increase the explanatory power of the general theory to
explain crime?
Research Question 7: Does GTCD-E predict all types of criminal behavior?
Specifically, do the causal variables and the size of their effects differ in
predicting general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime?
Significance.
The dearth of extant examinations of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD along with the
theoretical and methodological limitations inherent to existing in prior studies exposes a
significant gap in the criminological literature. This dissertation contributes to the
scholarly literature by addressing the previously mentioned limitations, providing a more
comprehensive systematic test of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD, and exploring the utility of
Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E.
This dissertation significantly improves upon previous studies in a number of
ways. First, it incorporates a large number of variables to measure relevant life domains,
constraints against crime, and motivations towards crime. It also utilizes a large sample
drawn from longitudinal data at two time points, each representing distinct developmental
stages. Further, this dissertation measures a variety of criminal outcomes. Finally, it tests
two iterations of the theory: Agnew’s (2005) original formulation (i.e., GTCD) and
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Cochran’s (2015) elaboration that proposes religion as a sixth distinct life domain (i.e.,
GTCD-E).
This project draws from an extant dataset, the Kaplan Longitudinal and
Multigenerational Study (KLAMS), that allows for a more nuanced and comprehensive
measurement of both life domains and delinquent outcomes. For one, KLAMS provides a
large number of items with which to construct variables. Whereas previous tests used
single-item indicators or smaller scales to measure the variables within life domains,
constraints, motivations, and deviant outcomes, this dissertation incorporates multi-item
scales for most variables within the relevant life domains. Additionally, KLAMS drew
data from thousands of respondents. Where other studies rely on data drawn from
hundreds of respondents (Cochran 2015) or barely reach one thousand participants
(Zhang et al. 2012), this dissertation incorporates a sample of over 1,600 participants
drawn from two waves of KLAMS data collection.
KLAMS is a longitudinal study consisting of waves that span multiple
developmental stages as participants age throughout the life course. This is important
because Agnew (2005) urges that the best way to test the general theory is to incorporate
multiple waves of data from the same sample. Specifically, KLAMS permits the
examination of the age-graded component of the general theory and the lagged effects of
life domains on crime.
Additionally, this dissertation examines several criminal outcomes. This is
notable since all but one of the prior tests of the general theory explore only a single
criminal or deviant outcome (Cochran 2015; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014;
Zhang et al. 2012). Specifically, three dependent variables are incorporated for each stage
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of development, which amounts to six total outcome variables. These include selfreported general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime during both adolescence
and adulthood. Only one prior study measured multiple forms of criminal outcomes to
assess whether Agnew’s predictions hold true across crime type (Muftić et al. 2014).
The current research also explores the potential utility of extending GTCD by
introducing a sixth life domain: religion. Cochran (2015) is the first to propose any such
an extension. He also performs the only test of an extension of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD.
Consequently, this study represents only the second test of GTCD-E.
Chapter Outlines
The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on a deeper discussion of the
theoretical background of the current study. That is, it describes theoretical competition
and integration as opposing strategies of theory reduction, assesses the merits and
shortcomings of each approach and argues in favor of continuing the practice of
theoretical integration. In addition, the second chapter reviews methods of theoretical
integration in criminology and identifies GTCD as an exemplar of Bernard and Snipes’
(1996) variable-centered approach to integration.
The third chapter provides an in-depth discussion of GTCD’s foundation,
arguments, and predictions. Next, it reviews the criminological literature surrounding
GTCD, including empirical tests and their findings, criticisms, and Cochran’s (2015)
proposed elaboration. Chapter 4 moves into a discussion of the analytic plan for the series
of empirical tests performed on both theories. It provides a comprehensive discussion
describing study hypotheses, the source from which data were drawn, the method by
which items were selected and variables were constructed, and the analyses utilized to
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conduct such tests. Chapter 5 is devoted to a discussion of the results of testing a number
of GTCD’s and GTCD-E’s propositions. The sixth and final chapter seeks to discuss the
findings reported in the previous two chapters and concludes the dissertation, providing
policy implications that may be inferred from these tests.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Theory Reduction in Criminology: The Great Debate between Competition and
Integration
As alluded to in the preceding chapter, the discipline of criminology is allegedly
plagued by a gratuitous amount of theoretical explanations for behavior and, seemingly
ironically, an inability to adequately explain its subject matter (Bernard 1990; Bernard
and Snipes 1996; Bernard et al. 2016; Elliott 1985; Muftić 2009; Weisburd and Piquero
2008). This overabundance of theories directly impacts the discipline of criminology in a
negative fashion by stagnating scientific progress, or the “accumulation of research
findings in the context of theories” (Bernard 1990:326; Bernard and Snipes 1996). While
most criminologists agree that too many separate theories exist within the field,
disagreement arises regarding which solution is best to alleviate this problem (Bernard
and Snipes 1996). The process of theory competition, or falsification, is one of two
primary means by which to reduce the number of extant theories. Advocates of this
method argue that separate criminological theories contain competing or contradictory
propositions or predictions. Therefore, the process of theory competition should be
employed to empirically pit separate theories against one another with the aim of
supporting one and falsifying the other (Muftić 2009). Ideally, those that are empirically
falsified are dropped from consideration, thereby reducing the overall number of
explanations of criminal behavior. However, scholars in the other camp argue that the
falsification process has failed thus far to reduce the number of theories and that these
disparate theories incorporate different, but not necessarily contradictory, assumptions,
propositions, and arguments (Bernard and Snipes 1996). Therefore, theoretical
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integration is a welcomed alternative. This process involves merging or integrating two
or more existing theories into a larger, unified explanation of behavior, also reducing the
overall number of extant theories.
Specifically, theoretical integration in criminology refers to the formulation of a
theory that “combines variables from divergent theoretical perspectives based upon some
logical reconciliation of different basic assumptions. It also provides some explanation of
how the new combined predictors are related to one another as well as to criminal
behavior in a coherent interrelated set of propositional statements" (Elliott 1985:130).
The prospect of theoretical integration in criminology caused a rift in the discipline after
Elliott and colleagues (1979) first attempted to unify strain, social control, and social
learning theories into a single explanation for criminal behavior. That same year Hirschi
(1979) authored a response to their effort in which he resolutely argued against the
practice of integration, famously declaring that “separate and unequal is better” for the
discipline of criminology (34). In his article, he outlines three principal forms of
integration, critiquing each as an inadequate method of theoretical development in
criminology. A major debate ensued during which arguments and counterarguments were
exchanged for decades in academic journals and books (Meier 1985; Liska, Krohn, and
Messner 1989).
Though it has quieted in recent years, the debate is still yet to be settled. The
scholarly literature remains quite divided with some maintaining that integration is
beneficial and others claiming it is merely an exercise in “futilitarianism” (Tittle
1985:95). Agnew ignited renewed interest with his call for the unification of criminology
in 2012; however, this too seems to have fizzled of late.
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The following discussion presents the primary scholarly arguments submitted
regarding the limitations and virtues of theoretical integration in criminology. Arguments
against integration are addressed first, as this is the manner in which the initial debate
unfolded temporally, with Hirschi (1979) critiquing Elliott and colleagues’ (1979) initial
integration attempt.
Arguments against integration.
“There were much of the beautiful, much of the wanton, much of the bizarre, something
of the terrible, and not a little of that which might have excited disgust.”
Edgar Allan Poe, The Masque of the Red Death, 2004
Hirschi is perhaps the staunchest and most vocal opponent of theoretical
integration (1979, 1989). His position on the matter may be summed up with a single
quote: “To my mind, differential association is at least of some theoretical interest. I
would not be able to speak so highly of an integrated theory of delinquency” (Hirschi
1979:36). This statement makes clear Hirschi’s stance that integrated theories offer no
theoretical interest or value to the discipline.
The chief argument against the practice of theoretical integration in criminology
is arguably that competing theories are unfit for unification because they make
incompatible assumptions that cannot be logically reconciled (Akers 1989; Bernard and
Snipes 1996; Farnworth 1989; Hirschi 1969, 1979, 1989; Liska, Krohn, and Messner
1989; Muftić 2009; Thornberry 1989; Wheeldon, Heidt, and Dooley 2014). Indeed, as
Bernard and Snipes (1996) contend, the stances of many opponents to integration rely on
this foundational claim. For instance, Hirschi (1969) argues that the three fundamental
criminological theories (i.e., strain, social control, and social learning) each offer
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contradictory assumptions about the motivation to commit crime and delinquency. Strain
theories argue that this motivation varies as stressors pressure individuals toward crime;
control theories claim that it is invariable, with unrestrained individuals committing crime
due to a deterioration of ties to conventional society; and cultural deviance theories posit
that crime is the result of subcultural norms that run counter to those of conventional
society. They also make incompatible assumptions about human nature, with the strain
tradition arguing that people are essentially oriented towards upholding the law but are
pressured to break it; the control tradition stating that people are hedonistic and will
violate norms absent sufficient checks on behavior; and the cultural deviance tradition
claiming that people are veritable blank slates that either maintain or break the law
according to that which they are taught (Muftić 2009). This leads him to claim that it is
“impossible” and “pointless” to combine them in a way that honors each constituent
theory (Hirschi 1989:39).
In Hirschi’s (1979) opinion, the process of integration, or merging theories with
incompatible differences, necessarily involves making inappropriate concessions on at
least one level. In attempting to unify disparate theories, integrationists must either ignore
inherent irreconcilable differences among component theories or misrepresent these
constituent theories by altering them in ways that render them unrecognizable. In the
former option, integrationists compromise their integrity by negligently or purposefully
overlooking the fact that component theories are incompatible. This is an option that
Thornberry (1989) notes is “logically contradictory and inappropriate” (54). The latter
option involves the formidable task of reconciling these differences by accepting the
assumptions of one theory and dropping those of the other. However, making such a
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concession “compromises the integrity” of the constituent theories (Thornberry 1989:56).
In sum, Hirschi (1979) considers integrating disparate theories to be foolish, as it results
in a finished product that is either illogical or makes unreasonable concessions to the
propositions of constituent theories. As such, the integrated theory will either be
irrational, or it will be an aberration unrepresentative of its core theoretical roots: the
theoretical equivalent of Dr. Frankenstein’s infamously calamitous creation.
Hirschi (1979) also complains that integrational theorists often blindly accept the
propositions of component theories as true, even if they are logically compatible. He
seems to suggest that the reasoning for not questioning the propositions of component
theories is rather selfish and lazy, since the more partial theories for which one accounts,
the more explanatory power their theory achieves. He says this "appears to be unusual
reasonableness" but may actually be "nothing more than the failure to invoke required
scientific bases of discrimination" (36).
Another important concern of critics is that integrated theories are far too
complex. They require numerous propositions that link together hordes of variables in
highly intricate ways, creating an end product that is not parsimonious (Farnworth 1989;
Liska et al. 1989; Tittle 1985). Critics argue that this is a notable limitation because
parsimony is a hallmark of a quality theory and facilitates the process of falsification
(Akers 1989; Bernard 1990; Hirschi 1989). Therefore, not only may complex integrated
theories be tough to grasp intellectually, they also may be difficult to subject to rigorous
empirical testing. Specifically, scholars note that proper testing would be cumbersome at
all stages of the process, including data collection, management, and analysis (Agnew
2005). To illustrate, Agnew’s GTCD contains nearly a dozen propositions that identify
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complex relationships (i.e., direct, indirect, linear, non-linear, interaction, and reciprocal)
among a large number of variables. Even he admits that such integrated theories run the
risk of overwhelming readers, hindering testing efforts, and impeding policy formation.
Potentially as a result of this complexity, though perhaps also partially due to its
relatively young age, GTCD has only been subjected to a handful of tests. Further, those
that do exist are partial in that they only test one or a few specific propositions. This
problem is somewhat ironic as integration was originally introduced as a new way to
reduce the abundance of theories. Therefore, if integrated theories cannot be falsified,
then they are not fulfilling one of their primary purposes (Bernard and Snipes 1996;
Muftić 2009).
A final key argument against the practice of integration is that so far, all attempts
have failed to yield the intended results (Hirschi 1979; Tittle 1985). That is, critics argue
that integrated theories have thus far failed to explain the levels of variance in crime
expected of them, which is their “avowed goal” (Hirschi 1979:34). This is unacceptable
considering they have also been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing the number of
extant theories.
Arguments for integration.
“All for one; and one for all!
Alexander Dumas, The Three Musketeers; or, The Feats and Fortunes of a Gascon
Adventurer, 1844
As Liska and colleagues (Liska et al. 1989) point out, Delbert Elliott is arguably
the firmest supporter of theoretical integration in criminology. As an author of the
catalytic study that sparked the initial theoretical debate about integration, he has spent
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considerable energy developing and defending this practice (Elliott 1985; Elliott,
Ageton, and Canter 1979). Many of the arguments in favor of integration revolve around
the perceived limitations of specific theories and integration’s potential improvements
over the method of theory competition (Akers 1998; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Elliott
1985; Muftić 2009; Thornberry 1987; Tittle 1985, 1995). This is perhaps due to the way
the debate originally unfolded, as integrationists responded to Hirschi’s forceful stance
against integration. While Hirschi (1979) views such competition as healthy,
integrationists argue that in practice it has not been effective and produces a variety of
negative consequences.
Regarding the effectiveness of theory competition, Bernard (1990) states that it is
unsuccessful and rarely leads to the rejection of theories. Instead most of the time, some
support is found for nearly all theories, yet no theory “has been able to explain all
variations in crime” (267). Indeed, Hirschi’s (1969; with Gottfredson 1990) own
competitive testing efforts have failed to fully discount any of the rival theories in his
models. For instance, in pitting his social bond theory against strain and cultural deviance
theories, he reports that school strains are virtually, though not fully, unrelated to
delinquency. He notes that those who “feel nervous and tense in school” are slightly more
likely to commit delinquent acts (Hirschi 1969:127). The competitive testing efforts of
many others have, while perhaps showing stronger support for one theory over others,
yielded at least some level of explained variance or predictive power for most contending
theories. In their recent test, Chouhy and colleagues (2016) find empirical support for
three out of five core criminological theories among their sample. To further illustrate
that competitive testing has been unsuccessful in reducing the number of theories,
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consider that Hirschi abandoned his previous social bond theory in favor of his more
recent general theory. Yet, while developing this new theory, he admits that social
control, social learning, and strain theory are all “alive and well,” some even despite
decades of empirical “pounding” (Hirschi 1989:44–49).
The principal argument in favor of integration is that such theories exhibit
considerably more explanatory power than traditional singular theories (Bernard et al.
2016). This broader explanatory power involves two levels: theoretical and empirical. At
the theoretical level, integrated theories aim to explain a greater variety of criminal
actions, among a greater variety of offenders, in a greater number of social contexts.
Since many integrated theories are general theories, they incorporate a broadly-defined
dependent variable that allows them to explain a greater variety of behavior. This is also
seen as a way to increase their explanatory power, as they are able to account for the
widest range of behavior. For instance, Sutherland (1939) defines his dependent variable
as acts that are in violation of the legal code, while Tittle’s (1995) integrated theory
defines it as behavior that is generally regarded as unacceptable and that which tends to
elicit a negative collective response upon detection. Additionally, integrated theories tend
to incorporate a larger number of causal factors, or independent variables, than traditional
theories. Integrationists see this as a benefit because it allows them to explain not the just
the variation in criminal behavior, but also that of many intervening variables (Agnew
2005; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Bernard et al. 2016; Elliott 1985).
At the empirical level, this strength is typically referred to in terms of an increase
in explained variance or predictive power. Many integrationists point to the inability of
traditional theories to explain high levels of variance as problematic. As Elliott (1985)
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asserts, these theories “typically account for only 10 percent to 20 percent of the variance
in illegal behavior” (124). He then reviews a variety of integration attempts and
demonstrates how they have, indeed, resulted in a greater level of overall explanatory
power. In all, he finds an average net increase of 4 percentage points and a relative
increase of 12 percent over previous explanations. Studies that attempted cross-level
integration demonstrate even larger gains in the level of explained variance. This leads
him to conclude that “traditional theories are best viewed as partial theories, and that
integrated theoretical models can increase the level of explanatory power" (Elliott
1985:141-142). Liska and colleagues (1989) concur with Elliott’s observation, though
cautiously noting that an absence of definitive results from empirical testing efforts does
not “itself call for the adoption of alternative theorizing” (4).
Advocates of integration also argue that it promotes new modes of thinking about
relationships among propositions and variables that will facilitate one of the theorist’s
primary aims: explaining the dependent variable (Muftić 2009). Traditional theories and
the process of theory competition are seen as hindering this task. Robinson (2012)
laments about the seemingly endless cycle of “testing the same limited and disciplinary
theories in mostly the same ways” (28). Theory competition produces specialists,
frustrating efforts at innovation and interdisciplinary collaboration. Robinson states that
this has produced “obstinate and stubborn” criminologists who refuse to learn alternative
theories (32). These symptoms of theory competition impede progress, plateauing the
discipline’s scientific trajectory and reducing its public policy utility.
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Assessing the evidence.
The proceeding discussion reflects on the arguments presented above in an effort
to make an educated decision about whether attempts at theoretical integration should be
abandoned or pursued. First, those against integration are considered. This is followed by
an assessment of supportive arguments.
None of the arguments against integration presented above preclude the merger of
extant theories as a theoretical activity, except for Hirshi’s (1969, 1979, 1989) repeated
claim that the core theories of criminology present different and fundamentally
incompatible assumptions or propositions. Wheeldon and colleagues (2014) agree that
this is the primary argument about the impossibility of integration and that the other
arguments only question its utility. It is wholeheartedly agreeable that theories making
such incompatible assumptions cannot and should not be integrated (Bernard and Snipes
1996). However, the argument that component theories propose irreconcilable
propositions is unconvincing. This conclusion is based primarily on the counterarguments
proposed by Bernard and Snipes (1996) and Agnew (2011).
Bernard and Snipes (1996) provide a commendable response to Hirschi’s
argument that the core theories in criminology are fundamentally incompatible and
therefore, cannot be integrated logically or without misrepresenting the spirit or intent of
constituent theories. They agree that theories whose core arguments are incompatible
should not and cannot be integrated, stating that any integration attempt that alters a
constituent theory’s fundamental arguments, or otherwise fails to accurately represent the
theory, cannot be labeled as an integration. However, they disagree that the most
criminological theories make incompatible arguments. They demonstrate that Hirschi
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(1979) and other detractors of integration, like Kornhauser (1978), reach this conclusion
erroneously. In stating his case, Hirschi does not accurately represent many of the
theories that he claims are incompatible. Hirschi's distortion of strain and cultural
deviance theories renders his argument against integration unconvincing. Once
interpreted correctly, strain, control, and cultural deviance theories can be integrated
(Bernard and Snipes 1996). This is somewhat ironic, since one of Hirschi’s chief
concerns is that constituent theories may be misrepresented during an integration attempt.
Specifically, Bernard and Snipes (1996) argue that the location of independent
variation of crime (i.e., social structural or individual characteristics) and the direction of
causation of criminal behavior are valid means by which to categorize theories.
Therefore, in terms of these two concepts, strain and cultural deviance theories are not
incompatible. This is because both identify the location of independent variation in the
social structure and map the direction of causation as flowing from culture to criminal
actions (Bernard and Snipes 1996). Recall that both strain and cultural deviance theories
propose that one’s location within the social structure is variable. Due to this variation,
the cultural beliefs and social strains to which one is exposed vary and directly influence
the likelihood of criminal behavior.
More recently Agnew (2011) demonstrates how the seemingly incompatible
primary assumptions about human nature (i.e., self-interest, altruism, or blank slate) may
be interpreted as compatible. He argues that it is not the case that humans are simply one
or the other, but instead can be all three. Indeed, actors can be self-interested, altruistic,
and shaped by environmental factors at different stages along the life course. These
modes of thought also show how different theoretical explanations are not actually
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incompatible, as previously believed. Therefore, the only argument that precludes
integration, indeed the point on which much of the debate against it rests, is sufficiently
dismantled.
Additionally, Hirschi’s claim that integrationists may misrepresent component
theories or misconstrue their core propositions in order to force separate theories together
in a logical fashion is a valid concern. However, it is undermined by the fact that the very
same mistake can happen when any researcher other than the creator of a theory attempts
an empirical test, regardless of whether the theory is integrated or not (Agnew 1991). For
instance, it can be argued that many empirical tests finding support for Hirschi’s own
general theory employ measurements or variables that misrepresent the spirit of the
original theory. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993) provide a review of select tests of their
theory and identify some that misconstrue or conflate the concept of self-control to be a
personality concept, as opposed to a social one. This is particularly egregious, as the
concept of self-control as the product of parenting and other social processes is
fundamental to the theory. Consequently, they concede that some measures of selfcontrol follow a “logic we explicitly reject” (49).
Further, the onus of blame does not rest entirely on the integrationist should an
integration attempt misrepresent a key theoretical concept. The creator of the original
theory may also share this burden, as they may be ambiguous in their propositions or
otherwise unclear in their theoretical formulation. For instance, Akers (1991) criticizes
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory for being unclear in its core concept’s
connection to social bond theory, noting that aspects of self-control are similar to those of
other social control theories; employing a confusing definition of positivism; and
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espousing tautological propositions. Therefore, an integrationist who interprets any of
these concepts in a way that is different from that originally intended by Gottfredson and
Hirschi is not fully to blame. Indeed, Bernard and Snipes (1996) argue that the
formulation of such abstract theories is the primary reason that theory competition has
been unsuccessful in reducing the number of theories in criminology.
While many of the other arguments against theoretical integration are strong and
point out legitimate concerns, they are not sufficient reasons to halt the pursuit of
unification. Rather, they may better be considered as points that facilitate the laying out
of best practices for the integration process, identifying potential problem areas that
should be thoughtfully considered before attempting integration. For instance, Liska and
colleagues (1989) and Bernard and Snipes (1996) outline steps that can be taken in order
to integrate theories without violating the spirit of constituent theories or forcing
incompatible assumptions or arguments together.
One may also take issue with Hirschi’s (1979) critique that integrationists blindly
accept the propositions of component theories when incorporating them into an integrated
model. Elliott (1985) offers a response to the statement that integrationists should not
accept the propositions of other theories at face value. He argues that the burden in this
case falls on the person who formulates and proposes a potential constituent theory. After
running tests, they should revise their propositions or offer other explanations if they are
inconsistent with empirical results. Therefore, criminological theories should not be
introduced in the scientific literature if they contain propositions or postulates that oppose
empirical findings. So, it is natural for the integrationist to accept some of these
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hypotheses and other propositions "on purely logical grounds" (135). However, they are
not blindly accepted.
Hirschi (1979) also implies that accepting the claims of other theories is done
selfishly for the sake of explaining more variance in criminal behavior. However, this
practice is arguably an efficient, rather than selfish, use of extant theories. The peerreview process exists to weed out untested or unscientific claims. Therefore, it is
reasonable and efficient to accept the findings of peer-reviewed tests of theoretical
propositions when incorporating them into an integrated theory. Again, it is prudent to
use all available scientifically-derived information when attempting to explain the
phenomenon of criminal behavior. Integrationists argue that doing so utilizes all available
information on the strongest known correlates with and predictors of crime that have
been gathered via scientific, systematic investigation. From this point of view, to not use
such information is negligent, irresponsible, and the antithesis of unbiased scientific
inquiry. They ask, is it not the basis of science to use all available information to answer
a question? Bernard (1990) argues that positive learning, through the accumulation of
verified knowledge, must be relied upon. So, it is a positive aspect of integration that
such theories take scientifically-verified findings for granted, as this represents scientific
progress.
The claim that integrated theories are too complex, rendering them free of
parsimony and essentially non-falsifiable is an argument which has merit. Indeed, many
integrated theories are quite complex, involving propositions about the direct, indirect,
reciprocal, linear, non-linear, and interactive effects found among a multitude of microand macro-level variables. Even Agnew (2005) mentions the potential difficulty inherent
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in fully testing his theory. Still, this was certainly a more powerful argument in the past.
This is chiefly due to advances in technology and statistical analysis. As Muftić (2009)
points out, hierarchical linear modeling and similarly sophisticated techniques allow
researchers to “control for the effect of both proximal (micro) and distal (macro) level
variables on crime and delinquency,” making the process significantly more manageable
(55). The scientific community is much more capable of collecting, managing, and
analyzing the data required to measure complex, integrated theories. Not only is it not
logically impossible to reconcile elements of competing theories through integration, but
such theories are also not technically impossible to test thanks to advances in analytical
methods and technology.
It is also important to note that integrated theories are arguably quite
parsimonious as they bridge multiple theories, many of which contain separate sets of
propositions and explain various forms of deviance in differing contexts, into a single
theoretical explanation. This is especially true for the method of conceptual integration
and absorption exhibited by Akers (1989, 1998), as this process identifies overlap and
commonalities among competing theories, thereby reducing redundancy. In this sense,
integrated theories are highly parsimonious (Akers and Sellers 2017).
Scholars point out that integration attempts have not been as successful as
originally thought. Obviously, in many ways this is a very similar argument to that made
by integrationists about theory competition. First, as Elliott (1985) points out, integrated
theories have been demonstrated to produce higher levels of explained variance than
traditional theories, though apparently not as high as Hirschi (1979) expects. There is
another crucial difference, rendering the integrationists’ argument more compelling. In
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this case, the argument in favor of integration is stronger if only because it advocates for
the exploration of alternative avenues as a supplement to falsification, not the outright
abandonment of competition (Bernard and Snipes 1996). Opponents of integration, like
Hirschi, however, call for the total abolition of integration because it has not been
perceived by them to produce the intended results. This is a thin argument as one need
only turn to the likes of Albert Einstein, Nikola Tesla, the Wright brothers, or Elon Musk
as examples. Should the Wright brothers have abandoned their efforts at flight in 1901,
two years before their first mechanically-powered flight, because their many to-date
efforts had previously failed to reach expectations? It seems history would suggest
otherwise. Indeed, the scientific method is an iterative process, which involves
incorporating and adjusting to feedback. Scientific study encourages the pursuit of
previously unexplored frontiers. Using the scientific process to attempt that which was
formerly thought implausible or impossible is an admirable endeavor.
The argument that integrated theories provide increased explanatory power of
deviance is a powerful argument in this author’s opinion. As a criminologist, the promise
of explaining criminal behavior to a greater degree is a substantial draw because it
demonstrates that scholars are improving in their predictive and explanatory ability,
which builds credibility for the discipline. It also provides the important benefit of
facilitating the formulation of policies that have an enhanced probability of effecting real,
positive change. The importance of this cannot be overstated.
For opponents of theoretical integration, the assertion that the sum is greater than
its parts is a veritable siren song magnetically attracting foolish integrationists. Hirschi
(1979) addresses this claim by arguing that much of this increase in explained variance is
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illusory or misattributed. He argues that in many instances, due to the type of integration
attempted, any gains in explained variance are attributable to the integrationist’s use of a
broad and unrestricted definition of crime. However, Elliott (1985) responds to this claim
by arguing that Hirschi draws an erroneous conclusion that is “logically unwarranted and
contradicted by the empirical evidence” (132). Hirschi (1979) also argues that in end-toend integration, the last theory in the causal chain (i.e., that which is theorized to be the
most proximate cause) subsumes all the explained variance of the previous theories. Once
again, Elliott (1985) refutes this idea, arguing that “sequential ordering does not negate
any causal argument about the effect of the initial variable in the causal chain” (133).
Further, though some have attempted such restructuring of causal sequences, they are far
from simple end-to-end integrations.
Hirschi (1979) and Farnworth (1989) also point out that an increase in explained
variance is not a particularly impressive feat. This is because integrated theories tend to
involve a significantly larger number of independent variables than traditional theories.
This alone should result in an increase in the amount of variance explained. Farnworth
notes that the quantitative indicator of explained variance “is not synonymous with
understanding and explanation, the real goal of a theory” (99). This is an important
distinction and one that integrationist should pay particular attention to when evaluating
their efforts and defending their practice. However, it is not a convincing argument to
abandon these attempts. Additionally, it may be argued that that an increase in the
number of independent variables included in one’s model is beneficial for causation
analysis, as it reduces the probability of omitted variable bias. Further, modern statistical
methods may be employed to account for any artificial increase in explanatory power that
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may result from the inclusion of additional predictor variables, like the adjusted Rsquared coefficient calculated for multiple linear regression models.
To say that the attempts at integration offer no unique contribution to the field of
criminology is also an unconvincing argument to this author. With this point, Hirschi
(1979) seems to imply that invention is the only theoretical method that would that would
add such a unique contribution. This is curious, as he later argues that the general theory
he produced with Gottfredson (1990) was derived not from invention, but from analyzing
an old problem in a new manner. This is precisely what many integrationists strive to
accomplish. This author argues that integration efforts, like those of Cloward and Ohlin
(1960), Elliott and colleagues (1979), Tittle (1995), Thornberry (1987), Moffitt (1993),
Akers (1998), Messner and Rosenfeld (2012), and Agnew (2005) offer at least the level
of unique contribution to criminology as Hirschi’s (1969; with Gottfredson 1991) own
theories.
Integration also aids theoretical development. It fosters cooperation and often
entails approaching issues from new vantage points, as is evidenced by Bernard and
Snipes’ (1996) and Agnew’s (2011) arguments above regarding the compatibility of
different theories. Tittle (1985) also discusses the ways in which integration contributes
to the scholarly understanding of the complex relationships surrounding criminal
behavior. According to him, integration facilitates the criminological examination of
reciprocal relationships. While others may be concerned with one side of the chickenand-egg question, whether delinquent friends precede delinquent behavior or vice versa,
Tittle argues that integrationists examine the possibility “that both are correct”
(1985:143). Along the same lines, other integrated explanations have been employed to
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examine common criminological correlates and problems, like the age-crime curve, the
gender gap in offending, and the SES-delinquency link, in new light (Akers 1998; Broidy
and Agnew 1997; De Coster and Zito 2010; Friedman and Rosenbaum 1988; Hagan,
Gillis, and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis 1987; Moffitt 1993; Singer and
Levine 1988; Steffensmeier and Allen 1996; Tittle, Ward, and Grasmick 2003). More
recently, Agnew (2011) and Robinson (2012) demonstrate that outside the box thinking,
open-mindedness, and reconceptualization of taken-for-granted ideas is beneficial. Note
that this is even what Hirschi (1989) argues for himself.
In this author’s opinion, the crux of the argument against theoretical integration,
namely that integration is logically impossible because component theories propose
incompatible and irreconcilably different assumptions, has been sufficiently dismantled
by the likes of Bernard and Snipes (1996) and Agnew (2013a). Hirschi has misconstrued
strain and cultural deviance theories in building a foundation for his argument against
integration. Therefore, the only argument that renders full integration impossible
crumbles. As a result, this author remains unconvinced that integration attempts should
be halted. Additionally, the potential for increasing the discipline’s ability to explain
delinquent behavior is of utmost importance, as it facilitates the ability of practitioners to
offer effective solutions and policy recommendations. The possibility of what integration
hopes to accomplish is too promising and important to ignore. This author does not
believe integration to be a fool’s errand, as Tittle (1985) puts it, or some sort of
theoretical alchemy in which naïve scientists futilely attempt to achieve the impossible.
Instead, this author remains hopeful and optimistic about the promise of theoretical
integration in criminology. However, the burden lies with the integrationist, as they must
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take great care in following the proper steps in their attempts to bridge disparate theories
into a unified whole. The process must be done systematically and carefully in order to
avoid creating “theoretical mush” (Akers 1989:24; Bernard and Snipes 1996:322).
Methods of Theoretical Integration
As stated previously, theoretical integration broadly refers to the combination of
interrelated theoretical propositions into a unified whole with the intent of creating a
more comprehensive explanation of a given phenomenon (Tittle 1985). Since the
definition is so broad, there exist a variety of methods by which one may combine
theoretical propositions. Liska and colleagues (1989) identify two broad categories of
theoretical integration: propositional and conceptual. The former refers to the integration
of constituent theories that proffer differing propositions and the latter refers to the
combination of constituent theories that articulate similar concepts. In Hirschi’s (1979)
critique of Elliott and colleagues’ (1979) integration attempt, he outlines three primary
means of propositional theoretical integration: end-to-end, side-by-side, and up-anddown. One can infer from Hirschi’s description that these methods are not mutually
exclusive, and that a given attempt at integration may incorporate more than one strategy.
Additionally, they may all be employed at any level of theoretical explanation: micro-,
macro-, and between-level analysis (Liska et al. 1989). Recently, Muftić (2009) called for
renewed efforts at micro-macro theoretical integration. In sum, theoretical integration in
criminology may be approached by a variety of means. Each is described below with
examples provided throughout. This section concludes with a discussion of Bernard and
Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered approach, since it is employed by Agnew (2005) to
create GTCD.
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The first method of theoretical integration outlined by Hirschi (1979) is end-toend, or sequential, integration. This process involves arranging the concepts or
propositions of various theories together into a new developmental sequence. In creating
this temporal sequence, the dependent variables of some theories become the independent
variables of others. In essence, the concepts of constituent theories are laid out end-to-end
to form a longer causal chain. As Liska and colleagues (1989) note, this form of
integration is best-suited for circumstances that permit organizing the causal variables
along a continuum, ranging from indirect to immediate, direct causes. For instance, the
order may begin by arguing that social disorganization impedes access to legitimate
opportunities, increasing exposure to delinquent peers, which then influences individual
delinquency.
Elliott and colleagues (1979) are noted for their early attempt at the end-to-end
propositional integration of strain, social control, and social learning theories in order to
explain sustained patterns of delinquency. This is an appropriate example to discuss as it
is widely regarded as the impetus of the debate about integration in criminology. They
argue that juveniles differ in the socialization they experience from an early age, resulting
in varying levels of strength of internal and external bonds to conventional society. The
authors define internal bonds as commitment to conventional society and external bonds
as integration into conventional groups or institutions. These bonds are malleable;
therefore, their strength may be altered by a variety of adolescent experiences.
Attenuating variables are those that negatively impact and weaken such ties. These
include strains like limited opportunities, failure in conventional activities or institutions,
negative labeling experiences, and social disorganization. According to the authors, an
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attenuation or complete severing of ties to the conventional social order cannot account
for sustained delinquency by itself. Noting that not all who have such ties engage in
delinquency, they argue that criminal behavior must be learned and reinforced to persist.
Therefore, they must introduce variables from social learning theories, demonstrating the
importance of delinquent peer groups. Elliott and colleagues propose that early
socialization affects the strength of one’s social bonds (control), which influences their
social experiences (strain), which affects the strength of their social bonds (control),
which affects their bonding to peer groups (social learning), which influences individual
delinquent behavior. The authors note that social bonds and strain can directly lead to
delinquency. However, they maintain that the effect of these variables is primarily
indirect, operating through delinquent peer groups.
In the end, Elliott and colleagues (1979) propose two paths to delinquency, with
each identifying social learning processes, principally strong bonding to delinquent peer
groups, as the immediate cause of delinquency. Their first model is a merger of social
control and social learning theories that applies to individuals whose early socialization
resulted in weak bonds to conventional society. Here, inadequate socialization leads to
weak bonds to society, which results in an increased strength of bonds to delinquent peer
groups, which then facilitates the social learning of crime, resulting in sustained patterns
of delinquent behavior. The second path is an integration of strain, social control, and
social learning theories aimed at explaining delinquency among individuals whose early
socialization produced strong bonds to conventional society. In this case, strong initial
bonds are weakened by strain and other attenuating experiences. This leads to the
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creation of strong bonds to delinquent peer groups, increasing the social learning of
delinquency, and ultimately increasing the likelihood of patterns of criminal behavior.
Next, side-by-side, or parallel or horizontal, propositional integration involves
placing constituent theories next to one another and identifying the cases to which each
applies (Hirschi 1979). To explain, the propositions of various partial theories may be
chosen to explain diverse categories of offenders (e.g., adolescent or adult, male or
female) or forms of criminal behavior (e.g., violent crime, drug crime, or financial
crime). For this reason, such integration tends to produce typologies of criminal behavior
and/or offenders (Muftić 2009). Hirschi (1979) also notes that side-by-side integration
avoids having to confront the issue of reconciling the incompatible assumptions of
constituent theories.
Moffitt’s (1993) developmental taxonomy is an oft-cited example of side-by-side
propositional integration as an attempt to explain antisocial behavior exhibited among
two types of offender. This theory draws upon neuropsychological concepts in addition to
those of social control theory, social learning, and social disorganization perspectives. It
involves partitioning delinquents into two types based on the developmental pathways
they follow; one is pathological while the other is normative. The two qualitatively
distinct groups comprising this dual-taxonomy are life-course-persistent offenders (LCPs)
and adolescence-limited offenders (ALs). Therefore, antisocial behaviors exhibited by
each group have distinct etiologies, affecting the characteristics and continuity of their
deviance.
Moffitt (1993) argues that LCPs comprise a small fraction of the total number of
delinquent adolescents. For LCPs, delinquency is developed early in life. The root cause
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of criminal behavior for LCPs lies in neuropsychological risk and a criminogenic
environment. Neuropsychological problems influence difficult behavior and interact with
the effects of criminogenic environments. In childhood, LCPs exhibit neuropsychological
variation that is manifested in “subtle cognitive deficits” and “difficult temperament”
(2001:356). Criminogenic social environments are characterized by poor parenting, poor
family bonds, poverty, and later poor relations to peers and teachers. This sets the stage
for antisocial behavior through a process of evocative interaction, in which children with
such problems may evoke changes from their social setting that exacerbate, rather than
moderate, their deviant behavior, which makes them "more vulnerable to criminogenic
environments" (Moffitt 1993:682). These failures and difficulties experienced early on
add up through cumulative and contemporary continuity, limiting future opportunities for
these youths. They also have a snowball effect, accumulating and eventually impeding
prosocial behavior. In the face of “narrowing life options” and diminished ability to
achieve goals through conventional behavior, along with their “maladaptive individual
dispositions,” LCPs turn to illegitimate, deviant means (Moffit 1993:695). They persist in
their antisocial behavior as they age, failing to learn prosocial alternative behaviors and
becoming ensnared in a deviant pattern of behavior due to the consequences of past
criminality. As a result of this cumulative effect, Moffitt expects that the life-course
transitions that normally influence desistence from crime, like marriage or employment,
to have little effect on LCPs.
LCPs engage in a variety of criminal behaviors individually and in groups,
committing a wider variety of delinquent acts than do ALs. Though it may manifest itself
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differently, in the form of different kinds of deviance, as an LCP ages, the underlying
disposition remains constant.
ALs are youth who came of age in a normal, healthy manner. For ALs,
delinquency develops at a later stage in life. The motivation of their delinquent behavior
is a maturity gap arising during puberty, in which youth are biologically mature, but
socially immature. These adolescents are becoming adults biologically, but since they
still inhabit the role of a minor, do not enjoy the social or legal privileges that accompany
adulthood. As a result of this maturity gap, they experience dysphoria and tend to adapt
through social learning, especially mimicry, of delinquency exhibited by LCPs. Such
delinquency allows them to “demonstrate autonomy from parents, win affiliation with
peers, and hasten social maturation” (Moffitt and Caspi 2001:356). ALs tend to engage in
group delinquency. Their delinquent behaviors tend to symbolize independence and
adulthood, including status offenses, public order offenses, vandalism, and theft. This is
found among males with a “tendency to endorse unconventional values, with a
personality trait called social potency, and with nonviolent delinquent offenses” (Moffitt
and Caspi 2001:357). This delinquent behavior is then sustained according to the
reinforcement principals of social learning theory.
The delinquent patterns of behavior do not persist indefinitely, however. As these
youths age, the maturity gap closes, and they are bestowed with the rights and
responsibilities of adulthood. For this reason, their delinquency is temporary. They
eventually desist as they progress through the life-course because the motivation towards
delinquency is lost as there is no longer a need to demonstrate one’s maturity and
autonomy. Aging introduces new social roles and responsibilities which are perceived as
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things that should be held onto and not lost due to criminal activity. Crime is
incompatible with their responsibilities as adults. For instance, substance abuse makes it
hard to get to work, arrests make it hard to keep one’s job, and DUI’s may cause
considerable financial loss. As a result, ALs weigh “commitment costs” as they decide to
desist in their offending. This process is facilitated by their healthy development because,
without the cumulative and contemporary continuity or cognitive deficits of their LCP
contemporaries, ALs enjoy significantly greater options to for altering their behavior in
prosocial ways. Moffitt (1993) argues that the vast majority of delinquent adolescents are
ALs, leading to the description of such deviance as “normative rather than abnormal”
(692).
Side-by-side integration is achieved in DTT as Moffitt (1993) selects propositions
from diverse disparate theories and fields (i.e., neuropsychology and social control), to
explain the behavior of two separate groups of criminal offenders across the life course.
Separate causal explanations are presented to account for the differences in onset and
continuity of criminal offending. These extant explanations are separated according to the
type of case to which each applies (Hirschi 1979).
Up-and-down, or deductive, integration is the final method of theoretical
integration proposed by Hirschi (1979) as well as the least-commonly employed strategy
by integrationists (Muftić 2009). In this case, the integrationist “raises the level of
abstraction” of a theory until it can incorporate the concepts of another theory (36). In
other words, a general theory is formed by rising to a level of generality that accounts for
at least some of the principles of various constituent theories (Liska et al. 1989).
Therefore, the propositions of more specific theories may be arranged in such a way that
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they logically follow, and thus may be deduced, from the “conceptually broader theory”
(Bernard and Snipes 1996:308). For instance, the integrationist may argue that a given
theory offers more abstract propositions than another theory and, as such, may
incorporate some of the latter theory’s elements (Liska et al. 1989). This is referred to as
theoretical reduction. Another form of up-and-down integration is known as theoretical
synthesis. In this case, the integrationist argues that the level of abstraction for multiple
existing theories may be raised to form an entirely new general theory.
Distinct from propositional integration, conceptual integration, or conceptual
absorption, involves identifying similar or related concepts among disparate theories and
combining them into a single explanation (Liska et al. 1989). Though such terms
themselves may be different, the meanings and operationalizations “overlap
conceptually” and are arguably similar (Akers 1989). Therefore, those of one theory may
simply be subsumed by the other. Akers (1989) argues that concepts from several leading
criminological theories, like anomie/strain and social control, may be conceptually
absorbed into social learning theory. For instance, the social learning concept of
reinforcement, in the form of rewards and punishments, is conceptually similar to anomie
theory’s concept of strain, or the disconnect between legitimate goals and culturallyapproved means of goal attainment (Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin 1959; Merton
1939). Specifically, the inability to obtain one’s goals through appropriate methods is
arguably a response to one’s efforts, through which one either learns to continue or
discontinue a given behavior. Therefore, Akers (1998) argues that social learning theory
can absorb this concept from anomie theory, along with a variety of others.
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Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered method of integration.
More recently, Bernard and Snipes (1996) propose a variable-centered method of
theoretical integration that, as its name implies, focuses on the known correlates of crime.
The authors argue that theoretical criminology neglects the concrete variables that have
been demonstrated to cause crime themselves. A focus on the known predictors of crime
promises to create powerful theories by paying less regard to the various constituent
theories and dedicating more attention to explaining the nature of the relationship
between individual predictor variables and crime, as well as each other. Indeed, Bernard
and Snipes (1996) contend that criminologists should not be concerned with which
constituent theory “owns” which variables but should instead examine “which variables
are related to crime in which ways” (322).
As mentioned previously, Bernard and Snipes (1996) first argue that
criminological theories should be interpreted according to where they locate independent
variation and their direction of causation. They further contend that the level of data
analysis should match the level of theoretical argument and that theories should be built
using the same level of data for their dependent and independent variables. Structural
variation theories attempt to explain how variable structural conditions influence
otherwise “normal” individuals to commit crime. Here, variables like social
disorganization, low collective efficacy, social learning environments, cultural pressures,
and social expectations influence deviant and criminal behavior (Akers 1973, 1998;
Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Cohen
and Felson 1979; Merton 1938; Park 1936; Park and Burgess 1926; Sampson 1986, 2012;
Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942; Sutherland 1939). Structural
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variation theories tend to explain aggregate-level outcomes (e.g., crime rates) and,
therefore, should use aggregate-level data (e.g., group-level characteristics).
Additionally, individual difference theories identify the location of independent
variation as characteristics of the individual. That is, they identify the mechanisms by
which variation in individual characteristics cause crime, despite experiencing similar
structural conditions (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1991; Hirschi 1969, Nye 1958; Sykes and
Matza 1957). Therefore, it is inherent differences between individuals (e.g., irritability,
level of self-control, treatment by peers, parental relationships, and academic
achievement) that are the causes of deviant and criminal behavior. As a result, these
theories should be examined using individual-level data.
This characterization of theories represents a prominent shift away from the
practice of categorizing theories as either strain, control, or cultural deviance (Bernard
and Snipes 1996). Both structural variation and individual difference theories, however,
attribute variation in criminal behavior and crime rates to the influence of multiple factors
(Bernard and Snipes 1996). It is precisely these factors and the relationships between
these variables to which criminologists should pay particular attention. Doing so has the
added benefit of being easily translatable to law- and policymakers.
Bernard and Snipes (1996) also contend criminologists should move away from
competitive testing, as the falsification process is flawed and ultimately fails to reduce the
number of existing theories. Indeed, they claim that pitting theories against one another is
“almost always inappropriate at the theoretical level” (1996:303). This is because almost
all different theories explain some variation in the dependent variable. That is, all or most
of the theories involved contribute some level of explanation for criminal behavior.
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Therefore, the authors propose a variable-centered approach, arguing that the
focus should be on “variables and the relations among variables” (Bernard and Snipes
1996:322). This proposed approach facilitates empirical testing since the concrete factors
related to crime, like low self-control, are readily observable and measurable. This is
highly significant, as abstract or ambiguous propositions and concepts are difficult to
measure and falsify. Once again, the primary focus on variables and relationships among
them is shown. Bernard and Snipes (1996) argue that through this method, criminological
theories can be integrated within the same classification and between classifications.
Chouhy and colleagues (2016) seem to support this method of integration as they
promote efforts to identify criminogenic risk factors associated with deviance. They
argue that the first step in this process is to organize existing theories in a way that
permits scholars to identify the “relative importance of the sources of criminal
involvement” (244). Ultimately, Agnew (2005) is inspired by Bernard and Snipes’ (1996)
work, as he employs their variable approach to integration in formulating GTCD.
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD is an individual difference theory according to Bernard
and Snipes’ (1996) classification, since it asks, “why are some individuals more likely
than others to engage in crime” (Agnew 2005:2)? Agnew begins by outlining seven
questions he argues a general theory must answer to be complete, or to exhibit a
sufficiently broad scope. This set of questions closely aligns with the variable-centered
approach’s focus on relations among variables. For Agnew, a complete general theory
must first identify: (a) the major causes of crime, (b) why these factors increase the
likelihood of crime, (c) how they relate to one another, and (d) how they interact in
influencing crime. A complete theory must also address: (e) the reciprocal effects crime
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exhibits on its causes, (f) the time and form of causal affects, and (g) what factors affect
the level and operation of the direct causes of crime. That is, these questions must be
answered to fully explain the dependent variable and to provide actionable information
that policymakers may use to develop effective crime control, intervention, and
prevention programs. The influence of Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable approach and
Agnew’s commitment to explaining the relations among multiple factors related to crime
is abundantly clear. Agnew (2005) disparages the temptation for theorists (e.g., Colvin
2000) to focus on only one or a handful of causal variables, as this inevitably neglects
other major, empirically-demonstrated causes of crime.
While the utility of a theory that answers these questions is obvious, one that
addresses each of these runs the risk of being too complex, abstract, and difficult to test.
Indeed, these characteristics describe a theory that is not parsimonious, which essentially
negates any potential benefits derived from the broad scope. Therefore, theorists must
tread a fine line between these two competing aims of scope and parsimony when
formulating a general theory. They face the formidable task of generating a theory that is
“reasonably complete,” yet “not so complex as to overwhelm readers” (Agnew 2005:10).
Agnew finds middle ground by proposing a theory that broadly focuses on the majority
of, though not all, known major and direct causes of crime. He also attempts to explain a
wide variety of, again not all, relationships between the factors that are linked to criminal
behavior.
How can such a theory be organized to best facilitate the examination of the
factors affecting crime and the relations among them? For Agnew, the answer lies in
parsing these causal variables out according to life domain: self, family, peer, school, and
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employment. The variables that comprise each of these life domains share common root
causes and primarily exert direct effects on crime, or “behaviors that are generally
condemned and that carry a significant risk of sanction by the state if detected” (Agnew
2005:12). Life domain variables are also argued to increase the likelihood of crime by
decreasing individual constraints against such behavior and/or increasing one’s
motivations towards it.
Following Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered method of integration,
Agnew’s (2005) primary theoretical concern is explaining the various and intricate
associations between life domain variables and crime, as well as their relations among
each other. Also following Bernard’s (1990) advice, Agnew parsimoniously presents his
theory in a series of “separate falsifiable propositions” to facilitate empirical evaluation
and testing of GTCD (335). In doing so, Agnew (2005) proactively confronts the
common criticisms that integrated theories are too abstract or gratuitously complex,
rendering them difficult to test and ultimately, unfalsifiable (Akers 1989; Bernard 1990;
Bernard and Snipes 1996; Farnworth 1989; Hirschi 1989; Liska et al. 1989; Muftić 2009;
Tittle 1985).
Agnew (2005) devotes considerable attention to justifying why he separates
GTCD’s propositions in an effort to show how the falsification of one, or a set, would or
would not affect the others. Not only does this follow Bernard’s (1990) recommendation,
but it proactively promotes theoretical modification and elaboration. This demonstrates
Agnew’s (2005) dedication to explaining criminal behavior and the scientific process. It
also highlights a lack of concern with GTCD belonging only to him (Bernard 1990;
Bernard and Snipes 1996). Indeed, at several points, Agnew states that he is highly open
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to modification of GTCD if empirical evidence contradicts its propositions at any stage.
The chapter that follows is dedicated to a more thorough review of GTCD and a
discussion of previous attempts to empirically evaluate its propositions.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
Agnew’s General Theory of Crime and Deviance
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD begins with the foundational argument that criminal
behavior is most likely to occur when constraints for committing such acts are low and
motivations towards them are high (Agnew 1992; Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979;
Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823; Burgess and Akers 1966;
Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Cohen and Felson 1979; Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; Hirschi 1969; Merton 1938; Nye 1958; Park
1936; Park and Burgess 1926; Sampson 1986, 2012; Sampson and Groves 1989;
Sampson and Laub 1992, 1994, 1995; Shaw and McKay 1942; Sutherland 1939; Sykes
and Matza 1957). A wealth of existing scientific research shows that myriad individual
and social variables affect constraints and motivations, from social psychological ones,
like low self-control and irritability, to more social variables, like peer relations and work
conditions.
Agnew’s (2005) principal contribution lies in his innovative method of grouping
these causal variables. Criminological theorists may be tempted to group these variables
according to the type of constraint (i.e., external control, stake in conformity, and internal
control) or motivation (i.e., strain, reinforcements for crime, exposure to successful
criminal models, and beliefs favorable to crime) they index. But Agnew (2005) cautions
against this practice, claiming that many variables “affect more than one type of
constraint or motivation” or both (39). For example, poor academic performance may
reduce one’s stake in conformity, a constraint against crime, and increase one’s strain, a
motivation towards criminal behavior.
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Instead, in his second proposition, he advocates grouping them into five clusters
called life domains: self, family, school, peer, and work. He states that the life domains
directly and indirectly promote crime by means of reducing the constraints against such
behavior and increasing the motivations for it. The next sections delve into a deeper
discussion of Agnew’s theory, including constraints, motivations, life domains, and
additional propositions.
Constraints against crime.
As stated previously, Agnew’s (2005) initial theoretical proposition is that crime
is most probable when constraints against it are low and motivations towards it are high.
Briefly, constraints are factors that discourage an individual from committing crime.
Here, Agnew draws heavily upon social control theory, self-control theory, deterrence
theory, rational choice theory, routine activities theory, and social learning theory (Akers
1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Beccaria 1872; Bentham
1823; Burgess and Akers 1966; Cohen 1955; Cohen and Felson 1979; Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1991; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; Hirschi 1969; Nye 1958; Sampson
and Laub 1992, 1995; Sutherland 1939; Sykes and Matza 1957).
Agnew (2005) identifies three primary forms of constraints: external control,
stake in conformity, and internal control. First, external control refers to process of others
identifying and punishing an individual’s delinquent behavior on a consistent basis.
Agnew notes that the external control exercised by significant others, like parents or
spouses, is often more substantial than external control exercised by formal entities, like
school authorities or law enforcement officials. Indicators of high external control exerted
upon an individual include the implementation of clearly-defined rules and expectations
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for behavior, regular supervision of behavior, and consistent and proportionate
sanctioning of deviant behavior. Clear rules that define appropriate behavior increase
one’s exposure to definitions unfavorable towards delinquency (Akers 1973, 1998, Akers
et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Sutherland 1939)
and often signal the consequences of violating such rules (Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823;
Hirschi 1969). Both direct and indirect forms of supervision are powerful deterrents to
deviant behavior and association with delinquent peers (Anderson 1999; Bentham 1823;
Cernkovich and Giordano 1987; Nye 1958; Vazsonyi and Flannery 1997; Warr 2005).
Lastly, discipline that is commensurate with an offense and consistently applied provides
the strongest deterrent effects (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Anderson 1999;
Bandura 1977; Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823; Burgess and Akers 1966). As Beccaria
(1872) proposes, “The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression,
than the fear of one more severe” (93).
Next, stake in conformity refers to one’s “investment in conventional society,” or
that which they stand to lose should they commit crime (Hirschi 1969:20). This draws on
Hirschi’s concept of commitment as a constraint against criminal behavior. It is
constraining because persons with a greater stake in conformity have much to lose if they
are arrested and punished for illegal acts. One’s stake in conformity may be cultivated
through strong social bonds to conventional others, taking part in activities with
conventional others, strong school and employment performance, and positive
reputations from conventional others. The consequences of crime may jeopardize one’s
relations with others, standing in various organizations, and ability to engage in desirable
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activities, and level of capital. It is the threat of losing something valuable that deters
criminal behavior (Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823).
The third type of constraint, internal control, refers to one’s ability to refrain from
crime due to either an internalized belief that crime is wrong or a high level of selfcontrol. Those high in internal control are better equipped to successfully resist the draw
of criminal behavior. This form of constraint arises from Nye’s (1958) conscience as a
cluster of control and Hirschi’s (1969) social bond elements of attachment and belief.
Nye (1958) identifies one’s conscience as the profound sense of guilt that dissuades one
from violating rules. It is theorized as the most powerful source of control preventing
humans from engaging in criminal or deviant behavior. Hirschi (1969) expands on this
concept by introducing attachment as the level of care afforded to the opinions of others
and belief as the level of understanding and endorsement of conventional rules and
values. Individuals that care little about other’s reactions to their deviant behavior are less
likely to be deterred by the potential of hurting or disappointing them through crime.
Similarly, those that do not accept conventional rules as legitimate are less likely to abide
by them.
Motivations towards crime.
Motivations for crime are essentially the opposite of constraints in that they are
forces that either entice or pressure an individual to violate norms. Those factors that
draw a person into crime are primarily drawn from deterrence theory, rational choice
theory, routine activities theory and social learning theory (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al.
1979; Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Cohen and Felson 1979;
Sutherland 1938). Those that pressure a person into crime are derived from strain theory
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(Agnew 1992, 2001; Agnew and White 1992; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955;
Merton 1938). Agnew (2005) categorizes motivations that encourage criminality into
three types: reinforcements for crime, exposure to successful criminal models, and
exposure to beliefs favorable to crime. These all stress the mechanisms by which criminal
behaviors and attitudes are learned. Lastly, Agnew refers to those motivations that push
an individual towards crime as strains.
Reinforcements for crime strengthen the likelihood that a behavior will be
repeated or continued (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Burgess and Akers 1977;
Bandura 1977). Reinforcements may be positive or negative. The former strengthens a
behavior by introducing a reward for the respondent, like the euphoria following
substance use, the monetary gain from burglary, or the ensuing feelings of peer
affirmation and prestige arising from gang membership. On the other hand, negative
reinforcements strengthen a behavior by removing a negatively-valued stimulus or
stopping an event that the respondent desires to be stopped. For example, a negative
reinforcement for truancy might be the experience of respite from the physical
harassment of schoolmates. Similarly, the act of running away from home may be
negatively reinforced since it may provide a desired break from parental abuse and family
conflict.
Agnew (2005) argues that exposure to successful criminal models and beliefs
favorable to crime promote criminal behavior because humans tend to imitate the
behaviors of and adopt the values of significant others. Therefore, an individual is more
likely to engage in criminal behavior when they are differentially exposed to significant
others espousing definitions favorable towards crime, modeling efficient and successful
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techniques of committing criminal behavior, and reaping the rewards of such action
repeatedly over time (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; Burgess and
Akers 1977; Bandura 1977; Sutherland 1938). For example, a child that witnesses their
mother successfully steal on multiple occasions is likely to imitate that behavior.
In addition to those motivations that encourage criminality through enticement,
there are also motivations that pressure or coerce individuals into criminal behavior, to
which Agnew refers as strains. Strains are negative social relationships through which an
individual develops negative emotions. Criminal behavior, then, is an adaptation to strain
that attempts to alleviate the individual’s negative affective state. There exist three
primary forms of strain: the actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively-valued
goals, the removal of positively-valued stimuli, and/or the introduction of negativelyvalued stimuli (Agnew 1992, 2001; Agnew and White 1992; Cloward and Ohlin 1960;
Cohen 1955; Merton 1938). These are derived directly from Agnew’s (1992, 2001; with
White 1992) GST.
Agnew (2001) notes that not all strains are equal and that some characteristics of a
strain increase the likelihood that an individual will cope via deviant or criminal means.
For example, strains are more likely to elicit a criminal reaction if they are perceived by
the individual as unjust or unfair. This includes those that the strained individual feels
undeserving of (e.g., bullying and discrimination), rather than those whose cause is
attributed to chance (e.g., an accident or illness). Those perceived by the strained
individual as high in magnitude are also more strongly related to criminal behavior. This
includes those high in degree (e.g., financial cost or subcultural beliefs), frequency,
duration, recency, or centrality (e.g., threatening the core aspects of the individual).
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Additionally, strains related to low social and self-control increase the probability
of crime. This specifically includes those associated with low levels of supervision,
commitment, and belief in conventional norms or values. For instance, Agnew (2001)
argues that a strain experienced by an individual whose behavior is rarely monitored and
who exhibits low levels of belief in conventional society is more likely to produce
criminal behavior than a comparable strain experienced by an individual upon whom
higher levels of social control are exerted. Finally, strains that create pressure for criminal
coping are also more likely to provoke criminal behaviors. Examples of such strains
include those that are associated with exposure to successful criminal models, increased
reinforcement for crime, and enhanced exposure to beliefs favorable towards crime (e.g.,
child abuse and peer conflict). Agnew (2001) considers each of these four characteristics
to be of equal theoretical import.
Life domains.
Agnew’s (2005) life domain-oriented grouping scheme allows those variables
with similar root causes to be clustered together. According to him, each cause should be
part of only one category. Admittedly, variables in different life domains may also have
common causes, but Agnew states that these instances are few in number and weak in
association. Agnew’s rationale for this argument is that the variables within each life
domain tend to be socially, physically, and temporally isolated from those in other life
domains. The five life domains (i.e., self, family, school, peer, and employment) contain
only those variables which previous research has confirmed to exhibit moderate to large
direct effects on crime. All variables within any given life domain either directly reduce
constraints against crime or increase motivations towards crime.
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The self domain is divided into the two traits of low self-control and irritability.
According to the Agnew (2005), low self-control is indicated by impulsivity, lack of
ambition, and lack of consideration of future consequences of behavior. Irritability is
evidenced by showing little concern for others, being antagonistic, and feeling intense
emotional reactions to negative events. These two key variables directly diminish
constraints against crime and increase the motivations for it. For example, those with low
self-control are expected to have low internal control and fewer stakes in conformity.
They are also more likely to hold beliefs favorable to crime, find crime rewarding, and
respond to strain with crime. Similarly, those possessing the trait of irritability are
typically low in internal control and resistant to external control. They are also more
likely to perceive events or situations as strain and to respond with crime. Finally, they
are also more likely to hold beliefs favorable to crime.
The family domain promotes crime in children and adolescents through negative
bonding to parents, poor supervision and discipline, family conflict and abuse, absence of
positive parenting, and criminal family members. Agnew presents a different set of
variables for adults: failure to marry, negative bonding to spouse and/or children,
negative bonding to children, having a criminal spouse, low levels of supervision and
discipline from one’s spouse, family conflict or abuse, and low levels of spousal social
support.
Agnew (2005) proposes that the key variables affecting criminality in the school
domain are negative bonding to teachers or school, poor academic performance, little
time spent completing homework, low educational and occupational aspirations, poor
school supervision and discipline, negative treatment by teachers, and the absence of
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positive teaching. As with the family domain, the general theory states that the significant
variables in this domain are different for adults than youths, as the majority of adults are
not enrolled in school. Therefore, he states that adults are more susceptible to crime if
they have low levels of education. However, Agnew notes that this effect is likely to be
indirect, only affecting crime through other life domains (e.g., work and family).
The peer domain causes criminality in youth whose close friends commit crime,
experience peer conflict or abuse, and spend much time in unstructured and unsupervised
settings. Agnew posits that adults are not as likely as adolescents to be acquainted with
delinquent peers. This is due primarily to the fact that crime tends to decline with age and
that peer relations are often less of a priority than family and work relations. Despite this,
Agnew posits that the peer domain should have a significant effect on crime for some
adults, specifically those with poor or no work or marital ties.
The employment domain is GTCD’s final grouping. Unemployment, poor work
supervision or discipline, negative bonding to work, poor work performance and
conditions, and criminal coworkers are the most important variables in this domain that
affect crime.
GTCD also proposes that the relative effect on crime exhibited by specific life
domains varies according to the developmental stage the individual inhabits. In other
words, it is an age-graded theory in that it outlines specific predictions about the causes
of crime for each stage of development throughout the life course. The variables within
the life domains expected to have the largest effect on crime are different for children,
adolescents, and adults. Further, within each stage of development, some variables are
predicted to have larger effects than others.
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For example, the family and self domains exhibit the largest effect during
childhood. Specifically, Agnew (2005) predicts that poor parenting, irritability, and low
self-control reduce constraints against delinquency and increase motivations for it. Since
children spend relatively little time in school or among peers at this age, these domains
are expected to exert only small to moderate effects on criminal behavior.
It is the self and peer domains, specifically low self-control, irritability, and peer
delinquency, that emerge as the most significant influences on delinquency during
adolescence. During this time period, the family’s influence is replaced by that of peers,
as the individual spends increasing amounts of time with friends. The school and
employment domains should only minimally or moderately affect criminality at this age
because educators and employment do not yet “play a central role in their lives” (Agnew
2005:57).
During adulthood the self, peer, family, and employment domains are expected to
exhibit the strongest effects on crime. Specifically, the two personality traits, peer
delinquency, no or poor marriages, and unemployment or bad jobs are likely to produce
crime. The school domain is expected to have only have a small or moderate effect at this
stage, as most adults have completed their education by the time they enter adulthood.
According to Agnew (2005), the school domain may exhibit an indirect effect on crime
through other life domains. Additionally, the effect of parenting should be minimal since
parents play a less central role in the lives of adults than children. Figure 1 illustrates
GTCD’s proposed effects of life domains on constraints against crime, motivations
towards it, and criminal behavior.

55

SELF
Irritability
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Low Self-Control
FAMILY
Negative Bonding
Poor Supervision/Discipline
Failure to marry
Negative bonding to
spouse/children
Family conflict/abuse
Poor supervision/Discipline

CONSTRAINTS AGAINST CRIME
External control
Stake in conformity
Internal control

PEER
Peer delinquency
Peer conflict/abuse
Unstructured/unsupervised activities
Peer delinquency
SCHOOL
Negative bonding to teachers/school
Poor academic performance
Little time spent on homework
Low educational/occupational goals
Poor school supervision/discipline
Poor treatment by teachers
Absence of positive teaching
Low educational attainment

CRIME

MOTIVATIONS FOR CRIME
Reinforcements for crime
Exposure to criminal models
Beliefs favorable to crime
Strains

EMPLOYMENT
Unemployment
Poor work supervision/discipline
Negative bonding to work
Poor work
performance/conditions
Criminal coworkers
Notes: Variables with relatively large effects are indicated by bold font. Variables affecting adolescence are
illustrated with a gray background and those affecting adulthood are shown with a white background.
Source: Agnew, Robert. 2005. Why Do Criminals Offend? A General Theory of Crime and Delinquency. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press. Adapted with permission.

Figure 1 Agnew’s (2005) General Theory of Crime and Delinquency
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The General Theory’s remaining propositions.
Recall Agnew’s (2005) argument that the variables influencing crime have similar
root causes and should be grouped together into one of five life domains. True to Bernard
and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered approach to integration, his next six propositions
spend a great deal of time specifying the relationship between the variables within his
five life domains. GTCD’s third proposition states that life domain variables exhibit
reciprocal effects on one another in addition to their effect on crime. Agnew notes that
these affects differ in magnitude according to one’s life stage. For example, the family
domain is expected to exhibit a large effect on the self domain during childhood.
Specifically, the absence of positive parenting and poor parental supervision may
negatively affect an individual’s level of self-control, as prosocial responses to strain are
taught early in life. Additionally, the peer domain, is expected to have a large effect on
negative school experiences. This is because criminal peers may discourage time spent
studying, encourage truancy, or discredit the authority of teachers. Further, peer
delinquency in adolescence may produce moderate reciprocal effects on poor parenting
practices and low self-control. As a final example, consider how low self-control might
affect the school domain. Those high in irritability and low in self-control might be
treated more negatively by teachers or alienated from organized activities. In sum, the
variables comprising each life domain exert effects of varying magnitude on each other in
addition to their effect on criminal behavior.
Agnew’s (2005) fourth proposition claims that prior crime indirectly affects
subsequent crime through its effect on the various life domains. That is, prior crime often
produces significant effects in life domain variables, thereby indirectly increasing the
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likelihood of future crime. For instance, individuals that successfully commit crime
undetected or are seldom punished for crime may develop a reduced “fear of external
sanctions” and an increased mastery of techniques of crime (Agnew 2005:93).
Additionally, crime may increase a variety of strains. Examples of such strains associated
with a criminal conviction include the burden of paying court fees and fines, the
revocation of a driving or professional license, or the loss of custody of one’s children.
Further, crime also tends to yield only short-term benefits. For example, consuming
illegal drugs results in a finite period of euphoria. Once this interval ends, an individual
may likely seek to use the substance again. This outcome is especially likely if prior
crime is responded to by others with indifference, approval or justification, or in a
disproportionately harsh manner. For example, criminal behavior in adolescence may
exacerbate harsh parental discipline, increase association with delinquent peer groups,
and negatively affect school performance.
Consider as a final example that prior crime in adolescence may indirectly affect
subsequent crime through the school and peer domains. An individual who has been
caught ingesting illicit drugs may be labeled as a deviant by teachers, administrators,
peers, and other parents. This might seriously attenuate one’s bond to school. The
individual may internalize the deviant label and begin only associating with deviant
others, thus increasing exposure to criminal models and definitions favorable towards
crime. Ultimately, the likelihood of criminal behavior is indirectly increased. Each of
these changes in life domain variables increases the likelihood of subsequent crime.
Next, Agnew (2005) proposes that life domain variables interact with one another
in affecting criminal behavior. That is, a given life domain’s effect on crime is moderated

58

or “influenced by the individual’s standing on the other life domains” (110). This
proposition states that a particular life domain is more likely to cause delinquency if the
individual’s position in other life domains encourages crime. To explain, the effect of
poor parenting on crime is expected to be stronger in those individuals with low levels of
self-control and negative attachment to school than in those with high levels. Similarly,
Agnew states that the life domains interact in affecting one another. For example,
irritability and low self-control will have a stronger deleterious effect on school
experiences and peer relations for those who are subjected to poor parenting practices.
Agnew’s sixth proposition states that the effects of life domains on delinquency
are primarily contemporaneous. In using this term to describe effects, Agnew (2005)
refers to those that occur within a few months after exposure to a given life domain
variable, like peer conflict. That is, life domain variables in adolescence should have a
large effect on adolescent delinquency, but a weaker effect, if any, on adult criminality.
In some instances, the effect may be immediate, while in others it takes longer to
manifest. For example, associating with delinquent others in adolescence might lead to
crime more quickly than negative bonding to school. He further specifies that life
domains should exhibit contemporaneous effects on one another and large lagged effects
on themselves. For instance, poor peer relations in childhood are expected to negatively
affect peer relations during adolescence.
In his seventh proposition, Agnew (2005) argues that life domains exert nonlinear
effects on crime, meaning that a given life domain’s effect on crime will increase as the
life domain increases. For instance, one’s level of self-control may produce an
exponential effect on crime as it increases or decreases. Put differently, the magnitude of
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the effect of a life domain variable on crime will become increasingly larger as one
progresses along the x-axis. As an example, individuals with three delinquent friends may
hypothetically be 1.5 times as likely to use substances as those with two delinquent
friends. However, those with eight delinquent friends may be twice as likely as those with
only seven delinquent friends.
In in the final proposition, GTCD states that outside factors, like those of the
larger social structure (e.g., community disorganization) and biological factors (e.g., age
or sex) indirectly and directly influence life domains. These macro-level variables
influence the level one inhabits in various life domains. For instance, community
disorganization may situate those that live in such areas in a position of poor parenting
practices, diminished school experiences, and increased levels of peer delinquency.
Agnew (2005) argues that such an influence ultimately causes low-socioeconomic status
adolescent males to exhibit the highest level of criminal propensity. Such a statement is
supported by the extant literature, as sex and socioeconomic status are among the
strongest correlates of deviant and criminal behavior.
Cochran’s Extension of the General Theory
Theoretical elaboration.
Where Agnew (2005) created GTCD via theoretical integration, Cochran (2015)
engaged in the practice of theoretical elaboration. Such elaboration should not be
conflated with theoretical integration. Thornberry (1989) identifies the core motivation of
elaboration as “maximizing the explanatory power of a particular theory without the
attendant concern of reconciling differences across theories” (59). This may be
accomplished through the introduction or removal of particular propositions, adjustment
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to the temporal ordering, and/or the re-evaluation of assumptions. The end goal or
elaboration in general is to produce a final product that boasts enhanced power over its
original form. Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E illustrates this by introducing a set of predictor
variables that may increase the theory’s ability to explain crime. While the end goals may
be similar, theory elaboration “involves the logical extension of a particular theory, in an
attempt to improve its adequacy” (Bernard and Snipes 1996:309).
Religion as a distinct life domain.
Cochran (2015) concludes that elements of religion, like religiousness and
religiosity, may influence criminal and deviant behavior sufficiently to warrant inclusion
in GTCD as a distinct life domain. First, religiousness refers to the salience one attributes
to their religious beliefs as a part of their daily life. Next, religiosity refers to behaviors or
actions related to one’s religious beliefs, like personal prayer, partaking of religious
sacraments, or attending religious services. Cochran’s own research and review of the
extant religious literature suggests a strong relationship between elements of religion and
crime (Baier and Wright 2001; Cochran and Akers 1989; Hill and Pollock 2015;
Pirutinsky 2014; Ulmer and Harris 2013). These studies generally report a deterrent
effect, with religious variables acting as protective factors against criminal behavior.
First, Cochran and Akers (1989) report a moderate negative relationship in which
religious adolescents are significantly less likely to use marijuana and alcohol than their
non-religious counterparts. Cochran and colleagues (1994) later find a similar negative
relationship for a variety of criminal and deviant behaviors among their youth sample.
However, these effects are completely attenuated for all but alcohol and cigarette use
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when self-control and arousal theory variables (e.g., impulsivity, thrill-seeking, and
physicality) are introduced into the regression equation.
More recently, Pickering and Vazsonyi (2010) report that religiosity is moderately
and consistently associated with reduced deviance among adolescents, controlling for the
effects of family process. This effect remains robust across sexes and age groups.
Pirutinsky’s (2014) research reveals a significant deterrent effect of religion on serious
crime among adolescents. The author further specifies this relationship by finding that
religiousness is also associated with higher levels of self-control and that
contemporaneous increases in religiousness are associated with lagged increased levels of
impulse control.
Other robust support for the inclusion of religion as a life domain comes from
Baier and Wright’s (2003) meta-analysis of the effects of religion on criminal and deviant
behavior. Baier and Wright analyze 60 extant studies and report a moderate deterrent
effect at the individual level (r = -0.12), which they argue provides “confidence that
religion does indeed have some deterrent effect” on crime (16). Notably, the authors
report that the more recent studies in their sample provided larger deterrent effect sizes.
They attribute this trend to the tendency for these studies to incorporate a greater number
of predictor variables and to utilize smaller sample sizes. Finally, turning toward a
different level of analysis, Ulmer and Harris (2013) find that religious social contexts are
associated with reduced rates of violence among both white and black populations at the
aggregate level. Additionally, certain religious contexts (i.e., increased religious
adherence and religious homogeneity) appear to moderate the effect of economic
disadvantage on violent behavior among black populations.
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Cochran (2015; et al. 1994) posits that such a deterrent effect operates mainly
through increased levels of self-control and social control exerted upon religious
individuals, specifically the bonds of attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief
(Hirschi 1969). However, one may also argue that elements of religion also act as
protective factors against many of the motivations to commit crime, like strain, exposure
to successful criminal models, and exposure to definitions favorable towards crime. This
is because religion may moderate the effects of stressful life events, like neglect, divorce,
harassment, or financial strain, through the collective resources it provides and
worldview it promotes.
Specifically, religiousness and religiosity may increase one’s level of social
capital. Bourdieu (1986) differentiated social capital from other forms of capital (i.e.,
economic, cultural, and symbolic) by defining it as the sum total of resources made
available to an individual through their membership in a social network. Similarly, Burt
(1992) posited that social capital is embedded in the network of relationships that one has
with others, through which the focal actor can access resources. In this context, such
resources may include positive coping strategies, spiritual support, medical and financial
aid, and expressions of affection and love (Pargament 2002). Religiousness and
religiosity also reduce motivations towards crime by emphasizing the existence of a
divine plan, ultimate explanations for aversive events, a benevolent deity, and a greater
sense of purpose in life. Therefore, this support and worldview may promote and
facilitate prosocial adaptations to strain while simultaneously reducing exposure to procriminal models and attitudes.
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For this reason, Cochran (2015) elaborates on GTCD by formulating GTCD-E
and introducing religion as a life domain that affects crime at all stages of development.
Specifically, this extended theory incorporates two principal variables within the religion
life domain: religiosity and religiousness. Both are expected to reduce the likelihood of
criminal and deviant behavior among individuals. Figure 2 outlines GTCD-E’s addition
of religion as a sixth life domain. It shows the effects of life domains on constraints
against crime, motivations towards it, and criminal behavior.
It should be noted that, although Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E proposes religion as
a sixth life domain, Agnew’s (2017) review of the relevant literature finds only relatively
small effects of religious variables on crime. Therefore, the inclusion of such a life
domain may be incongruous with Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered approach
to integration, through which Agnew (2005) includes only those factors that have
exhibited moderate or large effects on criminal behavior. As mentioned above, Cochran
and colleagues (1994) find that the effects of religious variables on crime are reduced to
non-significance for most of the criminal behaviors in their model (e.g., assault, illicit
substance use, and theft) when controlling for the effects of other predictors, like social
control and arousal theory variables.
Cochran’s (2015) own tests of GTCD and GTCD-E later reveal a similar pattern.
That is, religiousness and religiosity exert significant effects at one point, but these are
reduced to non-significance when all predictor variables are included in the model.
Additionally, Antonaccio and associates (2010) find a consistent negative relationship
between religiosity and crime among their international sample of adults in their initial
bivariate analyses.
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SELF
Irritability
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Low Self-Control
FAMILY
Negative Bonding
Poor Supervision/Discipline
Failure to marry
Negative bonding to
spouse/children
Family conflict/abuse
Poor supervision/Discipline

CONSTRAINTS AGAINST
CRIME
External control
Stake in conformity
Internal control

PEER
Peer delinquency
Peer conflict/abuse
Unstructured/unsupervised
activities
Peer delinquency
SCHOOL
Negative bonding to
teachers/school
Poor academic performance
Little time spent on homework
Low educational/occupational
goals
Poor school
supervision/discipline
Poor treatment by teachers
Absence of positive teaching
Low educational attainment

CRIME

MOTIVATIONS FOR CRIME
Reinforcements for crime
Exposure to criminal models
Beliefs favorable to crime
Strains

EMPLOYMENT
Unemployment
Poor work
supervision/discipline
Negative bonding to work
Poor work
performance/conditions
Criminal coworkers
RELIGION
Religiousness
Religiosity
Religiousness
Religiosity
Notes: Variables with relatively large effects are indicated by bold font. Variables affecting adolescence are
illustrated with a gray background and those affecting adulthood are shown with a white background.
Source: Agnew, Robert. 2005. Why Do Criminals Offend? A General Theory of Crime and Delinquency. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press. Adapted with permission.

Figure 2 Cochran’s (2015) General Theory of Crime and Delinquency – Extended
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However, this is not the case with their multivariate analyses, as the religion-related
significant predictors are both fewer in number and smaller in size than in the bivariate
analyses. These two studies suggest that any effects of religious variables are driven by
other factors. They also hint that religion variables may initially exhibit moderate to large
effects in the present study, but such effects will be diminished as other life domains,
constraints, and motivations are incorporated into the regression equation.
Lastly, Pargament (2002) argues that the beneficial effects of religious variables
may vary according to characteristics of one’s religion, one’s present social context, and
one’s own traits. Specifically, the author concludes that religions that are self-selected,
exhibit robust connectedness with other adherents, and are characterized by a strong
relationship with a deity produce the most beneficial outcomes. By contrast, religions
characterized by imposed beliefs, spiritual alienation, and a poor relationship with a deity
produce poor outcomes (Pargament 2002). Further, the efficacy of religion is enhanced
for those whose religion efficiently blends beliefs, motivations, and practices; those
marginalized along other social strata; those facing stressful situations; and those living in
social environments supportive of their faith.
Agnew (2017) further argues that, should religious variables produce sufficiently
large effects, they may better fall under other pre-existing life domains, like the self and
peer domains. This highlights the importance of the current research, as Agnew states, “If
religious variables do turn out to have a relatively large effect on crime, they will have to
be better incorporated into the model” (n.p.).
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Prior Empirical Testing Efforts
Findings.
GTCD has not been extensively empirically tested. This is perhaps due to its
complexity, relatively young age, or both. Regardless of the exact reason, only a handful
of partial scientific tests have been performed. While generally favorable, yet modest,
previous testing has produced mixed results. That is, these tests find support for some of
the general theory’s propositions but fail to find support for others. For example, Zhang,
Day, and Cao (2012) find that all three of the life domains tested (i.e., family, school, and
peer) influence general self-reported delinquency in the expected direction for their
sample of high-school youth. However, the fact that the life domains in their model
contain many variables that do not exhibit a significant effect on delinquency is
indicative of only minimal support. In their full regression model, which includes
measures of constraints and motivations, the authors’ find that the peer domain variables
produce the only observed significant direct effects of all the life domain variables. This
supports Agnew’s hypothesis that the peer domain is one of the most important predictors
of delinquency during adolescence. Additionally, Zhang and colleagues (2012) find that
life domains exhibit both direct and indirect effects on delinquency. This finding offers
support for Agnew’s hypothesis that life domains affect constraints and motivations,
which then influence delinquency.
Ngo, Paternoster, Cullen, and Mackenzie (2011) find only minimal support for the
effect of life domains on official recidivism for their sample of adolescents and young
adults who completed a correctional boot camp. This is because only two of the five life
domains in their model demonstrate significant correlations (i.e., school and
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employment). Further, the coefficients are relatively weak. In testing for nonlinear effects,
Ngo and colleagues (2011) only find negative employment to be significantly, although
weakly, associated with their delinquent outcome variable (i.e., recidivism). Again, this
only offers minimal support for the general theory’s assertion that the effect of life
domains becomes increasingly more robust as the conditions of a given domain worsen.
After further testing, the authors conclude that the relationship between life domains and
crime appears to be neither linear nor nonlinear and are unable to support the proposition
that a given life domain’s effect on crime will be influenced by the other life domains
(Ngo et al., 2011).
Next, Ngo and Paternoster (2014) find limited support for the general theory’s
proposition that life domains will produce contemporaneous and lagged effects on crime
and on each other. Regarding contemporaneous effects, three (i.e., self, family, and peer)
of the four life domains tested (i.e., self, family, peer, and school) exhibit the
hypothesized direction and size of effect on self-reported substance use among their
sample of adolescents. They also find that the contemporaneous effects of life domains
on crime are larger than lagged effects, which provides limited support for Agnew’s
(2005) assertion that the life domains produce largely short-term effects on crime.
Finally, the authors support the general theory’s claim that life domains exert
contemporaneous effects on one another and that any observed lagged effects are smaller
in effect size. However, this support is limited in that there are a few instances in which
the lagged effects of variables within life domains are higher in magnitude than their
contemporaneous counterparts.
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Muftić and colleagues (2014) test the general theory on an international sample of
adolescent students from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their analysis reveals that variables
within all four of the life domains tested (i.e., self, family, peer, and school) directly
affect self-reported violent and property crime in the expected direction. However, all but
the family domain significantly predicts substance use. They also find moderate support
for the proposition that life domains interact in causing crime. For instance, as level of
self-control increases, the effect of parental bonds on substance use is strengthened. They
also find support for indirect effects of variables on offending. Namely, age, sex,
neighborhood collective efficacy, and level of self-control all indirectly affect violent
crime through the life domains.
More recently, Cochran (2015) tests Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and his own GTCDE, which incorporates religious variables. The author finds that four of the six life
domains (i.e., self, family, school, and religion), several constraints (i.e., shame and
formal sanctions), and all four motivations separately significantly predict academic
dishonesty in a convenience sample of college students. Additionally, the life domain
model explains a greater amount of variance in dishonesty than either the constraints or
motivation models. However, in the full model, which includes all three groupings of
predictor variables (i.e., life domains, constraints, and motivations), all of the life domain
and constraint variables are reduced to non-significance. This leaves only the motivation
variables with a significant effect on dishonesty. Overall, Cochran’s (2015) test only
offers modest support for both theories and is unsupportive of Agnew’s claim that life
domain variables have largely direct effects on deviance. Instead, this finding may
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indicate that the effects of life domains are mediated by those exhibited by constraints
and motivations.
Notable limitations.
There are some important limitations to note regarding these previous partial tests
of the general theory. First, most of the previous studies only measure a single outcome
variable, with only one testing GTCD with multiple forms of crime. Zhang and
colleagues (2012) use a 15-item scale to measure self-reported general delinquency. This
scale includes items that ranged from petty theft and vandalism to carrying weapons and
assault; there is no distinction between types of offenses. Along similar lines, Ngo and
associates (2011) measure detected crime committed upon release from a correctional
boot camp, or recidivism. This is measured as a dichotomous indicator of having at least
one post-release arrest. This measurement also does not delineate between types of crime.
Ngo and Paternoster (2014) utilize a dichotomous indicator of two types of self-reported
substance use: alcohol and marijuana. Cochran’s (2015) outcome variable is an index of
various forms of self-reported academic dishonesty. Only Muftić and colleagues (2014)
examine the effects of life domains on multiple forms of crime. This is problematic as the
researchers are unable to explore the generality of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD.
GTCD is a general theory; as such, Agnew’s propositions should hold true for all
forms of crime and deviance. Therefore, it is valuable to examine multiple forms of crime
and deviance as one’s dependent variables. This allows for directly assessing the theory’s
ability to explain multiple criminal and deviant behaviors reported by the same sample.
The present research measures the impact of predictor variables on three forms of
criminal behavior: general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime.
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Additionally, only two previous tests of GTCD (Zhang et al. 2012; Cochran 2015)
organize their predictor variables in a manner that parses out life domain variables from
constraint and motivation variables. Agnew (2005) states that, while it may be a difficult
task, doing so permits assessing the direct effect of life domains on crime and the indirect
effects, as the life domains operate through reduced constraints against criminal behavior
and increased motivations towards it. Recall Agnew’s argument that the five life domains
are the true cause of delinquency, “affecting both the constraints against and motivations
for crime” (40).
Many previous tests are also limited in their construction of the variables that
comprise Agnew’s life domains. Specifically, many use a small number of items to
construct each scale, omit certain variables within a given life domain, or omit certain life
domains altogether. For example, Zhang and colleagues (2012) evaluate only three of the
five life domains (i.e., family, school, and peer). Notably, the authors do not measure the
self domain. This is a significant limitation because Agnew’s theory predicts that this
domain, which is comprised of irritability and low self-control, is one of the two major
causes, along with peer delinquency, of delinquency in all stages of development. That is,
it is expected to exhibit a large effect relative to the other life domains at all ages. With a
mean age of 15, their sample falls squarely into the adolescent age grouping and their
results may be affected by this omission. Further, only 10 variables are used to measure
these 3 life domains, with many being single-item measures. Admittedly, Zhang and
colleagues (2012) caution that their “findings are relevant to imperfect
operationalizations of the concepts in his original theory” and that future studies should
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examine “more refined” and comprehensive measures of the life domains (Zhang et al.
2012:875).
While Ngo and colleagues (2011) attempt to measure all five life domains, they
incorporate a relatively small number of variables in their analysis. The self, peer, and
employment domains are each comprised of a single variable and the family and school
domains are constructed of two variables each. Ngo and Paternoster (2014) incorporate a
larger number of variables but still omit some that the general theory considers vital, like
irritability within the self domain. In addition to such omissions, the authors measure selfcontrol by means of behaviors exhibited during school (i.e., homework completion,
absence, tardiness, attentiveness, and disruptiveness). These are arguably measures of the
school domain, not the self domain. The authors admit that this conceptualization is “not
optimal” and offer several defenses for this decision (8).
Muftić and colleagues (2014) measure four life domains, yet all are constructed
using only one or two variables. For example, the family domain is simply measured by a
two-item index of parental bonding and the peer domain is measured by a five-item scale
of peer delinquency. According to Agnew (2005), the family domain should also include
family criminality, conflict, poor supervision and discipline, among other variables.
Further, their measure of the self domain excludes irritability, which is one of only two
variables in this domain. Cochran (2015) provides only the second attempt to measure all
five life domains. Yet again, relatively few variables are used for each domain.
Additionally, Cochran’s measure of the family domain is constructed of two variables:
parental attachment and parental supervision. This is problematic because Agnew
predicts that these two variables influence adolescent, not adult, deviance. Cochran draws
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data from a “non-random sample of adult (i.e., 18 years of age or older) undergraduate
students (5). Therefore, the family domain should be measured using different variables,
like failure to marry, negative spousal bonding, negative bonding to children, and having
a criminal spouse, among others. Further, Cochran’s (2015) items for parental
supervision measure past behavior. They do not measure the current level of supervision
for the adults. This means that any effects observed by this construct are lagged rather
than contemporaneous, as the dependent variable is a measure of current (i.e., within the
last 12 months) deviant behavior.
An additional shortcoming of previous testing is that some researchers analyze
only cross-sectional data at a single point in time (Cochran 2015; Ngo et al. 2011). This is
a significant limitation as Agnew (2005) states that data drawn from multiple time points
are essential to properly estimating the contemporaneous and lagged effects of life
domains. Agnew argues that cross-sectional data may allow researchers to observe
associations between life domains; however, they do not permit the determination of
causes for such associations. Even when previous tests do incorporate longitudinal data,
some rely on data from specific waves to supplement missing data from previous waves
(Zhang et al. 2012).
Many of the previously-mentioned empirical tests also have sample limitations.
For example, Ngo and associates (2011) draw data from respondents who range in age
from 16 to 35. This wide range arguably includes two stages of development, which is
problematic for an age-graded theory. The samples from some studies only include a
specific age group, like adolescence (Cochran 2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Zhang et al.
2012). As a result of examining a single stage of development, the effects of the life
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domains on crime during other developmental stages cannot be evaluated. A more
complete test of the general theory will test the effects during multiple stages.
Additionally, Ngo and colleagues’ (2011) sample consists solely of male
participants who had previously been convicted of drug offenses. Further, the data are
racially-skewed with 83% of participants identifying as African American. As such, this
study only examines the effects of life domains on crime for a single sex that had already
been punished for having committed a crime in the past. It is unclear how the life
domains affect crime for females, whites, or those who have not been convicted of crime
in the past. Muftić and colleagues (2014) also use a racially homogenous sample. These
are notable limitations as the general theory seeks to explain crime in all contexts,
including crime committed across these social strata. Finally, Cochran (2015)
incorporates a relatively small convenience sample, which seriously calls into question
the validity of reported findings.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
Sample
Data for this dissertation are drawn from the Kaplan Longitudinal and MultiGenerational Study (KLAMS), which is a panel study spanning two distinct generations
of respondents conducted by researchers at the Texas A & M University (Kaplan 1980).
Dr. Howard B. Kaplan’s research efforts were supported by a number of grants issued by
the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) within the National Institutes of Health
(NIDA DA00105, DA00136, DA02497, and DA04310) (Pals et al. 2016). Though a brief
overview of the entire KLAMS sample will be presented, the current research
concentrates on the second generation of participants, who are children of the original
respondents that completed interviews between 1994 and 2008.
Data for the first generation were initially collected in 1971 as KLAMS
researchers interviewed a random selection of 50% of seventh grade students in the
Houston Independent School District in Houston and Harris County, Texas (Pals et al.
2016). This initial wave initiated in-school interviews for a sample of 7,627 participants
(Pals and Kaplan 2013). These students were tested at six additional time points over a
period spanning nearly four decades. Nearly 5,500 respondents participated in the final
wave of data collection, ranging from 35 to 39 years of age (Kaplan and Lin 2000; Pals et
al. 2016).
It was during this final wave that first-generation participants were asked to
identify all of their biological, adoptive, and foster children (Kaplan and Lin 2000). This
led to the inception of an additional study in which the children of first-generation
respondents who had already reached middle-school age, or early teenagerhood, were
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interviewed with instruments similar to those completed by their parents in decades prior
(Pals and Kaplan 2013). Specifically, the first wave of collection for the second
generation (G2T1) consisted of a 171-item self-administered questionnaire completed in
the respondent’s home and a structured comprehensive in-home interview from 1994 to
2000 (N = 7,519) (Kaplan, Liu and Kaplan 2005; Pals and Kaplan 2013). This was
followed up three years later (G2T2) with identical survey instruments, though funding
issues precluded re-interviewing the entire G2T1 sample (N = 1,074). Consequently, the
researchers shifted their focus to young adulthood and followed up with G2T1
respondents who were approaching 21 years of age. This wave (G2T3) once again
incorporated similar instruments and interviewed 1,629 of the original generation two
respondents from 2002 to 2007. Notably, KLAMS provides data for the second
generation at two distinct stages of development: adolescence (G2T1) and adulthood
(G2T3).
As previously stated, this study focuses on the second generation of respondents
by utilizing the first and third waves of data, with each representing distinct stages of
development. The first wave of generation two forms the adolescent sample (in the
dissertation referred to as T1) with respondents ranging in age from 11 to 13, while the
third wave forms the young adult sample (henceforth referred to as T2), with participant
ages ranging from 19 to 26. As a result, the final sample (N = 1,629) is limited to only
those respondents who completed both waves of data collection.
Thus, the final sample consists of students (N = 1629) from the Houston
Independent School District, which range in age from 11 to 13 during adolescence (M =
12.12, SD = 0.47) and 19 to 26 during adulthood (M = 21.51, SD = 0.97). The sample is
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predominantly female, with 52.42% and 52.61% reporting as such during adolescence
and adulthood, respectively. Additionally, the sample is slightly overrepresented by racial
minorities: 40.73% at T1 and 28.93% at T2. Note that this sharp decrease in respondents
identifying as a racial minority is likely an artifact of the T2 questionnaire, as it included
a different set of possible responses. Respondents perceive themselves primarily to be
situated in the middle-class, as it is the modal response for each time period (T1 =
49.47%, T2 = 49.1%). A large majority of the sample is religious during adolescence,
with 92.92% belonging to a religion and 91.91% considering religion to be important.
However, this proportion falls slightly during adulthood, with 84.57% of adults belonging
to a religion and 83.73% considering religion to be important.
Measures
Dependent variables: Rates of varying forms of crime.
The first step in the analytic process is to construct the dependent variables for the
sample during adolescence (T1) and adulthood (T2). Both Agnew’s GTCD (2005) and
Cochran’s GTCD-E (2015) are described as general theories capable of explaining
diverse forms of criminal behavior. Therefore, this study incorporates self-reported
measures of several types of criminal behavior as the dependent variables. These are T1
person/property crime, T1 drug crime, T1 general crime, T2 person/property crime, T2
drug crime, and T2 general crime. The researcher measures each form of crime as a count
of self-reports of related criminal behaviors that the respondent reports having committed
in the preceding 12 months.
Person/property crime includes the following acts (1 = yes, 0 = no): (1)
committing petty theft between $2.00 and $50.00, (2) committing petty theft less than
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$2.00, (3) starting a fist fight, (4) taking part in a gang fight, (5) using force to obtain
money or valuables from another person, (6) breaking into a home, store, or building, (7)
purposefully damaging public or private property, (8) taking a car for a ride without the
owner’s consent, (9) beating up someone who had done nothing wrong, and (10) taking
items worth $555.00 or more.
Drug crime is measured according the admitted use of the following substances in
the past year without a prescription (1 = true/yes, 0 = false/no): (1) marijuana, (2)
steroids, (3) inhalants, (4) stimulants, (5) sedatives or barbiturates, (6) tranquilizers, (7)
non-prescription drugs to get high, (8) psychedelics or hallucinogens, (9) powdered
cocaine, (10) crack cocaine, (11) heroin, (12) opiates, (13) PCP, phencyclidine, or angel
dust, and (14) designer drugs.
Lastly, general crime is a count that combines all of the person/property acts (10)
and drug behaviors (14). The exact same items are used to measure criminal behavior
during both waves of data collection. Approximately 20.69% of respondents report
committing at least one general crime act during adolescence (M = 0.37), while 42.60%
admit as such during adulthood (M = 1.04). Next, 19.95% of the sample admits
committing at least one type of person/property crime during adolescence (M = 0.33) and
19.64% report such behavior during adulthood (M = 0.29). Finally, only 2.46% of
respondents acknowledge using at least one type of drug during adolescence (M = 0.04),
while 34.01% report a drug crime during adulthood (M = 0.75).
Independent variables: Life domains.
The second step in this process is to use GTCD to inform the selection and
assignment of items from the KLAMS dataset into the six life domains (i.e., self, family,
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peer, school, work, and religion) for each stage of development. This study utilizes 18
indicators of GTCD’s and GTCD-E’s life domains during adolescence, most of which are
indices composed of dichotomous items: two for religion, seven for school, two for peer,
five for family, and two for self. Further, it incorporates 15 life domain variables during
adulthood: two for religion, four for employment, one for school, one for peer, five for
family, and two for self.
Recall that most items assessed with the KLAMS instrument are dichotomous in
nature (1 = true/yes, 0 = false/no). Those measured along different levels are
dichotomized and coded in the direction towards deviance according to Agnew’s
theoretical arguments. For example, affirmative responses to question 91 at T1 (“I often
act without stopping to think”) are coded as 1, and negative responses are coded as 0.
Additionally, a number of items are reverse coded to maintain directional consistency.
For instance, negative responses to question 41 at T1 (“My family obeys the law”) were
originally coded as 0. Consequently, this item is reverse coded such that 1 = my family
does not obey the law.
Scales are constructed from these dichotomous items for the key variables within
each life domain. A Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (KR-20) coefficient of reliability is
calculated for each scale to empirically verify that the groupings of these dichotomous
indicators hang together, or, are internally consistent (Agnew 2005). The data are well
suited for such a calculation because each scale item is coded as either 0 or 1, which is a
requirement of calculating a KR-20 coefficient (Thye 2000). For this reason, calculating
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients to assess internal consistency is not appropriate, as doing
so necessarily requires items that contain a range of possible responses. Scales that
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produce moderate (0.5 - 0.79) or high (0.8 - 1.0) KR-20 coefficients are immediately
accepted (Salvucci et al. 1997). Those producing low coefficients (KR-20 > 0.5) are
indicative of weak reliability. Therefore, they are further examined, and measures are
taken to improve internal consistency. Specifically, those items that poorly correlate are
re-examined in light of Agnew’s (2005) theory and dropped from the scales.
Ultimately, reliability coefficients for all accepted indices are between moderate
and high. Note Nunnally’s (1967) argument that this threshold of 0.5 to 0.6 is sufficient
during “the early stages of research” (226). Refer to Begun (1979) for an example of
research published in the American Sociological Association’s Journal of Health and
Social Behavior that incorporates indices with KR-20 reliability coefficients as low as
0.53, to which the author refers as indicative of “modest” internal consistency (384). See
also Kaplan, Damphousse, and Kaplan (1996) for research using KLAMS data that
justifies a similar range of reliability values.
Additionally, polychoric principal components analysis (PCA) is used to create
each index within the six life domains, constraints, and motivations at both time points.
Polychoric PCA determines which factors should be retained. Where the KR-20
coefficient measures internal consistency and shows whether items hang together, PCA
verifies that these items are actually measuring a common construct. Agnew (2005)
argues that this step is necessary to empirically verify whether such variables cluster
according to a given underlying construct (i.e., life domain). In this instance, each set of
factors explains at least 80% of the common variance (Floyd and Widaman 1995). PCA
is preferable to common factor analysis because it better accounts for missing responses
in the KLAMS data. While common factor analysis deletes listwise, PCA allows the
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researcher to keep cases that may have not responded to one or more scale items. Each
index is then rescaled to a value from 0 to 1 to facilitate interpretation (see Pals et al.
2016).
Agnew identifies low self-control and irritability as the two principal variables
within the self domain during adolescence. Low self-control is evidenced by a 20-item
index, consisting of true/false items that measure impulsivity, low ambition, feeling
unbound by conventional norms, and being wild or out of control (KR-20 = 0.71). Again,
this index is created via polychoric PCA. The eigenvalue drops from 6.08 for the first
factor to 1.73 for the second factor. 97.05% of the sample is missing 2 or less items out of
20. Therefore, the researcher allows for up to 2 missing cases out of the original 20 items
to calculate the self-control index (N = 1,581). Upon transforming this index to a range
from 0 to 1, the mean self-control score is 0.18.
Additionally, irritability is measured by a 10-item scale comprised of items to
which respondents indicated attributing aversive events to the malicious behavior of
others, affording little concern to the rights and feelings of others, an antagonistic or
adversarial interactional style, and mean spiritedness (KR-20 = 0.60). For this index
constructed using polychoric PCA, the eigenvalue drops from 3.77 to 1.31 from the first
factor to the second. 98.16% of the sample is missing 1 or less items out of 10 (N =
1,599). Again, the researcher allows for up to 1 missing case out of the original 10 items
to calculate the irritability index (M = 0.24).
The family life domain is comprised of 5 variables: a 9-item scale measuring
negative bonding to parents (KR-20 = 0.67), a 16-item index of poor parental supervision
and discipline (KR-20 = 0.51), a 14-item scale of family conflict and abuse (KR-20 =
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0.60), a 13-item scale measuring absence of positive parenting practices (KR-20 = 0.71),
and a 4-item index of family criminality (KR-20 = 0.52). Though omitted from the text in
order to conserve space due to the large number of scales, the essential information
regarding each polychoric PCA indices for both adolescence and adulthood (i.e.,
eigenvalue drops from the first to second factor, proportion of explained variance, and
missing cases) is presented in Table 1 and Table 2.
Agnew’s third life domain concerns itself with peer relations. The peer life
domain includes the following variables: a 16-item index of peer delinquency (KR-20 =
0.77) and a 7-item scale measuring peer conflict or abuse (KR-20 = 0.60).
The school life domain is comprised of seven principal variables. These include a
12-item index of negative bonding to teachers or school (KR-20 = 0.60), a single-item
indicator of poor academic performance (“Received a failing grade in one or more school
subjects during the previous grading period”), a single-item measure of little time spent
completing homework (“Below average hours spent per day completing homework or
reading for school assignments” [dichotomized]), a single-item indicator of low
educational and occupational aspirations (“Does not expect to engage in post-high school
education”), a 4-item index of poor school supervision and discipline (KR-20 = 0.50), a
single-item measure of negative treatment by teachers (“My teachers usually put me
down”), and a single-item indicator of the absence of positive teaching practices (“When
I work hard on schoolwork, my teachers tell me I’m doing a good job [reverse coded]”).
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Table 1 Index Construction for Adolescent Life Domain, Constraint, and Motivation
Variables using Polychoric Principal Components Analysis
Life
Domain,
Constraint,
Motivation
Self

Family

Peer

School

Constraint

Motivation

Index Name

Eigenvalue
Drop

Low Self-Control

6.08 to 1.73

Proportion
of
Explained
Variance
.304

Irritability

3.77 to 1.31

.377

Negative
Bonding

4.96 to .88

.551

Poor Supervision

4.15 to 2.58

.259

Family Conflict

4.24 to 1.69

.354

Poor Parenting

5.35 to 1.60

.412

Family
Criminality

2.29 to .89

.572

Peer
Delinquency

9.36 to 2.02

.585

Peer Conflict

3.21 to 1.36

.458

Negative
Bonding

4.06 to 2.00

.338

Poor Supervision

1.58 to .42

.790

Likelihood of
Others’ Poor
Reaction
Positive
Reinforcement
for Crime
Crime is
Desirable in
Some Instances

5.62 to 2.73

.312

1.73 to .27

.864

9.95 to 2.22

.622
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# of Missing
cases
permitted

N

µ

97.05%
missing 2
items or less

2 of 20

1581

.18

98.16%
missing 1
item or less
98.83%
missing 1
item or less
97.54%
missing 2
items or less
98.77%
missing 2
items or less

1 of 10

1599

.24

1 of 9

1610

.10

2 of 16

1589

.15

2 of 12

1609

.19

98.47%
missing 0
items or less
98.59%
missing 0
items
98.77%
missing 1
item or less
96.99%
missing 1
item or less
98.40%
missing 1
item or less
98.28%
missing 0
items
99.08%
missing 0
items
99.69%
missing 0
items
98.04%
missing 2
items or less

0 of 13

1604

.13

0 of 4

1606

.09

1 of 16

1609

.04

1 of 7

1580

.15

1 of 12

1603

.12

0 of 2

1601

.27

0 of 18

1614

.39

0 of 2

1624

.19

2 of 16

1597

.03

% Missing
Index Items

Table 2 Index Construction for Adult Life Domain and Motivation Variables using
Polychoric Principal Components Analysis

Low SelfControl

4.82 to 1.71

Proportion
of
Explained
Variance
.301

Irritability

3.57 to 2.26

.325

Negative
Bonding

1.82 to .17

.913

Spousal Conflict

2.96 to .55

.739

Low Spousal
Support

1.86 to .14

.932

Peer

Peer
Delinquency

3.18 to .56

.795

Employment

Poor Working
Conditions

6.75 to 1.77

.482

Life Domain,
Constraint,
Motivation
Self

Family

Index Name

Eigenvalue
Drop
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% Missing
Index
Items

# of Missing
cases
permitted

N

µ

97.97%
missing 3
item or less
97.42%
missing 2
item or less
99.82%
missing 0
items
99.69%
missing 0
items
100%
missing 0
items
99.45%
missing 1
item or less
99.75%
missing 1
item or less

3 of 16

1596

.106

2 of 11

1587

.304

0 of 2

1626

.154

0 of 4

1624

.035

0 of 2

1629

.003

0 of 4

1607

.061

1 of 14

1625

.300

The final life domain for adolescence is religion, since employment is not
included at this stage. The major variables in this domain are religiousness and
religiosity. Respondents were first asked, “How important would you say religion is in
your life?” Response options were 1 = very important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = not
very important, and 4 = not at all important. This variable is dichotomized and reverse
coded so that 1 = not very or not all important and 0 = very or somewhat important.
Regarding religiosity, students were asked to indicate how often they attended religious
services. Possible responses include 1 = about once a week or more, 2 = about two or
three times a month, 3 = about once a month, 4 = a few times a year, as on important
holidays or special occasions, and 5 = hardly ever or never. Again, this item is
dichotomized and reverse coded such that 1 = a few times a year, hardly ever, or never
and 0 = between once a week and once a month.
As an age-graded theory, the principal variables affecting crime are different
during adulthood from those in adolescent (Agnew 2005). As before, low self-control and
irritability are the major variables in the self domain. The former is measured by a 16item index consisting of items to which respondents reported being impulsive, preferring
high-risk activities, having little ambition or motivation, feeling unbound by conventional
norms, and being wild or out of control (KR-20 = 0.67). The latter is represented by an
11-item scale comprised of true/false items measuring experiencing events as aversive,
experiencing intense emotional reactions to aversive events, showing little concern for
the rights and feelings of others, having an antagonistic or adversarial interactional style,
and meanness (KR-20 = 0.64).
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The family domain contains five variables during adulthood. A single true/false
item to which respondents indicated being currently unmarried measured failure to marry.
This domain also includes a two-item index indicating negative bonding to spouse or
children (KR-20 = 0.73). In this case, respondents that currently do not have a spouse or
partner are coded as 0 since they are not exposed to this negative bond. It also includes a
single true/false item to which respondents indicate their spouse or partner having ever
been convicted of a crime. Again, respondents that currently do not have a spouse or
partner are coded as 0 since they are not exposed to this influence. A four-item scale
measuring family conflict or abuse (KR-20 = 0.63) and a two-item index indicating low
levels of spousal social support (KR-20 = 0.57) are the final two variables within this
domain. As before, respondents that currently do not have a spouse or partner are coded
as 0 since they are not exposed to these influences.
The peer domain at this stage incorporates only peer delinquency. This variable is
comprised of a 4-item scale of true/false items to which respondents indicated good
friends being charged with, found guilty of, or sentenced to prison for a criminal offense
or entering a substance abuse treatment facility (KR-20 = 0.75).
The school domain also includes only a single variable during adulthood. Here,
low educational attainment is indicated by a single item measuring respondent highest
achieved level. This is an ordinal level of measurement with higher responses indicating
higher levels of education. Therefore, this item is dichotomized such that 1 = high school
or less and 0 = greater than high school. Agnew (2005) cautions that the school life
domain at this stage likely exerts an indirect effect on crime.
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The employment domain includes three key variables. The first is a single item to
which respondents identified their current employment status. This is recoded so that 1 =
not currently employed for pay and 0 = currently employed for pay. This domain also
includes a single item measuring negative bonding to work to which respondents
identified not being proud of their job. This is reverse coded so that 1 = yes/true and 0 =
no/false. Unemployed respondents are coded as 0 since they are not exposed to this
negative bond. This domain also includes a single-item measure of poor work
performance to which respondents identified ever having been fired or laid off and a 14item scale indicating poor working conditions (KR-20 = 0.83).
As in adolescence, the religion domain incorporates religiousness and religiosity.
Each of these was measured with the same single-item indicators used previously. The
item measuring the importance of religion in one’s life is dichotomized and recoded so
that 1 = not very or not all important and 0 = very or somewhat important. The religiosity
item indicating frequency of attending religious services is also dichotomized such that 1
= a few times a year, hardly ever, or never and 0 = between once a week and once a
month.
Independent variables: Constraints and motivations.
Agnew (2005) argues that life domain variables affect the constraints against and
motivations towards crime, either increasing or decreasing one’s likelihood of criminal or
deviant behavior. He also notes that a proper test of GTCD should incorporate these as
predictor variables. Items related to both constraint and motivation variables are
identified for both developmental periods according to Agnew’s (2005) theoretical
arguments. Constraints during adolescence include two primary variables. The first is an
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18-item index consisting of items to which respondents indicated the likelihood that
others would react negatively to their deviant behavior (KR-20 = 0.73). The second
measures one’s own negative reaction to crime with a single item that asked respondents
how they react after doing something wrong (“When I do something wrong, I usually
admit it and take my punishment”). This item was dichotomized and reverse coded such
that 1 = no/false and 0 = yes/true.
Motivations towards crime during adolescence are comprised of four variables: a
single-item indicator of level of short-term negative emotions (“Often gets angry,
annoyed, or upset.”), a single-item measure of inability to adapt to strain with conformity
(“If someone insulted me, I would probably hit him.”), a 2-item indicator of level of
positive reinforcement for criminal behavior (KR-20 = 0.64), and a 16-item indicator of
crime being desirable in certain instances (KR-20 = 0.79).
Control variables.
All multivariate models include control variables for sex, age, race, and perceived
social class. As noted in the previous chapter, these are identified by Agnew (2005) as
important biological features and characteristics of one’s social context. These also
represent similar control variables incorporated in previous tests of GTCD (Cochran
2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; Zhang et al. 2012).
These controls include respondent’s sex (1 = male, 0 = female), age (years), race (1 =
white, 0 = other race), and a six-point ordinal measure of perceived social class (1 =
upper, 2 = upper-middle, 3 = middle, 4 = lower-middle, 5 = working, and 6 = lower).
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Analytic Plan
Noting the potential difficulty of a complete test of GTCD, Agnew (2005) states
that it is “probably best tested in bits and pieces” (185). The present study follows this
directive, aiming to explore a number of research questions pertaining to the propositions
of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E. To address these questions, a
string of multivariate nested negative binomial and Poisson regression models are
examined, as the dependent variables are counts of crime acts. Table 3 reviews each
research question and its accompanying research hypothesis for the present dissertation.
Sequential multivariate regression analysis.
The researcher estimates a series of 12 nested negative binomial regression
models (NBRM) and Poisson regression models (PRM) using the “nestreg” command in
STATA 13.1. This permits an examination of the contemporaneous and lagged effects of
life domains on all forms of self-reported crime during both developmental stages. This
technique categorizes the independent variables into separate groups and sequentially
adds each block to the regression model until all are included (Acock 2012). This method
is well suited for this dissertation research because it employs count outcome measures of
criminal behavior at both time points and because both theories already categorized the
independent variables into distinct blocks in the form of life domains. Nested regression
analysis in STATA also produces a Wald Chi2 test for each block of predictor variables,
indicating whether its addition to the regression equation significantly to an
understanding of the dependent variable.
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Table 3 Review of Research Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses
Research Question

Research Hypothesis

RQ1: Are all five life domains directly related to
recent criminal behavior? Specifically, do each of
Agnew’s (2005) five life domains, and the
variables within them, exhibit a direct effect on
such crime?

H1: All adolescent (T1) life domains are
significantly related to adolescent (T1) general
crime.
H2: All adult (T2) life domains are significantly
related to adult (T2) general crime.

RQ2: Are the effects of life domain variables on
recent crime mediated by constraints against it and
motivations towards it?

H3: T1 constraint and motivation variables
mediate the effect of T1 life domain variables on
T1 general crime.
H4a: T1 self and peer life domains produce a
larger effect on T1 general crime relative to the
other T1 life domains.
H4b: T1 irritability, low self-control, and peer
delinquency produce the largest relative effects on
T1 general crime.
H5a: T2 self, peer, family, and employment life
domains produce a larger effect on T2 general
crime relative to the other T2 life domains.
H5b: T2 irritability, low self-control, peer
delinquency, no/bad marriage, unemployment, and
bad jobs produce the largest relative effects on T2
general crime.
H6: The same T1 life domain variables predict all
types of T1 crime and deviance (i.e., general
crime, person/property crime, and drug crime).
H7: The same T2 life domain variables predict all
types of T2 crime and deviance (i.e., general
crime, person/property crime, and drug crime).

RQ3: Do the life domain variables with the largest
relative effect on crime vary according to one’s
developmental stage in the manner predicted by
the general theory? That is, do the life domain
variables with the greatest effect in adolescence
differ from those in adulthood?

RQ4: Does the general theory predict all types of
crime and deviance? Specifically, do the causal
variables and the size of their effects differ in
predicting general crime, person/property crime,
and drug crime?
RQ5: Are the life domains more strongly related
to recent, rather than future, criminal behavior?

H8: The effects of T1 life domain variables on T1
general crime are greater than those of T1 life
domain variables on T2 general crime.

RQ6: Do religious variables affect crime enough
to warrant inclusion as a separate life domain?
Specifically, does introducing religion as a
separate life domain increase the explanatory
power of the general theory to describe crime?

H9a: T1 religion life domain exerts a significant
effect on T1 general crime, controlling for all other
life domain variables.
H9b: T1 religiosity and religiousness significantly
negatively affect T1general crime.
H10a: T2 religion life domain exerts a significant
effect T2 general crime.
H10b: T2 religiosity and religiousness
significantly negatively affect T2 general crime.

RQ7: Does Cochran’s (2015) theory predict all
types of crime and deviance? Specifically, do the
causal variables and the size of their effects differ
in predicting general crime, person/property crime,
and drug crime?

H11: The same T1 life domain variables (with
religion) predict all types of T1 crime (i.e., general
crime, person/property crime, and drug crime).
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Additionally, overdispersion of variance is examined for each model. NBRM is
employed when the presence of overdispersion is confirmed, as it is more appropriate
than PRM under such circumstances (Long and Freese 2006). Conversely, PRM is
utilized when overdispersion of the variance is not present in the distribution. Since the
predictor variables take the form of polychoric PCA scales, the effect of each life domain
variable on crime is observed and directly compared to the others. Each effect is
presented as an incidence-rate ratio (IRR), which is interpreted as a factor change in the
expected count of crime incidents given a one-unit change in an independent variable.
The researcher checks for multicollinearity among predictor variables for each model.
The order of block entry into the regression equation begins with individual-level
social psychological variables, like self-control and irritability, and moves outward to
increasingly broader structural life domains. Agnew (2005) attributes great significance
to the influence of self-control and irritability on criminal behavior. Therefore, such
ordering allows the researcher to examine the ways in which the effects of these variables
evolve as additional predictor variables are incorporated into the regression equation.
Variables for each model are entered in up to seven consecutive blocks: control variables,
self domain, family domain, peer domain, school domain, work domain, and religion
domain. The dependent variable in each regression is substituted according to the
associated research question at hand. In one set of regression models (i.e., the second set
of models), two additional blocks are added: constraints against crime and motivations
towards crime.
The first set of models regresses T1 general crime on T1 life domains. This
permits an examination of the contemporaneous effects of life domains on crime (RQ1).
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The second set of models regresses T1 general crime on T1 life domains, T1 constraints
against crime, and T1 motivations towards crime. This set of models is compared to the
first set of models, allowing the researcher to gauge whether the observed effects of life
domains on crime were mediated by those of constraints and motivations (RQ2).
A third set of models is estimated, which regresses T2 general crime on T2 life
domains. This illustrates the contemporaneous effects of life domains on crime during
this stage of development (RQ1). This set of models is then compared to the first in order
to assess whether the relative effect sizes of each life domain variable vary according to
developmental stage (RQ3).
Next, a fourth set of models is estimated in which T2 general crime is regressed
on T1 life domains. This is compared to the first set of models in order to determine
whether the effects of life domains on crime are largely contemporaneous (RQ5).
Specifically, the contemporaneous effects of life domains on T1 general crime are
directly compared to the lagged effects of the same life domains on T2 general crime.
The fifth and sixth sets of models regress T1 person/property crime and T1 drug
crime on T1 life domains, respectively. These sets of models are then compared to the
first model to explore whether the contemporaneous effects of life domains vary
according to type of criminal behavior (RQ4). This process is repeated using the seventh
and eighth sets of models to assess whether the contemporaneous effects of T2 life
domains vary according to type of crime: T2 person/property crime and T2 drug crime.
These sets of models are subsequently compared to the second set of regression models.
Religion is included as a predictor life domain for adolescence in the ninth set of
models. Specifically, T1 general crime is regressed on all T1 life domains, including
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religion. This is subsequently compared to the first set of models, allowing the researcher
to determine whether such variables significantly influence criminal behavior and
whether Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E improves the explanatory power of Agnew’s (2005)
GTCD in adolescence (RQ6). This process is repeated for adulthood, with the tenth set of
models regressing T2 general crime on all of GTCD-E’s T2 life domains. Similarly, this
set of models is then compared to the second set of models to ascertain whether it
improves GTCD’s explanatory ability during adulthood (RQ6).
The eleventh and twelfth sets of models regress T1 person/property crime and T1
drug crime on Cochran’s (2015) T1 life domains, respectively. These are compared to the
ninth set of models in order to examine the generality of GTCD-E. That is, does GTCD-E
predict all forms of criminal behavior equally, or do the causal variables and their effect
sizes vary according to type of behavior (RQ7)?
In sum, this chapter identified the sample, variables, and analytic plan for the
present dissertation. A series of nested NBRM and PRM are estimated to address the
study’s research questions, namely the effects of GTCD’s (2005) and GTCD-E’s (2015)
life domain variables on three forms of criminal behavior at two time points.
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CHAPTER 5: TESTING BOTH THEORIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
Descriptive Summary Analysis
Data were drawn from the Kaplan Longitudinal and Multigenerational Study
dataset and the final sample is comprised of students (N = 1629) from the Houston
Independent School District. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable
incorporated in the present study. The sample was representative of minorities and
women, as it was about 40% minority and 53% female during adolescence, and 29%
minority and 53% female during adulthood. The mean age of respondents during
adolescence (T1) was 12.1, with a range of 11 to 13 years of age. The mean age during
adulthood (T2) was 21.5, ranging from 19 to 26 years of age. The modal perceived social
class for both time points was the middle class, with about 49% of the sample reporting it
as their own each time.
Adults generally tended to report higher rates of crime. Approximately one fifth
of participants reported committing at least one general crime act during adolescence,
compared to 42.60% that reported as such during adulthood. The samples were
comparable in terms of person/property crime, however. Specifically, 19.95% of the
sample reported committing at least one such crime during adolescence, and 19.64%
reported doing so in adulthood. Lastly, only 2.46% of participants reported committing a
drug crime during adolescence, but 34.01% reported doing so during adulthood.
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for All Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable

N

µ

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

1629
1629
1626
1427
1629
1629
1604
1621

12.117
.476
.603
2.673
21.513
.474
.711
3.156

.469
.295
.489
.938
.967
.499
.454
1.010

11
0
0
1
19
0
0
1

13
1
1
6
26
1
1
6

1629
1629
1629
1629
1629
1629

.366
.328
.038
1.044
.295
.749

.938
.796
.295
1.827
.694
1.478

0
0
0
0
0
0

11
8
7
13
6
11

1581
1599
1596
1587

.182
.240
.106
.304

.178
.206
.228
.216

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

1610
1589
1609
1604
1606
1629
1626
1604
1624
1629

.099
.146
.187
.129
.091
.889
.154
.016
.035
.003

.153
.163
.165
.161
.192
.314
.320
.124
.125
.046

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1603
1603
1605
1597
1601
1605
1604
1629

.115
.197
.112
.052
.271
.026
.080
.251

.152
.398
.316
.222
.359
.160
.272
.434

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1609
1580
1607

.037
.148
.061

.097
.191
.182

0
0
0

Controls
Age
Sex (Male)
Race (White)
Social Class (Higher values = lower classes)
Age
Sex (Male)
Race (White)
Social Class (Higher values = lower classes)
Forms of Crime
General
Person/Property
Drug
General
Person/Property
Drug
Life Domains
Self
Low Self-Control*
Irritability*
Low Self-Control*
Irritability*
Family
Negative Bond to Parents*
Poor Supervision/Discipline*
Family Conflict/Abuse*
Absence of Positive Parenting*
Criminal Parents/Siblings*
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond to Spouse/Children*
Criminal Spouse or Partner
Spousal Conflict/Abuse*
Poor Social Support from Spouse*
School
Negative Bond to School/Teachers*
Poor Academic Performance
Little Time Spent on Homework
Lower Educational/Occupational Goals
Poor Supervision/Discipline*
Poor Treatment by Teachers
Absence of Positive Teaching
Low Educational Achievement
Peer
Criminal Peers*
Peer Conflict/Abuse*
Criminal Peers*
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1
1
1
(continued)

Table 4 (continued)
Variable

N

µ

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

Life Domains
Employment
Unemployed
1629
.274
.446
0
1
Negative Bond to Work
1624
.110
.313
0
1
Poor Work Performance
1622
.245
.430
0
1
Poor Working Conditions*
1625
.300
.253
0
1
Religion
Religiousness
1627
.155
.361
0
1
Religiosity
1629
.280
.449
0
1
Religiousness
1629
.162
.369
0
1
Religiosity
1629
.527
.499
0
1
Constraints against Crime
Likelihood of Others’ Neg. Reaction*
1614
.394
.200
0
1
Likelihood of One’s Own Neg. Reaction
1606
.257
.437
0
1
Motivations towards Crime
Level of Short-Term Neg. Emotions
1609
.466
.499
0
1
Ability to Cope with Strain with Conformity
1597
.741
.438
0
1
Likelihood of Pos. Reinforcement for Crime*
1624
.190
.336
0
1
Crime is Desirable in Some Instances*
1597
.028
.085
0
1
Note: Adolescent variables are highlighted with a gray background and adult variables are highlighted with
a white background.
* Scale constructed using polychoric principal components analysis
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Results of Sequential Multivariate Regression Analysis
Contemporaneous and variable effects by age: Adolescence (1st set of models).
The first research question asks whether all of GTCD’s life domains are related
to crime. That is, does each domain exhibit a direct contemporaneous effect on crime.
The first set of models specifically examines the contemporaneous effect of adolescent
life domains on crime. To test this, the researcher estimated nested multivariate NBRM
with adolescent self-reported general crime incidents as the dependent variable.
Independent variables were sequentially added to the regression as five blocks: Block 1:
control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family domain, Block 4: peer domain,
and Block 5: school domain. Table 5 presents the contemporaneous effects of adolescent
life domains on general crime and summarizes the empirical contribution of each life
domain as a predictor of the rate of crime acts.
Several control variables were associated with general crime acts in the first
model. Older adolescents (IRR = 1.50, p < 0.01), males (IRR = 1.68, p < 0.001), and
those from a lower perceived social class (IRR = 1.23, p < 0.01) reported a higher rate of
general crime incidents. Race was not a significant predictor in this model. In Model 2,
the self domain was entered into the regression. All control variables were reduced to
non-significance. However, both low self-control (IRR = 2.76, p < 0.05) and irritability
(IRR = 26.32, p < 0.001) significantly increased the rate of reported crime acts.
In Model 3, the family domain was incorporated. Sex regained significance in this
model, with males reporting more crime acts (IRR = 1.34, p < 0.05). The effects of the
self domain were reduced with this addition. Specifically, low self-control was reduced to
non-significance and the magnitude of the effect of irritability fell to 15.41 (p < 0.001).
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Table 5 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent
Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1276)

Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 1
Controls
IRR
SE
1.502**
1.680***
1.228**

.203
.234
.091

Model 2
+ Self
IRR
SE

Model 3
+ Family
IRR
SE

-

-

1.339*
-

.176
-

2.760*
26.324***

1.084
9.194

15.413***

5.334

2.210*
4.154***

.845
1.222

.016

.086

.110

31.54***
294.91***
31.06***

165.93***
173.47***
128.34***

212.64***
127.67***
46.33**
(continued)
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Table 5 (continued)

Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2

Model 4
+ Peer
IRR
SE

Model 5
+ School
IRR
SE

1.467**
-

.184
-

1.390**
-

.174
-

10.380***

3.358

7.704***

2.518

-

-

2.201*
2.421*
-

.773
1.045
-

137.627***
-

72.323
-

100.773***
-

48.930
-

3.692**
1.412*
1.601*
1.613**
.180

1.518
.197
.375
.285

.163

LR Chi2
317.19***
349.00***
G2
78.72***
51.87***
Wald Chi2 for each block
88.03***
33.10***
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent
change in expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Additionally, poor parental supervision (IRR = 2.21, p < 0.05) and family
criminality (IRR = 4.15, p < 0.001) significantly increased the rate of self-reported
general crime acts. There were no significant effects for negative family bond, family
conflict and abuse, or negative parenting practices within the family domain.
Model 4 added the peer domain. Among control variables, sex (IRR = 1.47, p <
0.01) maintained a significant influence in the same direction. The effect of irritability
was further reduced to 10.38 (p < 0.001) within the self domain. Both poor parental
supervision and family criminality within the family domain failed to produce a
significant effect in this model. Only peer criminality (IRR = 137.63, p < 0.001) exerted a
significant effect within the peer domain, as that of peer conflict and abuse was not
significant.
The school domain was added to the regression equation in Model 5. With this
inclusion, Agnew’s (2005) final model was represented, including all life domain
variables. Sex was the only significant control variable, as males reported a rate of
general crime incidents that was 1.39 (p < 0.01) times greater than females, holding all
other variables constant. Age, race, and perceived social class remained unrelated to the
rate of adolescent crime acts. Within the self domain, each one-unit increase in
respondent irritability increased the expected rate of general crime incidents by a factor
of 7.70 (p < 0.001), controlling for all other independent variables. Self-control remained
a non-significant variable. Two variables within the family domain significantly impacted
general criminal behavior. One-unit increases in poor parental supervision and family
conflict and abuse scores increased the rate of general crime incidents by factors of 2.20
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(p < 0.05) and 2.42 (p < 0.05), respectively. Negative parenting practices and family
criminality were not significant in the final model.
Peer criminality within the peer domain was significantly positively related to
crime, while peer conflict and abuse was not. Specifically, a one-unit increase in
respondent peer criminality score increased the rate of general crime incidents by a factor
of 100.77 (p < 0.001). Finally, four school domain variables significantly affected the
rate of contemporaneous crime during adolescence. Each additional unit increase in
respondent negative school bond score raised the expected rate of general crime acts by a
factor of 3.69 (p < 0.01), while a unit increase in negative teaching practices score
resulted in a 1.61-factor (p < 0.01) increase. Additionally, students that performed with
poor academic performance and those with low educational goals reported rates of
general crime acts that were 1.41 (p < 0.05) and 1.60 (p < 0.05) times higher,
respectively. Neither little time spent on homework, poor academic supervision, nor poor
treatment by teachers significantly affected the rate of crime in the final model.
The overall model was a good fit to explain general crime at this developmental
stage (LR Chi2 = 349.00, p = < 0.001), yielding a pseudo-R2 coefficient of 0.180. The
pseudo-R2 increased steadily as each block of independent variables was added to the full
model, indicating an improvement in model fit. Similarly, the Wald Chi2 test for each
regression model was sufficiently large and highly significant, leading to the conclusion
that each grouping of variables contributed significantly to an understanding of general
crime during adolescence. Significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance (G2 =
51.87, p < 0.001) indicated that NBRM was preferred to PRM with the current data
(Long and Freese 2006). Tests for multicollinearity identified no such issues.
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Specifically, none of the calculated variance inflation factor (VIF) values exceeded 2.6
and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Mediating effects of constraints and motivations (2nd set of models).
The second research question inquiries whether the effects of life domain
variables on crime are mediated by constraints against crime and motivations towards it.
Therefore, the second analysis specifically examined contemporaneous adolescent life
domain effects as they are influenced by adolescent constraints against crime and
motivations towards it. Nested multivariate NBRM was again utilized with adolescent
self-reported general crime acts as the dependent variable. However, constraints and
motivations were incorporated as separate blocks of predictor variables in addition to the
life domain blocks utilized in the first set of regression analysis: Block 6: constraints
against crime, and Block 7: motivations towards crime. Table 6 summarizes the
contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains, constraints, and motivations on
general crime incidents as well as the empirical importance of each block of predictor
variables.
Model 6 was the penultimate model and added constraints against crime as independent
variables. Sex (IRR = 1.38, p < 0.05) remained the only significant control variable in
this model. Irritability (IRR = 7.15, p < 0.001) significantly increased the rate of crime
acts, while low self-control did not within the self domain. Within the family domain,
poor parental supervision (IRR = 2.30, p < 0.05) and family conflict and abuse (IRR =
2.37, p < 0.05) continued to exert a significant effect in this model. Peer criminality (IRR
= 96.19, p < 0.001) was the only significant predictor within the peer domain. Variables
that significantly affected the rate of crime incidents within the school domain include
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negative school bond (IRR = 3.64, p < 0.01), poor academic performance (IRR = 1.39, p
< 0.05), and negative teaching practices (IRR = 1.58, p < 0.05). The effect of low
educational goals failed to reach significance in this model. Lastly, none of the variables
within the constraints against crime block were significantly associated with self-reported
general crime acts. That is, neither the probability of others’ negative reaction to criminal
behavior nor the probability of one’s own negative reaction to crime exerted a significant
impact.
Finally, Model 7 introduced motivations towards crime as a block of independent
variables and represented the full regression model. As with Model 6, sex remained the
only significant control variable in the final model, with male adolescents reporting an
expected rate of general crime incidents that is 1.38 (p < 0.05) times greater than female
respondents, holding all other variables constant. Age, race, and perceived social class
were non-significant in the final model. Within the self domain, each one-unit increase in
respondent level of irritability raised the number of reported criminal acts by a factor of
7.13 (p < 0.001), controlling for all other predictor variables. Self-control remained
unrelated to crime incidents in the final model. Poor parental supervision was the lone
variable within the family domain that exerted a significant effect on self-reported general
crime incidents, as the effect of family conflict and abuse was reduced to nonsignificance. Specifically, each additional unit increase in poor parental supervision
increased the rate of general crime incidents by a factor of 2.30 (p < 0.05). Negative
family bond, negative parenting practices, and family criminality were not significantly
associated with general crime.

103

Table 6 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent Life
Domain, Constraint, and Motivation Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime
Incidents (N = 1276)

Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Block 6: Constraints
Prob. of Others’ Neg.
Reaction
Prob. of Own Neg.
Reaction
Block 7: Motivations
Level of Short-Term Neg.
Emotions
Ability to Cope with
Strain with Conformity
Positive Reinforcement for
Crime
Crime is Desirable in
Some Instances
Pseudo-R2

Model 6
+ Constraints

Model 7
+ Motivations

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.376*
-

.174
-

1.376*
-

.174
-

7.150***

2.367

7.150***

2.367

2.302*
2.374*
-

.810
1.031
-

2.302*
2.374*
-

.810
1.031
-

96.200***

96.200***

46.415

-

46.41
5
-

-

-

3.636**
1.393*
1.578*

1.488
.194
.279

3.636**
1.393*
1.578*

1.488
.194
.279

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.182

.182

LR Chi2
352.90***
352.90***
G2
50.67***
50.67***
Wald Chi2 for each block
3.89
3.89
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests))

104

Within the peer domain, only peer criminality was a significant predictor variable,
with one-unit increases in this score increasing the rate of general crime incidents by a
factor of 83.19 (p < 0.001). Low self-control did not significantly affect crime in this
model. Three school domain variables were significant. Each one-unit increase in
negative school bond score increased the expected rate of self-reported general crime acts
by a factor 3.63 (p < 0.01). Additionally, adolescents with poor academic performance
and those that experienced negative teaching practices reported rates of general crime
incidents that were 1.40 (p < 0.05) and 1.57 (p < 0.05) times higher than other
respondents, respectively. Little time spent on homework, low educational goals, poor
academic supervision, and negative treatment by teachers were not significantly related to
crime in the full model.
Both of the constraints variables (i.e., the probability of others’ negative reaction
to crime and the probability of one’s own negative reaction to crime) remained unrelated
to the rate of general crime acts in the final model. Similarly, none of the motivation
variables emerged as significantly related to general crime. Specifically, neither one’s
level of short-term negative emotions, one’s inability to cope with strain with conformity,
positive reinforcement for crime, nor the perception of crime as desirable in some
instances significantly affected the rate of self-reported general crime incidents.
While the final model was a good fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 354.14, p = < 0.001),
it was not a significantly better fit than the life domain only model. The pseudo-R2
coefficient of 0.183, increased steadily from 0.016 to 0.180 as each life domain block was
added to the equation. However, the pseudo-R2 value plateaued after the peer domain
was added, only increasing by an increment of 0.002 beyond 0.180 as both the constraints
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and motivations blocks were added, indicating no improvement. Along the same lines,
the Wald Chi2 test was sufficiently large and highly significant for each regression model
except those which incorporated constraint and motivation variables. This empirically
demonstrated that the addition of the control and life domain blocks significantly
improved the overall model’s ability to explain adolescent crime acts, while the addition
of the constraint and motivation blocks failed to do so. An examination of overdispersion
of the variance (G2 = 50.03, p < .001) identified NBRM as the preferred method of
analysis. Again, multicollinearity posed no problem since none of the calculated VIF
values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance value fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Contemporaneous and variable effects by age: Adulthood (3rd set of models).
The third research question asks whether life domain variables exerting relatively
large effects on crime vary according to developmental stage? Specifically, do the life
domain variables with the greatest effect in adolescence differ from those in adulthood?
To test this, and whether all life domains are related to crime during adulthood (RQ1), the
researcher estimated nested multivariate NBRM with adult self-reported general crime
incidents as the dependent variable. In this case, independent variables were sequentially
entered as six blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family
domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 7 summarizes the
contemporaneous effects of adult life domains on general crime and the empirical
contribution each life domain makes as a predictor of the rate of crime incidents.
Two control variables were associated with general crime acts in the first model.
Male (IRR = 1.58, p < 0.001) and white respondents (IRR = 1.51, p < 0.001) reported a
higher rate of general crime incidents. Age and perceived social class were not
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significantly related to general crime in this model. In Model 2, the self domain was
entered. Both sex (IRR = 1.61, p < 0.001) and race (IRR = 1.49, p < 0.001) continued to
exert significant effects among control variables. Within the self domain, both low selfcontrol (IRR = 1.85, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR = 3.99, p < 0.001) significantly raised
the rate of reported crime incidents.
The family domain was introduced in Model 3. Respondent sex (IRR = 1.65, p <
0.001) and race (IRR = 1.59, p < 0.001) continued to exert significant effects. The self
domain also maintained significance, with low self-control (IRR = 1.89, p < 0.01) and
irritability (IRR = 3.52, p < 0.001) each increasing the rate of general crime acts. Two
variables within the family domain yielded significant impacts: failure to marry (IRR =
1.91 p < 0.001) and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 3.38, p < 0.001). Negative
spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and low spouse/partner social
support did not significantly affect the rate of general crime incidents.
Model 4 incorporated the peer domain. Sex (IRR = 1.56, p < 0.001) and race (IRR
= 1.56, p < 0.001) continued to exert significant impacts among control variables.
Similarly, the effects of low self-control (IRR = 1.58, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR =
3.03, p < 0.001) remained significant within the self domain. Failure to marry (IRR =
1.91, p < 0.001), and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.61, p < 0.01) remained the only
variables within the family domain that were significantly associated with crime. The
lone peer domain variable, peer criminality (IRR = 5.39, p < 0.001) exerted a significant
effect on the rate of general crime acts.
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Table 7 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adult Life
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1480)
Model 1
Controls
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each
block

Model 2
+ Self

Model 3
+ Family

Model 4
+ Peer

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.581***
1.513***
-

.144
.159
-

1.605***
1.494***
-

.143
.154
-

1.654***
1.587***
-

.147
.164
-

1.555***
1.559***
-

.134
.156
-

1.846**
3.989***

.351
.826

1.886**
3.517***

.357
.726

1.579*
3.030***

.289
.602

1.907***
3.380***
-

.331
1.074
-

1.915***
2.608***
-

.323
.799
-

5.391***

1.124

.011

.029

.037

.055

43.22***
973.34***
43.60***

115.59***
818.66***
70.20***

150.25***
772.42***
31.75***

222.97***
618.69***
65.31***
(continued)
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Table 7 (continued)
Model 5
+ School
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Pseudo-R2

Model 6
+ Work

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.522***
1.606***
-

.131
.161
-

1.464***
1.641***
-

.125
.164
-

1.524*
3.037***

.279
.601

2.954***

.598

1.997***
2.616**
-

.338
.800
-

1.935***
2.143*
-

.326
.649
-

5.034***

1.052

4.770***

.974

1.359**

.139

1.301**

.132

1.367*
1.566***
.065

.196
.149
-

.057

LR Chi2
232.06***
261.65***
G2
605.26***
560.39***
Wald Chi2 for each
9.04***
29.58***
block
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Model 5 denotes the inclusion of the school domain. The same significant
variables from Model 4 remained as such in this model. Specifically, male (IRR = 1.52, p
< 0.001) and white (IRR = 1.61, p < 0.001) respondents reported higher rates of general
crime acts. Low self-control (IRR = 1.52, p < 0.05) and irritability (IRR = 3.04, p <
0.001) within the self domain maintained significance. Failure to marry (IRR = 2.00, p <
0.001) and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.62, p < 0.01) continued to exert the only
significant effects among family domain variables. Peer criminality (IRR = 5.03, p <
0.001) remained significantly positively associated with general crime during adulthood.
The effect of low educational achievement (IRR = 1.36, p < 0.01) achieved significance
within the school domain in adulthood.
The employment domain was added to the regression equation in Model 6. With
this inclusion, Agnew’s (2005) final theoretical model was represented, including all life
domain variables. Among control variables, males and white respondents reported rates
of general crime acts that were 1.46 (p < 0.001) and 1.64 (p < 0.001) times higher than
others, holding all other independent variables constant. Age and perceived social class
did not produce significant effects in the final model. Within the self domain, the effect of
low self-control was diminished to the point of non-significance. However, irritability
continued to exert a significant impact, as each unit increase in respondent score for this
variable raised the rate of general crime acts by a factor of 2.95 (p < 0.001).
The effects of failure to marry and spouse/partner criminality maintained
significance among family domain variables. Specifically, unmarried respondents and
those with criminal spouses/partners reported rates of general crime incidents that were
1.93 (p < 0.001) and 2.14 (p < 0.05) times higher than others, respectively. Neither poor
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spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, nor low spouse/partner social
support significantly impacted the rate of contemporaneous general crime acts in the final
model. The peer domain remained significantly related to general crime in the final
model. Each additional unit increase in respondent peer criminality score increased the
rate of general crime incidents by a factor of 4.77 (p < 0.001), controlling for the effects
of all other variables.
Low educational achievement continued to exert a significant positive effect
within the school domain, as those whose highest level of education was high school
reported a rate of general crime acts that was 1.30 (p < 0.01) times greater than those with
more education than a high school degree or its equivalent. Finally, two variables within
the employment domain significantly affected the rate of general crime acts. Those with a
negative work bond reported a rate of general crime incidents that was 1.37 (p < 0.05)
times greater than others. Additionally, those with poor work performance reported a rate
of contemporaneous general crime acts that was 1.57 (p < 0.001) times higher. Nonsignificant effects in this domain included unemployment and poor working conditions.
The full model provided the best fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 349.00, p = < 0.001)
and produced a pseudo-R2 coefficient of 0.065. The pseudo-R2 value increased from
0.011 to 0.065 as independent variables were added to subsequent models. Additionally,
the Wald Chi2 test for each regression model was large and highly significant,
demonstrating that the addition of each block contributed significant to an understanding
of general crime during adulthood. Significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance
(G2 = 560.39, p < .001) confirmed NBRM as preferable to PRM (Long and Freese 2006).
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Multicollinearity among predictor variables was not a problem, as none of the calculated
VIF values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Comparison of contemporaneous and lagged effects (4th set of models).
The fifth research question explores Agnew’s claim regarding the
contemporaneous and lagged effects of life domains on crime. It specifically questions
whether life domains are more strongly related to recent crime rather than future crime.
This analysis tested whether adolescent life domains exerted a significant lagged effect
on crime and whether this effect is weaker than contemporaneous effects. Therefore, the
researcher employed nested multivariate NBRM with adult self-reported general crime
incidents as the dependent variable. As before, independent variables were added to the
regression as five consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain,
Block 3: family domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 8
summarizes the lagged effects of adolescent life domains on general crime acts in
adulthood. It also presents the empirical contribution of each life domain as a predictor of
the rate of crime acts.
Two of four control variables were associated with general crime acts in the first
model. Males (IRR = 1.65, p < 0.001) and white adolescents (IRR = 1.37, p < 0.01)
reported a higher rate of general crime acts in adulthood. Age and perceived social class
did not significantly affect the rate of crime incidents in this model. The self domain was
incorporated in Model 2. The effects of sex (IRR = 1.55, p < 0.001) and race (IRR = 1.38,
p < 0.01) remained significant. Only irritability (IRR = 2.26, p < 0.01) within the self
domain significantly affected the rate of self-reported general crime incidents, as low
self-control was not significantly related.
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In Model 3, the family domain was added. Sex (IRR = 1.60, p < 0.001) and race
(IRR = 1.43, p < 0.01) continued to exert the only significant effects among control
variables. Irritability (IRR = 2.21, p < 0.01) retained significance within the self domain.
Only one variable from the family domain produced a significant effect on adult selfreported crime incidents in this model: family criminality (IRR = 1.76, p < 0.05). Neither
negative family bond, poor parental supervision, family conflict and abuse, nor negative
parenting practices significantly influenced the rate of self-reported general crime acts in
this model.
The peer domain was introduced in Model 4. The effects of sex (IRR = 1.63, p <
0.001) and race (IRR = 1.45, p < 0.001) maintained significance. Irritability (IRR = 2.27,
p < 0.01) also remained the only significant predictor within the self domain.
Within the family domain, family criminality was reduced to non-significance.
Within the peer domain, peer criminality did not exert a significant effect, but peer
conflict and abuse significantly negatively influenced lagged crime in adulthood (IRR =
0.46, p < 0.01).
The school domain was added to the regression equation in Model 5. This model
represents Agnew’s (2005) final model. Respondents that were male and white were
reported rates of lagged general crime acts that were 1.64 (p < 0.001) and 1.41 (p < 0.01)
times higher than others, respectively. Non-significant effects among control variables
included age and perceived social class. Irritability was the only significantly associated
variable within the self domain, as low self-control did not exert an effect.
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Table 8 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent
Life Domain Variables Predicting Lagged General Crime Incidents (N = 1276)
Model 1
Controls
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 2
+ Self

Model 3
+ Family

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.654***
1.368**
-

.160
.139
-

1.552***
1.385**
-

.153
.144
-

1.605***
1.433**
-

.159
.151
-

2.258**

.631

2.211**

.641

1.755*

.462

.010

.013

.015

36.46***
872.17***
36.89***

45.94***
849.96***
9.40*

54.90***
834.29***
8.69
(continued)
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Table 8 (continued)
Model 4
+ Peer
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 5
+ School

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.627***
1.454***
-

.161
.153
-

1.635***
1.406**
-

.162
.150
-

2.269**

.658

2.074*

.610

-

-

-

-

.455**

.133

.424**

.126
-

.018

.020

63.81***
819.01***
8.94*

71.43***
801.67***
7.59

Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Specifically, a one-unit increase in the respondent irritability score increased the rate of
lagged general crime incidents by a factor of 2.07 (p < 0.05), controlling for the effect of
all other variables.
All family domain variables (i.e., negative parental bond, poor parental
supervision, family conflict and abuse, and negative parenting practices) remained
unrelated to lagged crime acts in the final model. Within the peer domain failed to reach
significance, peer conflict and abuse continued to negatively influence the rate of crime
acts. Specifically, a one-unit increase in level of peer conflict and abuse decreased the
rate of expected lagged general crime incidents by a factor of 0.58 (p < 0.01). Lastly,
none of the variables within the school domain exerted significant effects on crime in
adulthood in the final model, including negative school bond, poor academic
performance, little times spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic
supervision, poor treatment by teachers, and negative teaching practices.
The final model fit the data well as an explanation for lagged general crime acts
(LR Chi2 = 71.43, p = < 0.001), producing a pseudo-R2 value of 0.020. However, not all
models provided a significant improvement. The Wald Chi2 test for the following models
was significant: Model 1 (control variables), Model 2 (+ self domain), and Model 4 (+
peer domain). This indicates that each of these three blocks significantly improved the
overall model. However, the Wald Chi2 test for Model 3 (+ family domain) and Model 5
(+ school domain) failed to reach significance, suggesting no improvement. PRM was
less appropriate than NBRM for this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of
the variance in the distribution (G2 = 801.67, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). Tests for
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multicollinearity identified no such issues, as none of the calculated VIF values exceeded
2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Variable effects by crime type: Adolescence (5th and 6th sets of models).
The fourth research question explores whether Agnew’s (2005) life domains
affect all types of crime in the same manner. Therefore, the next two analyses examined
the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on two additional forms of
criminal behavior: person/property crime and drug crime. First, nested multivariate
NBRM was employed with adolescent self-reported person/property crime incidents as
the dependent variable. The independent variables were sequentially entered as five
consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family
domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 9 presents the
contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on person/property crime incidents
and summarizes the empirical each block of predictor variables makes to the full model.
Most of the control variables influenced general crime incidents in the initial
model. Older adolescents (IRR = 1.39, p < 0.05), males (IRR = 1.75, p < 0.001), and
those from a lower perceived social class (IRR = 1.23 p < 0.01) reported higher rates of
person/property crime acts during adolescence. Respondent race was not significantly
related to the dependent variable in Model 1. Model 2 included the self domain. With this
inclusion, the effects of all previously-significant control variables were diminished to
non-significance. Both self domain variables exerted a significant effect, as low selfcontrol (IRR = 2.46, p < 0.05) and irritability (IRR = 26.69, p < 0.001) each increased the
rate of expected person/property crime acts among the sample.
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Table 9 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent
Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Person/Property Crime Incidents (N =
1276)
Model 1
Controls
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 2
+ Self

Model 3
+ Family

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.394*
1.755***
1.227**

.189
.242
.090

-

-

1.392**
-

.183
-

2.457*
26.694***

.939
9.143

16.536***

5.674

2.577*
2.812***

1.207
.834

.017

.092

.110

32.35***
202.87***
31.93***

170.60***
107.52***
133.16***

203.23***
82.14***
33.06***
(continued)
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Table 9 (continued)
Model 4
+ Peer
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 5
+ School

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.472**
-

.188
-

1.402*
-

.179
-

11.489***

3.777

8.346***

2.767

-

-

2.082*
2.543*
-

.742
1.111
-

75.165***
-

40.432
-

55.395**
-

27.490
1.713
.197
.384
.273

.151

4.138**
1.395*
1.627*
1.508*
.167

279.09***
56.40***
64.59***

310.14***
38.56***
32.25***

Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Model 3 incorporated the family domain. Sex (IRR = 1.39, p < 0.01) regained
significance and was the only significant predictor among the control variables. The
effects of the self domain were diminished in this model. The effect of low self-control
was attenuated to non-significance and the effect of irritability fell to 16.54 (p < 0.001).
Family conflict and abuse (IRR = 2.58, p < 0.05) and family criminality (IRR = 2.81, p <
0.001) emerged as the only variables within the family domain that were significantly
related to person/property crime. Negative family bond, poor parental supervision, family
conflict and abuse, and negative parenting practices did not exhibit a significant impact in
this model.
The peer domain was introduced in Model 4. Sex (IRR = 1.47, p < 0.01) retained
significance among the control variables. Irritability maintained significance within the
self domain but its effect magnitude fell to 11.50 (p < 0.001). All family domain variables
were reduced to non-significance in this model. Only peer criminality (IRR = 75.17, p <
0.001) within the peer domain significantly impacted the rate of adolescent
person/property crime, as peer conflict and abuse was unrelated.
Model 5 included the school domain and represented Agnew’s (2005) final
theoretical model. Male adolescents reported a rate of contemporaneous person/property
crime incidents that was 1.40 (p < 0.05) times higher than females, controlling for all
other predictor variables. Non-significant effects among control variables in the final
model included age, race, and perceived social class. Irritability exerted the only
significant effect among self domain variables, with each unit increase in irritability level
increasing the rate of contemporaneous person/property crime acts by a factor of 8.35 (p
< 0.001). Self-control did not significantly affect crime in the final model.
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Within the family domain, poor parental supervision and family criminality
exerted significant impacts in the final model. Specifically, each additional unit increase
in parental supervision and family criminality scores raised the rate of person/property
crime incidents by factors of 2.08 (p < 0.05) and 2.54 (p < 0.05), respectively. Negative
family bond, negative parenting practices, and family criminality continued to be nonsignificant variables in the final model. Only peer criminality within the peer domain
significantly affected crime in the final model, as peer conflict and abuse was nonsignificant. Specifically, a one-unit increase in level of peer criminality raised the rate of
expected contemporaneous adolescent person/property crime incidents by a factor of
55.40 (p < 0.001), holding all other variables constant.
Among school domain variables, negative school bond, poor academic
performance, low educational goals, and negative teaching practices were significantly
positively related to person/property crime during adolescence. Specifically, a one-unit
increase in negative school bond score increased the rate of person/property crimes by a
factor of 4.14 (p < 0.001). Additionally, respondents that perform poorly in school and
those that experience negative teaching practices reported rates of person/property crimes
that were 1.40 (p < 0.05) and 1.51 (p < 0.05) times higher, respectively. Finally, those
that have low educational goals reported a rate of person/property crime that was 1.63 (p
< 0.05) times higher than those with higher goals. Non-significant effects in this domain
included little time spent on homework, poor academic supervision, and poor treatment
by teachers.
The overall model provided the best fit for explaining person/property crime
during adolescence (LR Chi2 = 310.14, p = < 0.001). The pseudo-R2 coefficient for each
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model increased consistently from 0.017 to 0.167. Each block of predictor variables
added to the overall model’s ability to explain person/property crime during adolescence,
as indicated by large and significant Wald Chi2 tests. PRM was less appropriate than
NBRM for this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance in the
distribution (G2 = 38.56, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). Again, multicollinearity was
not an issue since tests revealed that no calculated VIF values exceeded 2.6 and no
tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
As mentioned previously, the proceeding analysis is the second of two related
analyses measuring the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on specific
forms of crimes. This next analysis utilized PRM with adolescent drug crime incidents as
the dependent variable. Similar to the previous analyses, independent variables were
entered sequentially in five blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain,
Block 3: family domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 9
presents the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on drug crime acts and
summarizes the empirical contribution each block of predictor variables makes to the full
model.
Model 1 included only control variables. Within this model, age (IRR =2.94, p <
0.001) significantly affected the rate of drug crime incidents during adolescence for this
initial model. Respondent sex, race, and perceived social class produced non-significant
effects. Model 2 introduced the self domain. With this addition, the effect of age
remained significant and positive (2.43, p < 0.01). Within the self domain, only
irritability (IRR = 16.55, p < 0.01) was significantly associated with drug crime, as the
effect of low self-control was not significant.
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Table 10 Summary of Nested Poisson Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent Life
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Drug Crime Incidents (N = 1276)
Model 1
Controls
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 2
+ Self

Model 3
+ Family

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

2.938***
-

.870
-

2.425**
-

.708
-

1.949*
-

.588
-

16.552***

13.488

-

-

6.212*
39.634***

4.764
19.179

.039

.094

.250

15.35**
16.14**

37.29***
23.71***

99.53***
71.85***
(continued)
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Table 10 (continued)
Model 4
+ Peer
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
Wald Chi2 for each block

Model 5
+ School

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

2.356*
-

.940
-

2.926*
-

1.340
-

-

-

-

-

.061*
9.136***

.074
5.749

.033*
8.569**

.046
5.760

330.989***
-

248.890
-

894.031***
-

704.223
1.237
2.059

.427

2.674*
5.145***
.493

170.39***
59.59***

196.66***
29.26***

Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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The family domain was entered into the regression in Model 3. Age (IRR = 1.95,
p < 0.05) maintained its significant positive effect in this model. The effect of irritability
within the self domain was reduced to non-significance. Two family domain variables
significantly impacted the rate of adolescent drug crime incidents: poor parental
supervision (IRR = 6.21, p < 0.05) and family criminality (IRR = 39.63, p < 0.001). Nonsignificant effects include those of negative family bond, family conflict and abuse, and
negative parenting practices.
Model 4 introduced the peer domain. The effect of age was reduced to nonsignificance, while that of race (IRR = 2.36, p < 0.05) emerged as significant in this
penultimate model. Both self domain variables continued to exert non-significant effects.
Family criminality (IRR = 9.14, p < 0.01) and negative parenting practices (IRR = 0.06, p
< 0.05) exerted the only significant effects with the family domain since the effect of
parental supervision became non-significant. Peer criminality (IRR = 330.99, p < 0.001)
emerged as the only significant variable within the peer domain. Peer conflict and abuse
was unrelated to adolescent drug crime in this model.
The school domain was included in Model 5, which incorporated all of Agnew’s
(2005) life domains. The effects of race continued to be significant in the final model, as
white students reported a rate of drug crime incidents that was 2.93 (p < 0.05) times
greater than others, controlling for the effects of all predictor variables. Neither age, sex,
nor perceived social class exerted a significant impact on the rate of contemporaneous
adolescent drug crime. Both self domain variables remained non-significant. Family
criminality and negative parenting practices continued to exert the only significant effects
with the family domain. Specifically, a one-unit increase in family criminality score
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increased the rate of contemporaneous adolescent drug crime incidents by a factor of 8.57
(p < 0.01). Additionally, a one-unit increase in negative parenting practice score
decreased the rate of drug crime acts by a factor of 0.97 (p < 0.05), controlling for all
other variables. Non-significant effects in this domain include negative family bond, poor
parental supervision, and family conflict and abuse.
Only peer criminality within the peer domain exerted a significant effect in the
final model since peer conflict and abuse remained non-significant. Specifically, a oneunit increase in level of peer criminality increased the rate of contemporaneous
adolescent drug crime incidents by a factor of 894.03 (p < 0.001), holding all other
predictor variables constant. Poor academic performance and negative teaching practices
within the school domain were significantly positively related to drug crime. Specifically,
adolescents with poor school performance exhibited rates of drug crime acts that were
2.67 (p < 0.05) times higher than others, holding all other variables constant.
Additionally, those that experienced negative teaching practices reported rates of drug
crime incidents that were 5.14 (p < 0.001) times higher than other respondents. Negative
school bond, little time spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic
supervision, and poor treatment by teachers each produced non-significant effects in this
model.
As was the case with other forms of adolescent crime, the full model yielded the
best fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 196.66, p = < 0.001). The pseudo-R2 value increased from
0.039 to 0.493 as additional blocks were incorporated into regression models. The Wald
Chi2 test produced for each model is large and significant, leading to the conclusion that
each significantly contributed to the ability to explain contemporaneous drug crime acts
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during adolescence. This indicates support for GTCD’s ability to explain this type of
crime during adolescence. Having calculated both the NBRM and Poisson models,
NBRM was less appropriate, as a test for overdispersion of the variance in this
distribution was not significant (Long and Freese 2006). There were no issues with
multicollinearity among predictor variables, as tests revealed that no calculated VIF
values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Variable effects by crime type: Adulthood (7th and 8th sets of models).
The following analyses continue to address the fourth research question, which
questions the generality of Agnew’s (2005) theory, or its ability to influence multiple
types of crime. However, the next two sets of regression models apply this question to
adulthood, rather than adolescence. Therefore, the first analysis tested whether adult life
domains contemporaneously affected person/property crime. As such, nested multivariate
NBRM was first estimated with adult self-reported person/property crime acts as the
dependent variable. Again, independent variables were added to the regression in six
consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family
domain, Block 4: peer domain, Block 5: school domain, and Block 6: employment
domain. Table 11 presents the contemporaneous effects of adult life domains on
person/property crime and summarizes the empirical contribution each life domain makes
as it is related to the rate of crime incidents.
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Table 11 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adult Life
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Person/Property Crime Incidents (N = 1480)
Model 1
Controls
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each
block

Model 2
+ Self

Model 3
+ Family

Model 4
+ Peer

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

.835*
2.242***
-

.059
.285
-

.861*
2.220***
-

.059
.276
-

2.278***
-

.288
-

2.192***
-

.275
-

9.844***

2.693

9.061***

2.493

7.564***

2.069

2.694*
-

1.058
-

2.294*
-

.891
-

3.644***

.912

.023

.066

.070

.083

46.22***
127.54***
45.80***

131.96***
77.74***
86.09***

140.30***
73.29***
8.45

166.33***
63.21***
26.67***
(continued)
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Table 11 (continued)
Model 5
+ School
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Pseudo-R2

Model 6
+ Work

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

2.137***
-

.267
-

2.103***
-

.263
-

7.510***

2.041

7.115***

1.986

2.276*
-

.876
-

-

-

3.355***

.837

3.276***

.815

1.341*

.183

-

-

.087

-

.085

LR Chi2
170.83***
174.50***
G2
56.96***
55.75***
Wald Chi2 for each
4.62*
3.69
block
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Model 1 included only control variables. Older (IRR = 0.84, p < 0.05)
respondents reported a smaller rate of person/property crime acts, while male respondents
(IRR = 2.24, p < 0.001) reported an increased rate. Race and perceived social class did
not exert significant effects in this model. Model 2 incorporated the self domain. The
effects of age (IRR = 0.86, p < 0.05) and sex (IRR = 2.22, p < 0.001) retained
significance among control variables. Only irritability (IRR = 9.84, p < 0.001)
significantly impacted crime within the self domain, as the effect of low self-control
failed to achieve significance.
The family domain was introduced in Model 3. The effect of age was reduced to
non-significance, but that of sex (IRR = 2.28, p < 0.001) continued to be significant.
Irritability (IRR = 9.06, p < 0.001) remained the only significant predictor among the self
domain. Within the family domain, only spouse/partner (IRR = 2.69, p < 0.05) criminality
produced a significant impact on adult person/property crime. Failure to marry, negative
spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and low spouse/partner social
support did not exert significant impacts in this model.
Model 4 added the peer domain. The same variables from Model 3 retained
significance in this model. Among control variables, male (IRR = 2.19, p < 0.001)
respondents reported higher rates of person/property crime incidents. Irritability (IRR =
7.56, p < 0.001) continued to exert the only significant effect among self domain
variables. Similarly, spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.29, p < 0.05) remained the only
significant predictor within the family domain. The peer domain significantly impacted
crime, as peer criminality (IRR = 3.64, p < 0.001) increased the rate of person/property
crime acts.
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The school domain was introduced in Model 5. Sex (IRR = 2.14 p < 0.001)
remained the only significant variable within the block of control variables. The self
domain positively impacted person/property crime through respondent irritability (IRR =
7.51, p < 0.001). Spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.28, p < 0.05) continued to be the
only variable within the family domain that was significantly associated with
person/property crime during adulthood. Peer criminality (IRR = 3.36, p < 0.001)
maintained significance within the peer domain. The school domain achieved a
significant impact, as low educational achievement (IRR = 1.34, p < 0.01) increased the
rate of contemporaneous person/property crime incidents.
Model 6 introduced the employment domain and included all of GTCD’s life
domain variables. Within the block of control variables, only respondent sex yielded a
significant effect. That is, male respondents reported a rate of contemporaneous
person/property crime incidents that was 2.10 (p < 0.001) times higher than female
respondents. Age, race, and perceived social class did not significantly affect the
dependent variable in this model. Each one-unit increase in respondent level of irritability
raised the rate of person/property crime incidents by a factor of 7.12 (p < 0.001), holding
all other variables constant. The effect of the other self domain variable, low self-control,
did not reach statistical significance. The family domain did not affect crime in the final
model, as no variable produced a significant effect. The effect of spouse/partner
criminality was diminished to non-significance along with those of failure to marry,
negative spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and low spouse/partner
social support.
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The peer domain maintained its significant impact on crime in the final model. A
one-unit increase in respondent peer criminality score raised the rate of contemporaneous
person/property crime incidents by a factor of 3.28 (p < 0.001) during adulthood,
controlling for the all other independent variables. Within the school domain, the effect
of low educational achievement was attenuated to non-significance. Lastly, the
employment domain did not produce significant effects on crime. None of the variables
in this domain (i.e., unemployment, negative work bond, poor work performance, and
poor working conditions) significantly impacted the rate of person/property crime acts.
While the full model was a good fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 196.66, p = < 0.001),
a couple of life domains did not significantly improve the model’s ability to explain
person/property crime during adulthood. The pseudo-R2 value increased from 0.023 to
0.087, but plateaued as the family, school, and employment domains were incorporated in
to the regression. On a related note, the Wald Chi2 test for the following models was
significant: Model 1 (control variables), Model 2 (+ self domain), Model 4 (+ school
domain), and Model 5 (+ peer domain). This indicates that the addition of each of these
three blocks of variables significantly contributed to an understanding of person/property
crime during adulthood. Note, that the test statistic for Model 4 (+ school domain)
reached a lower level of significance (p < 0.05) than the other significant models. Further,
the Wald Chi2 for Model 3 (+ family domain) and Model 6 (+ employment domain) failed
to reach statistical significance, suggesting no improvement. Significant evidence of
overdispersion of the variance (G2 = 55.75, p < .001) indicated that NBRM was preferred
over PRM (Long and Freese 2006). A test for multicollinearity revealed no issues. None
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of the calculated VIF values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38
(Menard 1995).
In the same manner as before, the following analysis tested the contemporaneous
effect of adult life domains on drug crime. Nested multivariate NBRM was employed in
which adult self-reported drug crime incidents were the dependent variable. As was the
case in previous analyses, predictor variables were added to the regression in six
consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family
domain, Block 4: school domain, Block 5: peer domain, and Block 6: employment
domain. Table 12 presents the contemporaneous effects of adult life domains on drug
crime. It also shows the empirical contribution each life domain makes when added to the
model.
Model 1 was restricted to control variables. Among these, respondent sex (IRR =
1.39, p < 0.01) and race (IRR = 1.88, p < 0.001) impacted the rate of drug crime acts. The
effects of age and perceived social class did not achieve statistical significance. Model 2
added the self domain. The effects of sex (IRR = 1.42, p < 0.01) and race (IRR = 1.81, p
< 0.001) remained significant. Additionally, both self domain variables produced
significant effects, as low self-control (IRR = 1.95, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR = 2.69,
p < 0.001) both increased the rate of expected drug crime incidents.
The family domain was incorporated in Model 3. Both sex (IRR = 1.46, p <
0.001) and race (IRR = 1.94, p < 0.001) remained as significant variables among control
variables. Similarly, both low self-control (IRR = 2.02, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR =
2.30, p < 0.01) continued to exert significant effects from the self domain. Three variables
within the family domain yielded significant impacts on drug crime: failure to marry (IRR
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= 2.10, p < 0.001), spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 3.41, p < 0.01), and spouse/partner
conflict and abuse (IRR = 2.44, p < 0.05). Non-significant effects in the family domain
included negative spouse/partner bond and low spouse/partner social support.
The peer domain was introduced in Model 4. Males (IRR = 1.34, p < 0.01) and
white respondents (IRR = 1.94, p < 0.001) reported increased rates of drug crime acts.
Low self-control (IRR = 1.65, p < 0.05) and irritability (IRR = 1.99, p < 0.001) within the
self domain continued to yield significant positive effects. The effect of the family
domain was diminished in this model, as that of spouse/partner conflict and abuse was
reduced to non-significance. Additionally, failure to marry (IRR = 2.13, p < 0.001) and
spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.45, p < 0.05) continued to be significantly related to
adult drug crime. Lastly, peer criminality (IRR = 6.15, p < 0.001) within the peer domain
produced a large effect relative to the other life domain variables.
Model 5 added the school domain. Sex (IRR = 1.31, p < 0.01) and race (IRR =
2.00, p < 0.001) remained the only significant control variables. The self domain
continued to produce significant effects with low self-control (IRR = 1.57, p < 0.05) and
irritability (IRR = 2.02, p < 0.01) each increasing the rate of drug crime incidents. Failure
to marry (IRR = 2.24, p < 0.001) and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.46, p < 0.01)
each continued to exert a significant influence within the family domain. The peer
domain maintained a significant impact, with peer criminality (IRR = 5.81, p < 0.001)
exerting a significant effect. The school domain produced a significant impact on drug
crime since low educational achievement (IRR = 1.38 p < 0.01) increased the expected
rate of contemporaneous drug crime acts.
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Table 12 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adult Life
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Drug Crime Incidents (N = 1480)
Model 1
Controls
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each
block

Model 2
+ Self

Model 3
+ Family

Model 4
+ Peer

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.386**
1.882***
-

.144
.232
-

1.415**
1.808***
-

.145
.221
-

1.460***
1.940***
-

.150
.237
-

1.340**
1.939***
-

.133
.230
-

1.953**
2.689***

.429
.645

2.026**
2.302**

0.444
0.551

1.647*
1.986**

.349
.459

2.103***
3.414**
2.435*
-

0.42
1.235
1.082
-

2.129***
2.450**
-

.419
.853
-

6.152***

1.485

.011

.022

.032

.051

37.37***
761.78***
37.81***

74.12***
682.12***
35.50***

107.20***
639.16***
29.77***

170.47***
624.25***
56.62***
(continued)
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Table 12 (continued)
Model 5
+ School
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Pseudo-R2

Model 6
+ Work

IRR

SE

IRR

SE

1.308**
2.003***
-

.131
.239
-

1.246*
2.086***
-

.124
.250
-

1.566*
2.024***

.333
.467

1.982**

.469

2.235***
2.458*
-

.443
.856
-

2.110***
-

.415
-

5.811***

1.409

5.435***

1.283

1.383**

.165

1.311*

.241

1.460*
1.739***
.063

.241
.192
-

.053

LR Chi2
177.88***
210.62***
G2
502.47***
453.63***
Wald Chi2 for each
7.36**
32.67***
block
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Model 6 was the final model and incorporated the employment domain. As such,
it includes all of GTCD’s life domain variables. Among control variables, both sex and
race exerted significant effects. Specifically, males and white respondents reported rates
of drug crime acts that were 1.25 (p < 0.05) and 2.09 (p < 0.001) times higher than others,
respectively. Respondent age and perceived social class were not related to drug crime
acts in the final model. Within the self domain, the effect of low self-control was reduced
to non-significance. However, each additional unit increase in irritability score increased
the rate of drug crime incidents by a factor of 1.98 (p < 0.001), controlling for the effects
of all other predictor variables.
The effect of the family domain was attenuated in the final model. The effect of
spouse/partner criminality was reduced to non-significance, while that of failure to marry
continued to significantly influence drug crime. Specifically, unmarried respondents were
reported a rate of drug crime acts that was 2.11 (p < 0.001) times higher than married
ones, controlling for all other variables. Additional non-significant effects in this domain
included negative spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and poor
spouse/partner social support. The peer domain retained its significant effect on crime in
the final model, with a unit increase in respondent peer criminality score raising the rate
of contemporaneous drug crime acts by a factor of 5.44 (p < 0.001) during adulthood,
controlling for the effects of all other independent variables.
The effect of low educational achievement continued to be significant within the
school domain. Specifically, those whose highest level of education was high school were
expected to report a rate of drug crime acts that was 1.31 (p < 0.05) times higher than
those with more than a high school level of education. Lastly, two variables within the
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employment domain significantly affected crime in this model. Respondents with
negative work bonds and poor work performance reported rates of drug crime incidents
that were 1.46 (p < 0.05) and 1.74 (p < 0.001) times higher than others, respectively.
As with general crime during adulthood, the full model provided the best fit for an
explanation of drug crime (LR Chi2 = 453.63, p = < 0.001). The pseudo-R2 value
increased from 0.011 to 0.063, indicating improvement in the model’s explanatory
ability. Similarly, the Wald Chi2 test for all models was large and highly significant,
demonstrating that each offered a significant improvement for the overall model.
Significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance (G2 = 453.63, p < .001) identified
NBRM as preferable to PRM for this data (Long and Freese 2006). Multicollinearity
among predictor variables did not pose a problem, as a test revealed no calculated VIF
values over 2.6 or tolerance coefficient under 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Contemporaneous effects of religion as a life domain: Adolescence (9th set of
models).
Having tested Agnew’s (2005) GTCD, the final group of analyses tested
Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E by incorporating religion as a distinct life domain and block
of predictor variables. The sixth research question queries whether the religion life
domain significantly improves the ability of life domains to explain crime. This analysis
specifically examined the contemporaneous effect Cochran’s adolescent life domains
exert on general crime acts. Nested multivariate NBRM was again employed with
adolescent self-reported general crime incidents as the dependent variable. This analysis
included the religion domain (Block 6) in addition to the life domain blocks utilized in
the first set of regression models (i.e., the initial test of Agnew’s theory on adolescent
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general crime). Table 13 presents the contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s adolescent
life domains on general crime incidents and summarizes the contribution of each life
domain as it is associated with the rate of general crime acts.
With the introduction of the religion domain to GTCD’s life domains, Model 6
was Cochran’s (2015) final model and incorporated all relevant life domain variables.
With the exception of low educational goals, which was reduced to non-significance, all
significant variables in the final model were the same as those in the first set of models.
Specifically, among control variables, only sex exerted a significant impact, with male
respondents exhibiting reported rates of contemporaneous general crime incidents that
were 1.39 (p < 0.01) times higher than females, holding all other predictor variables
constant. Non-significant effects among control variables included age, race, and
perceived social class. Low self-control was not a significantly related to crime in this
model, but a unit increase in respondent level of irritability increased the rate of
contemporaneous general crime acts by a factor 7.51 (p < 0.001). Poor parental
supervision and family conflict and abuse remained as the only significant variables
within the family domain. Specifically, unit increases in each raised the rate of general
crime incidents by factors of 2.15 (p < 0.05) and 2.45 (p < 0.05), respectively. Negative
family bond, negative parenting practices, and family criminality continued to produce
non-significant effects in this domain.
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Table 13 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Cochran’s Adolescent
Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1276)
Model 6
+ Religion
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Block 6: Religion
Religiousness
Religiosity
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each
block

IRR

IRR

1.387**
-

.174
-

7.505***

2.469

2.146*
2.451*
-

.760
1.060
-

97.860***
-

47.597
-

3.658**
1.400*
1.608**

1.506
.196
.284

.180

-

349.68***
50.67***
.69

Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)

140

Within the peer domain, peer criminality significantly increased the rate of
general crime, while peer conflict and abuse was unrelated. Specifically, each additional
unit increase in level of peer criminality increased the rate of expected adolescent
contemporaneous general crime incidents by a factor of 97.86 (p < 0.001), controlling for
all other variables. The same three school domain variables that were significant in the
first set of regression models exerted significant effects in the final model. Specifically, a
one-unit increase in negative school bond score increased the rate of general crime acts
by a factor of 3.66 (p < 0.01) in this model. Next, adolescents with poor school
performance exhibited rates of general crime incidents that were 1.40 (p < 0.05) times
higher than others, while those experiencing negative teaching practices reported rates of
crime acts that were 1.61 (p < 0.01) times greater than other respondents. Little time
spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic supervision, and poor
treatment by teachers did not significantly impact crime in the final model. Notably,
neither religiousness nor religiosity within the religion domain significantly affected
general crime incidents in the final model.
As was the case with constraints and motivations, the religion domain did not
significantly improve the ability of the model that included only GTCD life domains to
explain general crime during adolescence. The pseudo-R2 coefficient remained at 0.180
and the Wald Chi2 test for the religion model was not significant. Therefore, the evidence
does not support the assertion that Cochran’s (2015) variables improve the model’s
ability to explain crime during adolescence. PRM was less appropriate than NBRM for
this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance in the distribution
(G2 = 50.67, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). Tests for multicollinearity revealed no
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issues, with none of the calculated VIF values exceeding 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient
falling below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Contemporaneous effects of religion as a life domain: Adulthood (10th set of
models).
To test the contemporaneous effect of Cochran’s (2015) adult life domains on
general crime, the researcher estimated a series of nested multivariate NBRM with adult
self-reported general crime acts as the dependent variable (RQ6). This tenth set of
regression models included the religion domain (Block 7) in addition to the life domain
blocks utilized in the third set of models, which incorporated all of Agnew’s (2005) life
domains as they impact general crime in adulthood. Table 14 presents the
contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s adolescent life domains on general crime incidents
and summarizes the contribution of each life domain as a predictor of the rate of crime
acts.
Model 7 added the religion domain and represented Cochran’s (2015) final
theoretical model. As such, it included all relevant life domains. All variables that were
significant in the third set of models (i.e., that which tested the contemporaneous effects
of Agnew’s adult life domains) were significant variables in this model. The only
exception is that the effect of negative work bond within the employment domain lost
significance in this final model. Males and white respondents reported rates of general
crime incidents that were 1.43 (p < 0.001) and 1.26 (p < 0.05) times higher than others,
respectively. Non-significant effects among control variables included age and perceived
social class. Within the self domain, the effect of low self-control remained nonsignificant. Irritability maintained significance, however, as each unit increase in this
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score raised the reported rate of general crime acts by a factor of 3.13 (p < 0.001),
holding all other predictor variables constant.
Failure to marry and spouse/partner criminality continued to exert the only
significant impacts within the family domain in the final model. Specifically, unmarried
respondents and those with spouses/partners that engage in crime reported rates of
general crime incidents that were 1.66 (p < 0.01) and 1.88 (p < 0.05) times higher than
other respondents. Neither negative spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and
abuse, nor poor spouse/partner social support significantly influenced crime in this
model.
The peer domain continued to exert a significant effect on crime in the final
model. Specifically, a one-unit increase in respondent peer criminality score raised the
rate of contemporaneous general crime acts by a factor of 4.63 (p < 0.001) during
adulthood, holding all other independent variables constant. The effect of low educational
achievement maintained significance within the school domain, as those with high school
as their highest level of achievement were reported a rate of general crime incidents that
was 1.24 (p < 0.05) times higher than those with more than a high school level of
education. Finally, only one variable within the employment domain, poor work
performance, significantly affected crime in this model. Respondents reporting poor work
performance reported a rate of general crime that was 1.64 (p < 0.001) times higher than
other respondents, controlling for the effects of all other predictor variables.

143

Table 14 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Cochran’s Adult Life
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1480)
Model 7
+ Religion
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Failure to Marry
Negative Bond
Criminal Spouse
Conflict/Abuse
No Social Support
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Block 5: School
Low Achievement
Block 6: Work
Unemployed
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Poor Conditions
Block 7: Religion
Religiousness
Religiosity
Pseudo-R2

IRR

IRR

1.426***
1.264*
-

.120
.128
-

3.128***

.618

1.658**
1.880*
-

.275
.551
-

4.627***

.900

1.240*

.123

1.636***
-

.152
-

1.762***
1.678***
.086

.192
.157

LR Chi2
347.41***
G2
493.27***
Wald Chi2 for each block
85.76***
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Notably, the religion domain exerted a significant impact in the final model.
Specifically, respondents that were not religious and those that did not attend religious
services reported rates of general crime incidents that were 1.76 (p < 0.001) and 1.68 (p <
0.001) times higher than other respondents, controlling for the effects of all other
variables.
In support of GTCD-E, the addition of the religion domain resulted in a better fit
for the data in explaining general crime during adulthood. This stands in contrast to the
that which was observed during adolescence. The LR Chi2 value increased from 261.65 to
347.41 (p = < 0.001) and the pseudo-R2 coefficient rose from 0.065 to 0.086. Further
support is provided by the Wald Chi2 test for each model, as it was large and highly
significant, indicating a significant improvement to the overall model. Consequently, the
current analysis empirically supports the proposition that Cochran’s (2015) variables
warrant inclusion as explanatory variables for the criminal behavior during adulthood.
NBRM was preferred over the PRM as a test revealed significant evidence of
overdispersion of the variance in the distribution (G2 = 493.27, p < .001) (Long and
Freese 2006). Testing revealed no evidence of problematic multicollinearity among
predictor variables since no calculated VIF value exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance
coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
Variable effects of religion by crime type (11th and 12th sets of models).
Continuing to test Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E by incorporating religion as a
distinct life domain and block of predictor variables, this analysis examined whether
Cochran’s adolescent life domains exert a significant contemporaneous effect on
person/property crime acts. Recall that the seventh research question explores whether
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Cochran’s life domains affect all types of crime similarly. Therefore, nested multivariate
NBRM was employed with adolescent self-reported general crime incidents as the
dependent variable. The eleventh set of regression models included the religion domain
(Block 6) in addition to the life domain blocks utilized in the fifth set of models, which
incorporated all of Agnew’s (2005) life domains as they affect person/property crime
during adolescence. Table 15 summarizes the contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s
adolescent life domains on person/property crime acts and shows the empirical
contribution of each life domain as a block of independent variables.
Model 6 incorporated the religion domain and included all of GTCD-E’s
theoretical life domain variables. With the exception of poor parental supervision, which
was reduced to non-significance, all variables that were significantly related to crime in
the fifth set of regression models (i.e., that which tested Agnew’s theory on adolescent
person/property crime) were significant in this model. Sex maintained significance as the
only control variable significantly impacting person/property crime. Specifically, male
adolescents reported rates of contemporaneous drug crime acts that were 1.40 (p < 0.01)
times higher than females, controlling for the effects of all other variables. Age, race, and
perceived social class did not produce significant effects. Within the self domain, the
effect of irritability maintained significance, while that of low self-control was not
significant. Each additional unit increase in respondent level of irritability raised the rate
of contemporaneous person/property crime acts by a factor 8.10 (p < 0.001).
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Table 15 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Cochran’s
Adolescent Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Person/Property Crime
Incidents (N = 1276)
Model 6
+ Religion
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Block 6: Religion
Religiousness
Religiosity
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
G2
Wald Chi2 for each
block

IRR

IRR

1.398**
-

.178
-

8.097***

2.701

2.591*
-

1.134
-

53.066***
-

26.448
-

4.093**
1.383*
1.596*
1.500*

1.697
.196
.379
.272

.168

-

311.39***
38.22***
1.26

Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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The effect of the family domain was attenuated in this model, as the effect of poor
parental supervision was no longer significantly associated with person/property crime.
However, a one-unit increase in family conflict and abuse raised the rate of
person/property crime acts by a factor of 2.59 (p < 0.05). Negative family bond, negative
parenting practices, and family criminality yielded non-significant effects within this
domain.
Only one peer domain variable, peer criminality, exerted a significant effect in the
final model. Each unit increase in peer criminality score increased the rate of adolescent
contemporaneous person/property crime incidents by a factor of 53.07 (p < 0.001),
holding all other variables constant. Peer conflict and abuse was unrelated to the rate of
person/property crime acts in the final model. Four school domain variables continued to
significantly impact person/property crime in the final model. These included negative
school bond, poor academic performance, low educational goals, and negative teaching
practices. Each unit increase in negative school bond score increased the expected rate of
person/property crime incidents by a factor of 4.09 (p < 0.01). Additionally, respondents
that perform poorly in school and those that experience negative teaching practices
exhibited rates of person/property crime acts that were 1.38 (p < 0.05) and 1.50 (p < 0.05)
times higher than others, holding all predictor variables constant. Finally, those with low
educational goals were expected to report a rate of person/property crime that was 1.60 (p
< 0.05) times higher than those with higher goals. The effects of little time spent on
homework, poor academic supervision, and poor treatment by teachers continued to be
non-significant.
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Both variables within the religion domain failed to significantly impact adolescent
contemporaneous person/property crime acts in this model, as neither religiousness nor
religiosity produced a statistically significant effect.
Once again, the religion domain failed to provide a significant improvement in
the explanation of adolescent person/property crime over the model that included only
GTCD life domains. The LR Chi2 value increased from 310.14 to only 311.39 (p < 0.001)
and the pseudo-R2 coefficient increased by an increment of 0.001 to 0.168. Further, the
Wald Chi2 test for the model that added the religion domain failed to achieve statistical
significance. This demonstrates that these variables did not significantly contribute to an
understanding of person/property crime during adolescence. These findings do not
provide evidence that Cochran’s (2015) religion variables should be included as
explanatory factors for person/property crime during adolescence. PRM was less
appropriate than NBRM for this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of the
variance in the distribution (G2 = 38.22, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006).
Multicollinearity was once again not an issue, as none of the calculated VIF coefficients
exceeding 2.6 and no tolerance value falling below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
This final analysis also addressed the seventh research question, as it tested
whether Cochran’s adolescent life domains significantly affect contemporaneous drug
crime acts among adolescents. As such, nested multivariate PRM was employed with
adolescent self-reported drug crime incidents as the dependent variable. The twelfth, and
final, set of regression models included the religion domain (Block 6) in addition to the
life domain blocks utilized in the sixth set of models (i.e., that which included all of
Agnew’s (2005) life domains as they influence drug crime during adolescence). Table 16
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presents the contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s (2015) adolescent life domains on
drug crime incidents and summarizes the empirical contribution of each life domain as a
predictor of the rate of crime acts.
Model 6 incorporated the religion domain and represented Cochran’s (2015) final
theoretical model. With the exception of three variables, all variables that were
significant in the sixth set of regression models were the same that were significant in this
model. These included respondent age, which gained significance, and negative parenting
practices and poor academic performance, which were reduced to non-significance. Older
and white adolescents exhibited rates of self-reported drug crime acts that were 2.10 (p <
0.05) and 3.82 (p < 0.01) times higher than others, controlling for the effects of other
predictor variables. Sex and perceived social class did not exert significant effects. The
self domain did not significantly impact drug crime since neither low self-control nor
irritability yielded significant effects. As in the sixth set of models, family criminality
exerted the only significant impact within the family domain. A one-unit increase in level
of family criminality increased the rate of contemporaneous adolescent drug crime acts
by a factor of 11.38 (p < 0.001). The effect of poor parental supervision was not
significant in the final model. Other non-significant effects include those of negative
family bond, family conflict and abuse, and negative parenting practices.
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Table 16 Summary of Nested Poisson Regression Analysis of Cochran’s Adolescent Life
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Drug Crime Incidents (N = 1276)
Model 6
+ Religion
Variable
Block 1: Controls
Age
Male
White
Low Social Class
Life Domains
Block 2: Self
Low Self-Control
Irritability
Block 3: Family
Negative Bond
Poor Supervision
Family Conflict
Poor Parenting
Criminal Family
Block 4: Peer
Criminal Peers
Peer Conflict
Block 5: School
Negative Bond
Poor Performance
Little Time HW
Lower Goals
Poor Supervision
Poor Treatment
Poor Teaching
Block 6: Religion
Religiousness
Religiosity
Pseudo-R2
LR Chi2
Wald Chi2 for each
block

IRR

IRR

2.099*
3.818**
-

.752
1.848
-

-

-

11.379***

7.729

1965.045*
**
-

1659.268

5.706***

2.352

.141**
.522

.093
-

-

208.17***
8.99*

Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in
expected count. Only significant effects are reported.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Next, peer criminality within the peer domain exerted the largest effect on the rate
of drug crime. Specifically, each additional unit increase in peer criminality score
increased the rate of contemporaneous adolescent drug crime acts by a factor of 1965.05
(p < 0.001), holding all other variables constant. The effect of peer conflict and abuse
remained non-significant. Lastly, the only variable within the school domain to produce a
significant effect in the final model was negative teaching practices, as the effect of poor
academic performance became non-significant. Specifically, students exposed to negative
teaching practices exhibited a rate of reported drug crime acts that was 5.71 (p < 0.001)
times greater than other students, controlling for the effects of all other predictor
variables. None of the following variables within this domain produced significant effects
on the rate of drug crime acts: negative school bond, poor academic performance, little
time spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic supervision, and poor
treatment by teachers.
Religiousness emerged as a significant predictor of adolescent drug crime within
the religion domain. Contrary to theoretical expectations, non-religious respondents
exhibited a rate of drug crime incidents that was 0.86 (p < 0.01) times lower percent
lower than their religious counterparts. The effect of religiosity was not significant in the
final model.
Unlike with other forms of adolescent crime, the addition of GTCD-E’s religion
domain resulted in an improved fit over the model that included only GTCD life domains
when explaining drug crime during adolescence. Specifically, the LR Chi2 value
increased from 196.66 to 208.17 (p = < 0.001) and the pseudo-R2 coefficient rose from
0.493 to 0.522. Further, the Wald Chi2 test for the religion model significant,
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demonstrating its improvement for the overall model. Note, however, that the coefficient
for the religion domain achieved a lower level of statistical significance than the others (p
< 0.05). Considering GTCD-E’s inability to influence general and person/property crime,
along with the unanticipated direction of its effect on drug crime, the current analysis
provides further evidence that religious variables are not well suited to explain crime
during adolescence. A test for overdispersion of the variance in this distribution was not
significant, providing no evidence of overdispersion. Therefore, PRM was preferred over
NBRM (Long and Freese 2006). Again, tests for multicollinearity revealed no issues,
with none of the calculated VIF values exceeding 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient falling
below 0.38 (Menard 1995).
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
The goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the ability of Agnew’s (2005) General
Theory of Crime and Delinquency and Cochran’s (2015) General Theory of Crime and
Delinquency – Extended to explain crime. Therefore, the researcher estimated a series of
12 NBRM and Poisson regression models in order to test a number of hypotheses derived
from both theories. Results provided strong support for several of these hypotheses, and
thus, for Agnew’s and Cochran’s theories. First, these results are discussed below as they
relate to the current study’s research questions and corresponding hypotheses. Table 17
provides an overview of this dissertation’s research questions, hypotheses, and level of
support found for each hypothesis. Next, other notable findings warranting further
consideration are discussed.
Support for Hypotheses
Contemporaneous effects of life domains on crime.
The first research question assesses the contemporaneous effects of life domains
on crime. The results of this dissertation provide strong support for this proposition, as
each life domain yielded at least one variable that was significantly related to
contemporaneous general crime during adolescence and adulthood. Further, all
significant variables were related to crime in the expected direction. Those exhibiting
higher rates of contemporaneous adolescent general crime were male, irritable, poorly
supervised by parents, exposed to family conflict and abuse, negatively bonded to school,
performed poorly in school, had lower education goals, were subjected to negative
teaching practices, and were surrounded by friends that commit delinquency. Agnew’s
(2005) theory.
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Table 17 Review of Research Hypotheses and Corresponding Level of Support
Research
Research Hypothesis
Question

RQ1

RQ2

Level of
Support

H1: All adolescent (T1) life domains are significantly related to
adolescent (T1) general crime.
H2: All adult (T2) life domains are significantly related to adult
(T2) general crime.
H3: T1 constraint and motivation variables mediate the effect of
T1 life domain variables on T1 general crime.
H4a: T1 self and peer life domains produce a larger effect on T1
general crime relative to the other T1 life domains.

RQ3

RQ4

RQ5

RQ6

RQ7

H4b: T1 irritability, low self-control, and peer delinquency
produce the largest relative effects on T1 general crime.
H5a: T2 self, peer, family, and employment life domains produce a
larger effect on T2 general crime relative to the other T2 life
domains.
H5b: T2 irritability, low self-control, peer delinquency, no/bad
marriage, unemployment, and bad jobs produce the largest relative
effects on T2 general crime.
H6: The same T1 life domain variables predict all types of T1
crime and deviance (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and
drug crime).
H7: The same T2 life domain variables predict all types of T2
crime and deviance (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and
drug crime).
H8: The effects of T1 life domain variables on T1 general crime
are greater than those of T1 life domain variables on T2 general
crime.
H9a: T1 religion life domain exerts a significant effect on T1
general crime, controlling for all other life domain variables.
H9b: T1 religiosity and religiousness significantly negatively
affect T1general crime.
H10a: T2 religion life domain exerts a significant effect T2 general
crime.
H10b: T2 religiosity and religiousness significantly negatively
affect T2 general crime.
H11: The same T1 life domain variables (with religion) predict all
types of T1 crime (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and
drug crime).
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Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Moderate
Strong

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Strong
Unsupported
Unsupported
Strong
Strong
Unsupported

This profile is consistent with the gender gap in offending that is consistently found in the
scholarly literature (Agnew 2005; Akers 1998; Broidy and Agnew 1997; De Coster and
Zito 2010; Friedman and Rosenbaum 1998; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; Moffitt
1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Singer and Levine 1988; Steffensmeir and Allen 1996;
Tittle et al. 2003). Additionally, it is generally supportive of the results of prior tests of
Agnew’s (2005) theory that utilize adolescent samples. For instance, Muftić and
colleagues (2014) report that male sex, higher age, low self-control, relationships with
delinquent peers, and low parental bonding are all significantly related to three forms of
criminal activity. While the variables may differ slightly, these results are similar in that
nearly all life domains produce significant variables. Zhang and associates (2012)
produce the other test that incorporates a sample of adolescents and report weaker
support for life domain effects on delinquency. All three of their life domains produce
significant variables, yet, all but the effects of the peer domain are reduced to nonsignificance in their final model that includes constraint and motivation variables.
Nonetheless, the finding of the important role played by peer criminality is supported by
this study as well.
Findings from this dissertation also reveal that those exhibiting higher rates of
such crime during adulthood were male, white, irritable, unmarried, exposed to a
spouse/partner that engages in crime, did not engage in post-high school education, were
surrounded by peers that commit crime, had a negative bond to work, and performed
poorly at work. Again, these findings lend support for the gender gap in offending.
Additionally, the observed relationship between white racial status and crime in this
dissertation supports Ngo and Paternoster’s (2014) findings. However, the other tests of
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Agnew’s (2005) theory that incorporate an adult sample did not find such an association
(Cochran 2015; Ngo et al. 2011). Encouragingly, the effect of the self domain and peer
domain is supported by the findings of Ngo and Paternoster, who report that these are
salient to multiple forms of crime during adulthood. As is discussed in more detail later,
these findings provide evidence that the life domains, and the variables within them, that
relate to crime during adolescence are different from those during adulthood.
Mediating effects of constraints and motivations.
The second research question posits that the effects of life domains on crime are
mediated by the effects of constraints against crime and motivations towards it. Overall,
the present study finds only weak evidence of such effects, thus offering only minimal
support for this theoretical proposition. Initially, 8 of the 16 life domain variables
significantly increased the rate of contemporaneous general crime acts during
adolescence. These variables represented all four life domains and included one from the
self domain, two from the family domain, one from the peer domain, and four from the
school domain. However, the effects of one variable from the family domain (i.e., family
conflict and abuse) and one from the school domain (i.e., low educational goals) were
reduced to non-significance in the models that included constraints and motivations.
Further, the magnitude of the effect of peer criminality fell from the life domain models
to the full model. This suggests that the effects of these variables (i.e., family conflict and
abuse low educational goals, and peer criminality) were partially mediated by constraints
and motivations. Notably, none of the constraint of motivation variables were
significantly associated with contemporaneous crime during adolescence in the present
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analysis and further tests reveal that neither the constraint nor motivation models
provided significant improvement for the overall model.
These findings diverge from those of Cochran (2015) and Zhang and associates
(2012) who also tested for mediating effects in the same manner. Cochran finds that the
effects of life domain variables were largely diminished due to the influence of
constraints and motivations, as all but two previously significant life domain effects were
reduced to non-significance in his full model. Further, several constraint and motivation
variables emerged as significant in his model, leading him to conclude that life domain
effects are “indirect and effectively mediated through constraints and motivations”
(2015:18). In the only other prior test to examine constraints and motivations, Zhang and
colleagues (2012) also found that the effects of all but two life domain variables were
reduced to non-significance when controlling for constraint and motivation variables.
While these findings are not perfectly in line with results of the previous studies, they
demonstrate the importance of life domain variables in influencing crime.
One must be cautious when considering this limited level of support, however.
The weak evidence regarding these variables highlights the difficulty of operationalizing
constraint and motivation variables as separate constructs from life domain variables.
Agnew (2005) admitted that it is “difficult to distinguish the variables that we are
examining from the constraints and motivations they allegedly affect” (181). This is
especially difficult when using measures not specifically designed to test GTCD or
GTCD-E. For instance, Agnew notes that irritability, a life domain variable, is often
measured by asking a respondent to report how frequently they feel angry. However,
doing so then confounds irritability with a motivation for crime. Cochran (2015) states
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that most prior tests of GTCD either omitted constraint and motivation variables or
conflated them with life domain variables. In the present study, the available data did not
permit measurement of all theoretical constraint and motivation variables, such as one’s
own level of condemnation or approval of crime, level of long-term negative emotions,
level of care about one’s own positive reaction to crime, belief that crime is justifiable in
some instances, or view that crime is excusable in some instances. Further, some were
measured using a single item. For instance, respondent level of short-term negative
emotions was measured by a single item to which they reported whether they often felt
angry, annoyed, or upset. A preferable and more complete measure might include many
items indicating the frequency with which respondents feel a wide variety of negative
emotions, including anger, envy, guilt, fear, shame, sadness, frustration, and doubt. For
this reason, it is imperative that future researchers afford careful theoretical consideration
to parsing out constraint and motivation variables from life domain variables. Agnew
suggests the best method is to thoughtfully design one’s own questions designed
specifically to measure these variables.
Variable effects of life domains on crime by developmental stage.
The third research question explores whether the relative effect sizes of each life
domain vary according to developmental stage. Agnew (2005) predicted that the self and
peer domains would produce larger contemporaneous effects on general crime during
adolescence, relative to the other life domains. This expectation was supported, as
variables from these two life domains produced the largest relative effect sizes. No other
life domain produced an effect that reached the same size or level of significance. Agnew
further specified that irritability and low self-control within the self domain and peer
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criminality within the peer domain would exert the largest relative effects. This assertion
was moderately supported. While irritability and peer criminality produced the largest
contemporaneous effects on adolescent crime, low self-control failed to exert a
significant effect.
GTCD also expects that the self, peer, family, and employment domains would
produce the largest relative effects on general crime during adulthood. In support of this
hypothesis, the school domain produced the smallest Wald Chi2 statistic. Further, the
only variable within this domain, low educational achievement, exhibited the smallest
significant effect in the full model. GTCD more specifically expects that irritability, low
self-control, peer criminality, failure to marry, negative spouse/partner bond,
spouse/partner conflict and abuse, spouse/partner criminality, unemployment, negative
work bond, and poor working conditions should have the largest effects in adulthood.
This prediction was modestly supported as any of these variables that were significant
exhibited larger effects than the school domain. However, several of the variables listed
did not produce a significant contemporaneous effect on adult crime in the final model.
This precluded the hypothesis from garnering more robust support.
Only Cochran (2015) and Ngo’s team (2011) incorporated samples of young
adults in their tests of GTCD; all other tests have been administered on samples of
adolescents. Only the self and school domains were significant in Cochran’s model, while
Ngo and colleagues failed to find any life domain variable that was significantly related
to their measure of crime. Mixed findings in this regard may be partially attributed to
samples consisting of relatively young adults. Specifically, the mean age of Cochran’s
sample was 21.2 and that of Ngo and associates was 23.
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This dissertation also employed sample of adults that were relatively young,
ranging from 19 to 26, with a mean age of 21.5. It may be the case that this age group is
substantively different from older adults with respect to Agnew’s (2005) theoretical
propositions. For instance, the school domain does not account for the possible influence
of school bonds, teacher interactions, or educational activities in adulthood. However,
many young adults in the United States attend postsecondary educational institutions.
Similarly, GTCD emphasizes negative employment as important element in relation to
crime. Yet, employment experiences may be less frequent and less salient during this
period of young adulthood. As a result, the participants in these samples may fall between
adolescence and adulthood in terms of Agnew’s theoretical predictions. These results
highlight a specific age grouping for which theoretical revision may be appropriate.
Overall, the findings regarding general crime during both stages of development
provide evidence that the life domains, and the variables within them, that are related to
crime during adulthood vary markedly from those in adolescence, as expected. This is
encouraging and provides strong support for the age-graded component of GTCD, which
specifies that the life domain variables that influence crime and their effect sizes vary
according to one’s stage of development. No other direct test of Agnew’s theory has
examined the contemporaneous effects of life domains at two time points, prohibiting a
comparison with the results of others in terms of this proposition. Despite this, the present
findings align with those of more general scholarly literature, particularly life-course
criminology, that propose distinct causes of crime at differing stages of development
(Moffitt 1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Sampson and Laub 1992, 1995; Thornberry
1987).
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Variable effects of life domains on crime by type of crime.
The fourth research question addresses whether the contemporaneous effects of
life domains vary according to type of criminal behavior, as GTCD predicts that the same
life domains significantly affecting general crime should also affect person/property and
drug crime.
This expectation was largely supported with regard to general crime as compared
to person/property. Each life domain produced at least one variable that significantly
affected the rate of crime acts for person/property crime. Many of these were the same as
those that influenced general crime. Further, all significant effects were in the expected
direction. As was the case with contemporaneous adolescent general crime, irritability
from the self domain and peer criminality from the peer domain exerted the largest
relative effects on person/property crime. However, the effect of peer criminality on
person/property crime was nearly half the size of its effect in the general crime model. It
may be the case that the large effect of peer criminality on drug crime is responsible for
its larger effect on general crime. For this reason, it is less salient in relation to
person/property crime. The importance of the peer domain on adolescent and drug crime
is discussed later in this chapter along with other notable findings.
The proposition positing similar effects for contemporaneous adolescent drug
crime and general crime was not supported, however. The self domain failed to produce a
variable that significantly predicted drug crime in the final model. Unlike with adolescent
general crime, the effect of irritability failed to achieve statistical significance in affecting
drug crime. Another key difference is that the effect size of peer criminality was nearly
nine times larger than its effect on general crime. These findings suggest that the family
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and peer domains play a larger role in influencing drug crime during adolescence, while
the self domain was less important in explaining it. This may suggest that substance use is
more strongly associated with family strain and social learning among peers for
adolescents than elements of low self-control or irritability. Agnew’s (2005) theory may
require modification in predicting drug crime among adolescents since the self domain
failed to produce the relatively large effect expected of it.
Next, the researcher assessed whether the contemporaneous effects of adult life
domains vary according to type of crime. The expectation was that the same life domain
variables influencing general crime during adulthood would also affect person/property
and drug crime during this developmental stage. This hypothesis was only modestly
supported with regard to person/property crime since, as was not the case with general
crime, the family, school, and employment domains did not produce any variables that
significantly impacted person/property crime. Additionally, while 7 of 13 adult life
domain variables produced significant contemporaneous effects on general crime, only 2
significantly affected person/property crime. This indicates that GTCD was weaker in
predicting person/property crime than general crime. Again, this lack of support may be
due to the present study’s use a relatively young adult sample.
The theory was better able to predict drug crime in adulthood, however, which
provided stronger support for the theory’s proposition. Each life domain produced at least
one variable that significantly influenced adults’ reported engagement in drug crime.
Further, many of the same variables that significantly predicted general crime also
predicted drug crime, including irritability, failure to marry, low educational
achievement, peer criminality, negative work bond, and poor work performance. The
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increased ability of GTCD to explain drug crime and general crime in adulthood may be
due to the influence of peer criminality on drug crime among this relatively young
sample. Again, the large effect of the peer domain is discussed later.
Taken together, these findings speak to the generality of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD
and provide evidence of its ability to explain multiple forms of criminal behavior.
Though it varied in some respects, the theory’s variables were significantly related to
three forms of criminal behavior within two stages of development.
Lagged effects of life domains on crime.
The fifth research question posits whether the effects of life domains on crime are
largely contemporaneous. As such, Agnew (2005) predicts that contemporaneous life
domain effects should be larger than any observed lagged effects. Recall that 8 of 16
adolescent life domain variables exerted a significant contemporaneous influence on
general crime. Offering strong support for this hypothesis, all but one of these variables,
irritability, was reduced to non-significance as it affected lagged general crime. Further,
even though irritability remained a significant variable, its lagged effect was smaller than
its contemporaneous effect. This provides further support for Agnew’s (2005)
observation that crime is largely a product of one’s immediate context, rather than that of
the past.
This support was hampered somewhat, however. Peer conflict and abuse did not
produce a significant contemporaneous effect on crime but yielded a significant negative
lagged effect. That is, the experience of peer conflict and abuse during adolescence was
associated with a significantly lower rate of general crime during adulthood. Ngo and
Paternoster (2014) are the only other researchers to examine the lagged effects of life
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domains in their test of GCTD. They also found that these effects were generally smaller
than their contemporaneous counterparts. As with the present study, Ngo and Paternoster
also found that a life domain variable was contemporaneously unrelated to crime but
produced a significant lagged effect.
This finding may seem confounding on the surface. However, it may be the case
that peer conflict and abuse during adolescence results in positive change that acts as a
protective factor against crime during adulthood. For example, peer conflict and abuse
during adolescence may increase the likelihood of marriage or decrease the odds of peer
criminality during adulthood. For instance, Opotow’s (1991) research suggests that the
experience of peer conflict during adolescence may lead to a variety of positive, or
constructive outcomes, like the development of problem-solving skills and personal
development. Peer conflict may draw adult attention, leading those experiencing it to
receive instruction on cooperation and collaboration, taking the perspective of others, and
dispute resolution. These skills may then mitigate the impact of other risk factors
associated with crime at a later stage. In support of this, Johnson and Johnson’s (1996)
review of the literature found that conflict resolution and peer mediation programming
during adolescence leads to constructive outcomes for participants (e.g., increased selfesteem or reduced discipline problems) and that success in conflict resolution is
associated with a decrease in the frequency of peer conflicts. Therefore, this observed
effect may operate largely through its association with the other life domain variables in
adulthood. Future studies should not only investigate the lagged effects that life domains
have on crime, but also the lagged effects they have on each other. For instance, Agnew
(2005) argues that T1 low self-control and irritability have a large lagged effect on
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themselves at T2 and that they indirectly affect poor parenting practices at T2.
Systematically exploring such effects would clarify the relationships between life domain
variables.
Contemporaneous effects of religion as a life domain on crime.
The sixth research question examines whether Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E
improves the explanatory power of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD at both developmental stages.
First, the effect of both of GTCD-E’s religion variables (i.e., religiousness and religiosity)
on contemporaneous general crime during adolescence is discussed. The prediction of
their effect was not supported in the current analysis, as the religion domain did not
impact general crime during adolescence when controlling for the effects of GTCD’s life
domain variables. Supplemental analyses showed that, when entered as the only block,
religiosity significantly increased the rate of contemporaneous general crime. However,
this effect was quickly diminished to non-significance and neither religiousness nor
religiosity significantly predicted crime in the final model. Though contrary to study
expectations, these findings are in line with those of Cochran’s (2015) testing efforts. The
religion domain showed promise in his initial model, but its effect was reduced to nonsignificance in the final model that included all predictor variables. Therefore, religion
variables did not produce effects that warranted inclusion as a separate life domain when
predicting general crime among adolescents.
Next, these variables’ effects on contemporaneous general crime during adulthood
were explored. Expectations of an effect were strongly supported in this analysis. Both
religiousness and religiosity exhibited a consistent positive contemporaneous effect on
general crime during adulthood. As such, the evidence suggests that Cochran’s (2015)
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variables merit inclusion as a separate life domain when predicting general crime among
adults. This provides evidence that religious context, belief, and practices are more
salient for adult perpetration of crime, and as such, GTCD-E is better suited to explain
adult crime.
Why might GTCD-E be unable to explain adolescent crime, while offering insight
into adult crime? The present study’s null finding regarding the religion domain and
crime during adolescence is incongruous with the expectations of GTCD-E but is in line
with Agnew’s (2005) use of Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable centered approach when
building his initial theory. Agnew’s (2005, 2017) review of the literature did not find a
consistent moderate to large relationship between religious variables and crime. It is
important to note that the majority of literature regarding religion and crime focus on the
period of adolescence. Therefore, these variables were not included in his initial
formulation. Indeed, the academic literature on the relationship between religious
variables and adolescent crime is somewhat mixed, though less so when specifically
examining substance use. Religiousness and religiosity generally provide a protective
effect against crime, but this effect is consistently weak or modest (Bridges and Moore
2002; Johnson, De Li, Larson, and McCullough 2000; Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch
2003; Smith 2003). Notably, the impact of religious variables on crime is often
diminished when other variables (e.g., social bond) are controlled for (Bridges and Moore
2002; Cochran 2015). Some studies found non-significant associations and others, though
rare, found that religiosity acted as risk factors for delinquency and substance use for
adolescence, even among more rigorous studies (Chitwood, Weiss, and Leukefeld 2008;
Johnson et al. 2000). As such, the current findings contribute to the mixed literature on
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religion and criminal behavior and may suggest that religious variables are not salient to
crime among adolescents but are for adults.
Adult participants were less likely to report attending religious services and that
religion is an important part of their life. This is consistent with prior research on
religious development that finds both religious beliefs and practices decrease during the
transition from adolescence to adulthood (Desmond, Morgan, and Kikuchi 2010). It is
also in line with the finding that, while both religious variables decrease, that decrease in
religious attendance is greater. The key to understanding the theory’s inability to explain
adolescent crime and its ability to explain adult crime may lie in this decline. One
explanation for the importance of religion in predicting crime among adults is that they
possess greater agency and, thus, have increased responsibility for choosing to be
religious or attend religious services (Yonker, Schnabelrauch, and DeHaan 2012). As
such, these variables may have greater consequences for behavior for adults than
adolescents.
Research on the development of spirituality and religiosity shows that religion,
religiousness, and religiosity for youth are strongly influenced by parental religion
(Landor et al. 2011; Meyers 1996; Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch 2003; Smith 2003). That
is, evidence of “intergenerational transmission and parental socialization” exists in which
parental religious beliefs and practices exerting a significant influence on those of their
children (Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch 2003:9). As such, the effects of religious practices
and beliefs may not impact their behavior like it does adults. Children and adolescent
religious practices tend represent those of their parents, as they are less likely to decide
the religion to which they belong, the place of worship they attend, or the frequency with
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which they attend religious services. When one does not make a decision of their own
volition, they may be less invested in that decision. Even if a child does not enjoy or want
to attend religious services, they may be compelled to do so by their parents. By contrast,
adults that attend religious services possess the autonomy to go or not and still choose to
attend. Consequently, even though fewer adults tend to engage in religious practices,
doing so may exert a stronger impact on them.
While spirituality is developing during childhood and adolescence, these youth
may lack the cognitive ability to fully comprehend the abstract existential and
philosophical questions that religion often addresses (e.g., the nature of right and wrong,
human nature, free will) (Benson, Roehlkepartain, and Rude 2003; Bridges and Moore
2002; Fowler and Dell 2006). As such, they may not understand that which they claim to
believe. Therefore, a given religion’s underlying philosophy may not affect an
adolescent’s behavior in the same what it might an adult adherent’s behavior. However,
emerging adults enjoy more social autonomy and possess the capacity to thoughtfully
consider such topics. It is within this developmental stage that emerging adults closely
“examine previously-socialized beliefs to establish a more mature sense of self of the
religious self” (Stoppa and Lefkowitz 2010:23). As a result, they either drop such beliefs
or choose to hold onto them. The key is that those claiming to be religious at this
developmental stage may do so after reflective thought and critical examination.
Therefore, religiousness and religiosity may play greater roles in affecting the behavior of
adults (Yonker et al. 2012). Consequently, the hypothesized protective influence of
religious factors against criminal behavior is not realized for adolescents.
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Variable effects of religion as a life domain on crime by type of crime.
The seventh and final research question explores whether GTCD-E predicts
multiple types of crime. Correspondingly, GTCD-E’s life domains were assessed as they
relate to person/property crime and drug crime. Recall that the religion domain initially
emerged as significant but was reduced to non-significance in all subsequent models
predicting general crime. A similar pattern appeared with regard to person/property crime
in which the religion domain initially produced a significant variable, however its effect
was again diminished to non-significance in subsequent models. As such, neither religion
domain variable impacted person/property crime during adolescence. This finding does
not offer support for the inclusion of religion as a life domain for person/property crime
during adolescence.
The religion domain significantly affected adolescent drug crime, however.
Specifically, non-religious status acted as a protective factor against drug crime. Unlike
in previous models, irritability did not produce a significant effect. Additionally, peer
criminality exhibited the largest effect. These mixed findings regarding the impact of
religious variables on adolescent crime provide further evidence that GTCD-E is less
suited to explain any type of adolescent crime in its current form. Again, while not
supportive of this dissertation’s expectations, this finding is consistent with Agnew’s
(2005) choice to omit such variables from his theoretical framework.
Other Notable Findings
As alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, a number of interesting findings
emerged that deserve further attention. First to be addressed is the finding that irritability
consistently exhibited significant effects across crime type and developmental stage,

170

while low self-control was consistently unrelated. In fact, irritability was a significant
predictor in 10 of 12 sets of regression models. Low self-control, on the other hand,
routinely experienced initial significance, but was always diminished to non-significance
in final models. Some may be surprised by this finding given the level of support for selfcontrol variables demonstrated in the literature (Pratt and Cullen 2000; de Ridder et al.
2012). Agnew (2005) distinguished irritability from low self-control in his formulation of
GTCD, a decision which provides a more nuanced portrait of the effect of these
personality traits on criminal behavior.
However, the concept of low self-control is often analyzed in light of Gottfredson
and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime. The authors define crime as acts that are
immediately gratifying, simple, risky, provide few long-term benefits, require little skill,
and cause pain or discomfort to victims. For this reason, they identify the elements of low
self-control as impulsivity, insensitivity, physicality, and short-sightedness. Presumably,
Hirschi and Gottfredson link low self-control to crime through the likelihood of crime to
cause harm or pain to victims. That is, since crime tends to cause harm or physical pain to
victims, those low in self-control exhibit a short-fuse and bad temper. Specifically, they
have “minimal tolerance for frustration and little ability to respond to conflict through
verbal as opposed to physical means” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990:90).
Agnew (2005) characterizes those low in self-control as being “wild” or “out of
control” in everyday language. Those low in self-control lack motivation, are selfcentered, fail to consider long-term consequences, feel unbound by conventional norms,
lack motivation, prefer excitement, and act without thinking. However, he also admits
that Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) definition of low self-control is broader in that it
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incorporates elements of a lack of control and irritability. Consequently, Agnew’s
definition of low self-control is stricter since it omits elements of irritability.
Agnew (2005) characterizes irritable persons as being “mean,” “nasty,” “having a
short fuse,” and feeling as though others are “out to get them.” Irritability in GTCD
involves a lack of concern for the feelings of others, exhibiting an antagonistic or
adversarial interaction style, being overcome with anger, experiencing events as aversive,
and attributing aversive events to the malicious behavior of others. Since Gottfredson and
Hirschi’s (1990) definition of low self-control includes the concept of irritability, most
empirical tests of the general theory incorporate constructs of low self-control that
include irritability. Importantly, the oft-cited scale measuring low self-control developed
by Grasmick and associates (1993) also incorporates elements of irritability and poor
temperament. This is also true of many of its variants, as they are often comprised of
items related to (1) risk-seeking, (2) preferring simple tasks, (3) physical activity, (4) selfcenteredness, (5) impulsiveness, and (6) bad temperament (see Vazsonyi et al. 2001).
Consequently, unlike Agnew (2005), many empirical tests measuring low self-control do
not separate irritability from low self-control.
Agnew (2005) does not provide an explicit justification for his choice to separate
the two personality constructs, other than that both are demonstrated to reduce constraints
against crime and increase motivations towards it. It is important to consider, then, that
many studies demonstrating a positive relationship between irritability and criminal
behavior pre-date Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory. Therefore, evidence
demonstrating the effect irritability on crime when measured as a distinct construct
existed prior to their general theory. This is consistent with Agnew’s (2005) variable-
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centered approach to theoretical integration which identifies variables that the have been
demonstrated in the literature to exhibit a moderate to large effect on criminal acts. It is
important to remember that the current study is not a test of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s
(1990) general theory, but rather a test Agnew’s (2005) GTCD. It may also be that most
criminological constructs of self-control tend to incorporate both personality traits
because they are specifically testing Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory. In this
case, the two constructs are not combined because this study is not testing their theory.
The findings of this dissertation suggest that irritability affects crime
independently of low self-control. This conclusion is reached because irritability
significantly predicts multiple forms of crime, while low self-control fails to exert a
significant effect on any form of crime. A separate analysis omitted irritability from the
regression equation that estimated the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life
domains on general crime. In this case, low self-control exerted a large, highly significant
effect when initially entered, but was quickly diminished to non-significance when all life
domain variables were incorporated. This is further evidence that irritability produces its
own effect on crime and that separating these two personality traits in the manner
suggested by Agnew (2005) provides a more nuanced understanding of their effects on
crime.
Another notable finding is the primacy of peer criminality as a correlate of
criminal behavior during adolescence. While this variable significantly predicted crime
for adolescents and adults, its effect on the former was large. Specifically, the effect of
peer criminality ranged from 43.77 to 682.09 in the final models of equations that
estimated adolescent crime. For comparison, no other effect magnitude exceeded 15 in
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these models. This finding is in line with past research that demonstrates the importance
of peer behavior as a predictor of juvenile delinquency (Haynie et al. 2005; Haynie,
Doogan, and Soller 2014; Warr and Stafford 1991). The evidence that peer criminality
plays a smaller role during adulthood specifically supports findings of the extant
literature that suggest the susceptibility to peer pressure and influence in adolescence
peaks at age 14 and declines linearly until age 18 (Steinberg and Monahan 2007:1531).
The sample in this dissertation supports this trend. Though peers play a significant role at
both time points, the effect of this domain was the largest during adolescence, when
respondents were between 11 and 13 years of age.
The salience of peer criminality is also supported among prior tests of Agnew’s
(2005) GTCD. For instance, peer criminality and time spent with peers produced the
strongest effects on deviance in Cochran’s (2015) life domain model and yielded the only
significant effects among life domains in his full model that controlled for constraints and
motivations. Specifically, Cochran’s measure of peer pressure to commit deviance
produced the third largest effect when controlling for all variables. Similarly, peer
criminality produced the only significant effect in Zhang and colleagues’ (2012) full
model. The peer domain consistently provided the strongest support for GTCD in all
other tests (Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; Ngo et al. 2011).
Peer criminality is an especially salient variable regarding drug crime. The effect
size for this variable predicting adolescent general crime or person/property crime ranged
from 43.77 to 83.71. However, it ranged from 398.87 to 682.09 when predicting
adolescent drug crime. Family criminality was also important, though it did not produce
the same magnitude of effects. These findings highlight the importance of social learning
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from peers as a cause of drug crime and suggest that this influence outweighs that of
family members (Akers 1973, 1998; Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Sutherland
1939; Sykes and Matza 1957; Thornberry 1987).
The salience of peer criminality in relation to drug crime at both stages of
development is supported in the literature. In Winfree and Bernat’s (1998) tests of social
learning and self-control theories for eighth grade students in two cities, the social
learning variables explained more than twice the amount of variance at each location.
Notably, one of their four social learning indicators was an index of six items measuring
the perceived benefits of belonging to a gang. This variable yielded the largest effect in
several of their regression models. In another study, Johnson and associates (1987)
examined the “complex etiology” of substance use among adolescents and found that the
“proportion of one’s friends that uses drugs is by far the most influential factor in
adolescent drug use” (333) when controlling for social learning and social control
variables. As with the current dissertation, parental criminality also played a role in
influencing adolescent drug use, but this impact was quite small when all variables were
accounted for. This is further supported in Allen and associates’ (2003) meta-analytic
review of the literature, in which they concluded that peer group affiliation provides a
stronger influence on the use of multiple types of substances than parental drug use. In
Akers (1998) extensive review of the literature on social learning variables and crime, he
concluded that “other than one’s own prior deviant behavior, the best single predictor of
the onset, continuance, or desistance of delinquency is differential association with lawviolating or norm-violating peers” (164). This is also shown in Akers and Cochran’s
(1985) review of the relative efficacy of social learning, social control, and strain
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variables in which differential peer associations yielded the largest effect on crime of any
single variable under study.
One possible explanation for the particularly large effect of social learning
variables on drug crime is that perhaps, by nature, substance use is a particularly social
form of crime, relative to others (Akers 1998). Criminal peers often provide first access
to illicit substances and teach the methods of consumption that are less likely to be
learned in a conventional context or through trial and error (e.g., injecting drugs
intravenously) (Akers 1998; Kaplan, Martin, and Robbins 1984). Peers also create a
sense of pressure to engage in substance use. Peer pressure is important because, while
parents that use drugs may show definitions favorable towards crime, they are unlikely to
create situational pressure in the way that peers do. Johnson and colleagues (1987) argue
that “emotion-laden situational pressure is a stronger force than is more rational
contemplation of less immediately pressing values, attachments, and role models in
determining the behavior of adolescents (337).
Finally, several notes regarding the effects of control variables should be
mentioned. Respondent sex played a consistent role, with males reporting increased rates
of crime in 10 of 12 sets of regression models. This is supportive of the well-established
gender gap in offending (Agnew 2005; Akers 1998; Broidy and Agnew 1997; De Coster
and Zito 2010; Friedman and Rosenbaum 1998; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987;
Moffitt 1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Singer and Levine 1988; Steffensmeir and Allen
1996; Tittle et al. 2003).
Respondent age played a relatively minor role in this study as it only significantly
impacted the rate of crime in two sets of regression models. This is somewhat surprising
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given what is known about the age-crime curve (Agnew 2005; Akers 1998; Friedman and
Rosenbaum 1988; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Moffitt 1993; Moffit and Caspi 2001;
Tittle et al. 2003). Perhaps the age ranges at each time point are too narrow to
demonstrate the existence of this phenomenon. The age ranges utilized in this dissertation
capture the onset of the age-crime curve during adolescence (11-13) and the peak during
adulthood (19-26) (Moffitt 1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001). Therefore, another way to
examine this is to consider the rates of various crimes at each time point. The adult
sample should exhibit higher mean rates of general, person/property, and drug crime
during adulthood. This is confirmed with an examination of the descriptive statistics, as
respondents report committing more general crime acts during adulthood than
adolescence. Additionally, respondents reported committing a greater number of drug
crime incidents during adulthood than adolescence. However, the rates of person/property
crime incidents did not vary by much.
Respondent race was significantly associated with crime in 5 of 12 sets of
regression models, with white respondents reporting increased rates of crime acts. Also,
perceived social class was not related to crime in any set of models. These findings
regarding race and social class are congruous with previous studies that find little to no
differences in self-reported crime among races and income levels, despite significant
observed differences in arrest rates, incarceration rates, and other official statistics
(Agnew et al. 2014; Pager 2007; Tittle and Meier 1990; Travis and Western 2014).
Study Implications
A number of implications arise from the analyses in this dissertation. Both
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E explain criminal behavior. The
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results indicate that the causes of crime vary according to developmental stage and crime
type. Agnew’s GTCD is sufficient to predict crime during adolescence, but GTCD-E’s
religion domain warrants inclusion as a predictor of adult crime. As such, peer
criminality and irritability tend to exert the largest effects during adolescence. However,
peer criminality, spouse/partner criminality, irritability, religiousness, and religiosity tend
to be the strongest predictors of crime during adulthood. Similarly, the causes of crime
vary according to crime type. For instance, irritability, a personality trait, exerts a
stronger influence on general crime and person/property crime, while strain and social
learning variables from the family and peer domains play larger roles in predicting drug
crime.
These theoretical insights should inform the formulation of crime intervention and
prevention policies and programs. Crime prevention and intervention should not focus on
a single life domain. This dissertation’s findings highlight the importance of targeting
multiple, or all, life domains at once. The causes of crime are multiple and span life
domains. Consequently, efforts to address the impact of these variables, or risk factors,
should likewise span life domains.
Not only should such efforts target multiple life domains, they should also be
tailored to specific developmental stage and form of crime. Though often convenient and
less expensive, the use of broad, generalized policies and programs is strongly
discouraged in light of the evidence suggesting the causes and correlates of crime vary by
developmental stage and crime type. For instance, a program attempting to reduce drug
crime among adolescents should aim to address all four adolescent life domains in
general (Agnew 2005). However, it should pay special attention to counteracting the
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strong influences of peer and family criminality. Agnew (2005) also argues that
prevention programs should begin early in life so as to intervene before one “becomes
enmeshed in the web of crime” (201).
What does such a program look like in practice? One may draw inspiration from
Rios’ (2011) concept of a community-based youth support complex. This multiinstitutional support complex provides youth with a variety of pro-social programs and
activities that decrease their involvement and association with criminal others, like
afterschool sports, tutoring sessions, and skill-building workshops. It should also involve
a mentorship component through which participants can cultivate strong relationships
with productive community members. Miller (2008) notes the importance of including
female participants as leaders since they are traditionally underrepresented in such
programs. The provision of role models will produce a multitude of benefits and should
facilitate the cultivation of social capital, broadening networks of social support and
weakening criminal networks. Another benefit is that the relationships formed with these
conventional role models will function to counteract the social learning influence of
criminal peers and family members.
In line with this approach is the Big Brothers Big Sisters Community-Based
Mentoring program, which promotes mentorship and engagement in pro-social
recreational activities. An evaluation of this program demonstrated the efficacy of such
an approach, as participants were nearly half as likely to engage in drug use and more
than a quarter less likely to engage in alcohol use than the control group (Tierney,
Grossman, and Resch 2000).
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Efforts aiming to reduce general crime or person/property crime among
adolescents should follow this general format but introduce a strong focus on combating
the influence of irritability as a personality trait. Activities and mentors within this
support complex may effectively reduce crime by teaching participants conventional
conflict resolution tactics, pro-social problem-solving approaches, and anger management
skills. LifeSkills Training (LST) is an example of a crime prevention program that
targets these risk factors. LST aims to improve decision making, promote prosocial
coping with strain, and increase social skills among adolescents in an effort to counteract
the effects of peer pressure and stress. Encouragingly, this approach has been
demonstrated as effective in delaying onset of substance use among participants (Trudeau
et al. 2003).
Similarly, efforts that seek to reduce crime among adults should also employ a
broad support complex. However, they may consider expanding their focus to include the
employment and religion domains, as these domains provided significant, though modest,
positive relationships to crime. For instance, they may provide employment opportunities
as well as the skill-building and training necessary to secure employment. Additionally,
mentors may play a large role for adults in this regard. Seibert and colleagues (2001)
highlight the importance of developing higher-level contacts by demonstrating that they
provide access to particularly useful benefits, like higher levels of career sponsorship.
The authors also posit that mentorships can produce benefits beyond merely being a good
role model. They can also introduce the mentee to influential actors that can function as
additional mentors. Combined, these efforts may reduce the negative influence of
unemployment or poor employment experiences among adults. Similarly, strategies that
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target adults may incorporate religious institutions, as higher levels of religiousness and
religiosity were associated with lower rates of crime.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although the current data enhance scholarly understanding of the life domains
associated with GTCD and GTCD-E and crime, important limitations must be
considered. First, this dissertation incorporates self-reported measures of crime as the
dependent variables. Thornberry and Krohn (2000) note potential threats to reliability and
validity that may result from reliance on self-reports of delinquency and other potentially
sensitive behaviors (see also Krohn et al. 2010). Additionally, the questionnaires were
lengthy and respondent fatigue may be a concern. Future studies should incorporate
measures designed to combat these potential threats to validity and reliability.
Along the same lines, the sample in this study was technically one of
convenience. As such, concerns may arise regarding representativeness and
generalizability. Despite this, it is encouraging that the sample is proportionate to a
random sample of the United States population in terms of a number of demographic
variables, like sex and race (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). It is further encouraging that
current findings generally support theoretical propositions. Future testing efforts are
strongly encouraged to include a large, random sample that is nationally representative.
Doing so should assuage generalizability concerns and paint a more complete picture of
the effects of life domains, constraints, and motivations on crime.
This study utilized a narrow age range to represent adulthood. As alluded to
previously, this age group may be substantively different from older adults with respect
to the propositions of GTCD. Consequently, this age range may not be fully
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representative of adulthood. It may be better characterized as young, or early, adulthood.
For this reason, findings regarding the impact of life domains on crime during adulthood
may be unique to this strict age grouping, differing from those incorporating wider age
ranges to represent adulthood. It is advisable that future research in this area incorporate
an age range that more fully captures adulthood as a developmental stage. Though, to
facilitate a more nuanced understanding, future research may consider creating separate
periods of adulthood (e.g., early, middle, and late) and exploring potential differences.
On a related note, no test of GTCD to date has utilized a sample that captures the
childhood developmental stage. As such, the theory’s ability to explain this important
stage remains unexamined. Therefore, future studies should also incorporate the
childhood developmental stage to more fully assess the age-graded component of GTCD.
This study also incorporates two waves of data. While this is a strength, as it
permits the examination of multiple developmental stages, one must be cautious when
speaking in terms of causality and prediction. Agnew (2005) notes that at least three
waves of data are necessary to estimate contemporaneous and lagged effects
simultaneously. In light of this, future testing efforts should utilize longitudinal designs
that incorporate more than two waves of data collection.
Similarly, this dissertation analyzed secondary data that was not designed for the
express purpose of testing GTCD or GTCD-E. As such, the present analyses suffer from
imperfect measures of theoretical constructs. Specifically, some variables, like poor
school performance or negative teaching practices during adolescence were measured
using a single item, rather than an index. Notably, this was also the case with the
measures of religiousness and religiosity employed at both time points. A stronger
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measure of these concepts that incorporates multiple items into an index is highly
desirable. Along the same lines, other indices incorporated in this dissertation produced
weaker reliability coefficients than desired. The KLAMS data also did not permit the
inclusion of all theoretical variables. Some life domain, constraint, and motivation
variables simply could not be measured using KLAMS items and were, therefore, omitted
(e.g., time spent in unstructured activities with friends during adolescence and co-worker
criminality during adulthood). Future studies are encouraged to collect primary data using
instruments designed to measure elements of GTCD and GTCD-E. This will increase
face validity and ensure that all theoretical variables are represented, protecting against
the threat of omitted variable bias. Agnew states that this is the best way to fully test
GTCD, though he admits that it would be expensive and time consuming.
There are likely other potentially important variables that would refine scholarly
understanding of the religion domain as it is related to crime in the context of GTCD-E.
For instance, Pargament (2008) posits that a variety of other characteristics of religion
may influence its efficacy in producing beneficial outcomes (e.g., whether the motivation
for religion intrinsic or extrinsic, the degree to which the religion is integrated into the
larger social context, and the approach to coping the religion advances). The nature of the
KLAMS data precluded such exploration in the current study, as such items were not
asked of respondents. It is imperative that future research efforts employ methodologies
that permit a more nuanced exploration of how a variety of religious variables operate
alongside other life domains, constraints, and motivations in affecting crime.
Finally, this study was a partial test of GTCD and GTCD-E that examined only a
handful of theoretical propositions. Future studies should strive to achieve a more
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complete test by examining a variety of other theoretical propositions, like the
contemporaneous and lagged effects of life domain variables on each other, non-linear
effects of life domains on crime, effects of prior crime on future crime, and interaction
effects among life domain variables.
Conclusion
To conclude, results from this dissertation address a key gap in the literature
surrounding an understudied, though potentially important criminological theory.
Agnew’s (2005) General Theory of Crime and Delinquency is broad in scope and highly
complex. It is difficult to test all propositions or to even fully test a number of
propositions. Consequently, this theory has only been subjected to a handful of empirical
tests (Cochran 2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014;
Zhang, Day, and Cao 2012). This dissertation provides one of the most complete tests of
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and only the second test of Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E. It
achieves this by utilizing a large number of predictor variables drawn from two waves of
data. This permitted an examination of the contemporaneous and lagged influence of life
domains on three forms of crime (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and drug
crime) at two distinct stages of development (i.e., adolescence and adulthood). Consistent
with prior empirical tests, results provide mixed support for Agnew’s propositions,
highlighting the complexity of the theory.
Specifically, general support is provided for the direct effects of both theories’
variables, indicating they are important to the explanation of crime. Also, in line with
Cochran's (2015) findings, initial observed effects of religious variables on criminal
behavior in a sample of adolescents are reduced to non-significance when all other
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predictors are introduced in most regression models, hinting that the incorporation of
such variables may be incongruous with Agnew's chosen method of theoretical
integration. However, religious variables emerge as significant predictors of general
crime during adulthood, suggesting that the relationship between these variables and
crime is more complex than anticipated. Additionally, strong support is found for the
proposition that the effects of life domains are primarily contemporaneous. Results offer
weaker support, however, for the assertion that life domain effects are largely mediated
by constraints against crime and motivations towards it. The findings also highlight the
utility of integrated theoretical frameworks in criminology as a means to improve the
discipline’s ability to explain criminal and deviant behavior.
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